Frank Dikötter explains how the Western prison became

A Journey of Research in Asia

Crossing between Old and New Nations

The past several decades have witnessed a growing communications gap on the nature of nationalism between Western scholars and those in the new nation-states in Asia. Within academic circles in the West, the critique of nationalism is well established. Among scholars from the more recently independent states of Asia, one finds greater identification with the nation. I will try to explain this gap by exploring the changing relationship between nationalism and globalization in different parts of the world, before outlining an approach that aims to bridge this gap.

For radical intellectuals in the newly independent countries, the nation – even when its performance disappointed – was the unquestioned vehicle for decolonization as well as the horizon for our goals and expectations: the building of an egalitarian socialist society, national development, the reconstruction of national culture and the dissemination of scientific and secular consciousness. By contrast, Western critique of the nation has a long history. Contemporary criticism, again mainly from the West, draws attention to the nation’s many failures: state socialism has led to inefficiency and coercion; national development to ecological imbalance and disaster; national culture to chauvinism and exclusion of outsiders and minorities; secularism has become the lightning rod for the discontent of resurgent religious groups. Far from the solution, nationalism is now seen as part of the problem. Can the nation still be the goal of our endeavors? Is it still fruitful to see the amelioration of the conditions of the poorest through national lenses?

In the new nation-states, the attitude of intellectuals towards nationalism and the nation-state is more complex than in the West. Foreign criticism of the national project is often perceived as grossly one-sided and irresponsible, ignoring both the nation’s intractable problems and its genuine achievements. As both insider and outsider, I have levelled the critique and experienced the pain of not having the problems and achievements of the new nations recognized. Inhabiting both sides of this border has not brought me special insights and may have compounded my dilemmas. But my position has spurred me to probe these dilemmas further.

Globalization and the accompanying shift towards the globalization paradigm have tended to undercut the moral weight of nationalism and national models. The shift to the globalization paradigm has tended to undercut the moral weight of nationalism and national models. The shift to the globalization paradigm does not mean, in my view, a shift towards the positive evaluation of globalization, although that may be the dominant tendency. I understand it to mean that the societies of the world have been globalizing for quite some time and that nations and localities have been just as significantly shaped by global developments in society, economics, culture, and ideology as by their individual histories.

Nations and global competitiveness

Debate now rages on when globalization began. My own view on this question is that it depends upon which indices are considered. In my recent writings I argue that the early twentieth century represented an important stage of ‘cognitive globalization’ when societies the world over re-fashioned themselves as nation-states.

In this view, nations are not ancient continuities. While the shifting influence of historical factors is undeniable, the institutional and cognitive re-casting of societies as homo...
A recent photo in the papers shows a man with a bag on his head, his arms behind his back. The Iraqi is kneeling on the grass among scattered shoes and carpets. His hands are invisible but there’s little doubt they are tied behind his back. The caption informs us American soldiers are looking for terrorists plotting attacks on coalition forces. What ought to be deduced from this photo and what does it suggest, rightly or wrongly, about American involvement in Iraq?

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The photo captivates and shocks, but this alone does not make it good journalism. If not journalist practice itself, surely science must raise the question. When journalism, itself increasingly influential, misrepresents, it is the responsibility of science and of the humanities in particular, to raise criticism and to counter stereotypes, misconceptions, and lies. Part of the relevance of Asian Studies lies in shouldering this responsibility.

With this backdrop, the IIAS’ tenth anniversary provided the occasion for five renowned alumni to reflect on their craft. While it is easy to criticize how Asia has been construed in opposition to the European self, modernity, rationalism, Christianity, and the West, alternative frameworks are harder to come by. The visions contained in the ‘Imagining Asian Studies’ theme are thus invitations to further reflection and debate.

What frameworks, scale of analysis, and units of comparison are most fruitful when studying Southeast Asia? Is it possible to study this region, or for example India as wholes, and if so, how? How can we relate to Asian topics in meaningful ways and what place ought Asian Studies have in the larger whole? What framework and concepts does studying Korean history demand, and what keys do multidisciplinary and long-term perspectives hold for understanding Vietnamese villages? If criticizing popular misconceptions is a necessary task, this issue strides the path with conviction. It tackles cognitive dissonance regarding contemporary North Korea, which is shrouded in political and media mystification; the transnational natures of ‘nationalist’ struggles, and the roots of ‘religious’ violence. As always we appreciate your reactions. Enjoy reading. – MS
Terrorist nationalism

How did the newly independent nations seek to achieve their goals of development, equality, and global justice? Most decolonizing nations, rejecting the model of racial or ethnic nationalism, adopted a model of equal rights for all within their territory. The territorial model of civil nationalism seemed well suited to the realization of the nation’s emancipatory goals, and provided a framework for building a nation out of a diverse society without privileging dominant groups. Nationalism and capitalist globalization, moreover, functioned as strategies of mutual facilitation and containment. Nation-states sought to regulate flows of capital and resources not only to promote their own narrow interests but also to stem the erosion of social institutions and relationships, mainly caused by the free flow of capital. Nation-states have historically been wary of rapid transformations as they erode the jobs, statuses, relationships, loyalties, and authenticities that underpin state sovereignty. Although the territorial model did not generate rapid growth rates, it worked — at least for as long as the state acted as the principal agent of the redistribution of resources — to moderate internal and external cutthroat competition.

Ethnic nationalism

Even in the best of times, it was unclear if the ideology of territorial nationalism was adequate to generate the loyalty and enthusiasm of the nation’s diverse groups, who ascribed to a variety of interests and visions of society. Because of these weaknesses, exclusive racial, religious, and linguistic nationalisms were never far from the surface, supplementing civic nationalism and providing, when necessary, more passionate forms of nationalism. Nationalists of the blood and soil variety tended to overlook or deny their commonalities, resorting to imperious or purely internal conceptions of sovereignty based on the deep history of their people and the land: an authentic national community morally superior to others. The cold war and Cold War Cold War. Despite the potential for nationalism to be exclusive and elitist, conditions for constructive nationalism prevailed during much of the post-war period. It is in this extraordinary period that allow for constructive nationalism exist today. Engrossed as they are in economic globalization, most nation-states prioritize global competitiveness over balanced development. Not so with such weak national ideologies as cosmopolitanism, in which ideas of community, internationality, and tolerance dominate. The ideology of social democratization, which is not only an effective way to transcend the falseness of racial and ethnic nationalism, seeks to redefine the concept of nation in ways that resemble the social Darwinist rhetoric of a century ago. The faltering promise of territorial citizenship in multi-national states with an alienating effect on minorities and peripheral regions alike. The contemporary idea of the rapid expansion of elite wealth has once again led to the targeting of Chinese ethnic minorities. National populaces are confronted by anonymous markets that commoditize, erode the nation-states, and reproduce myths of nationhood. The most immediate response to this threat is, ironically, greater attachment to myths of national authenticity, even as these myths are themselves commodified, consumed, and returned to the void. This kind of catch-22 ethical and moral ambiguity that has swept us into shared time-spaces. Inequalities will continue to exist between nations, but uneven development will cut across national boundaries.

While globalization’s homogenizing dimension causes us to exaggerate our differences as nations, it also allows us to see that we inhabit the same problems and opportunities. In this lies the basis of dialogue.

Regional interdependence

While the existing relationship between globalization and nationalism seems incapable of generating new visions, emerging transnational linkages present new opportunities to think about development in spaces where nation-states have little interest or access. They enable scholars and intellectuals to direct their attention to those who have been left behind or peripheralized by national societies. While transnational linkages are global, many of the dense points of interaction and interdependence are regional, pointing to new ways to think about development. To be sure, the one experience with regionalism we have had — Japanese imperialism’s doomed experiment with the Co-prosperity Sphere — can only serve as a negative model, a model where regionalism became the vehicle for nationalism. We have also known how competing interests and visions make Asian regionalism a project for the long-term future. While an Asian regional formation is unlikely to look like the European Union, Asian scholars should look at Europe anew — without post-colonial anxiety — to learn from the EU and avoid its mistakes.

Allow me to indulge in my fantasy for Asia’s future. Nations, of course, are unlikely to disappear any time soon. Central to the formation of a region, however, is interdependence, an interdependence likely to be expressed in complex, multi-tiered, and multi-modal apparatuses permitting cooperation, coordination, control, and autonomy. Interests are, and will remain, too variegated to make the region anything like a nation, while the distribution of power is, and ought to be, unfavourable to the hegemony of any single country. At any rate, it should be an inclusive, functional formation rather than an exclusive power bloc. But perhaps it ought to have just enough power to deter the US, the hegemon that now dominates the world.

Despite some brave efforts, we scholars have been laggards. The forces of globalization have generated nascent initiatives of the nationalist and liberal traditions. We must also learn from the EU and avoid the mistakes. Today the old Stilwell Road is again in use, trans- Himalayan trade has re-opened, and there is talk of an Asian highway. As scholars of Asia, we can deploy our knowledge of the changing contours of regions and affiliations, of multiple links between centres and peripheries, of complex relations between culture and political economy, so that when the political formations are born, we too can shape them in new and meaningful ways, to restore the spirit of the anti-colonial movement that once brought Asians and others together.

Reference


Professor Prasenjit Duara is affiliated to the departments of History and East Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University of Chicago. His principal research interest is modern Chinese history. He has also worked on nationalism, imperialism, decolonization, and problems of identity, history and historical theory.

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Editors note

Reference


Professor Prasenjit Duara obtained a PhD at Harvard University in 1983 and won the American Historical Association’s Farb Prize and the Association for Asian Studies’ Levenson prize with his first book, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900–1942 (Stanford 1988, 1991). This study treats some of the basic themes in connection to the social and cultural history of modern China, which feature among Duara’s evolving interests since the 1980s. He deals with the changing relationship between the state, elites, and popular culture from the late imperial period until the present and has, in recent years, scrutinized many of the problems regarding these issues through the lens of gender and sexuality.

A second area of Duara’s interest deals with nationalism, imperialism, and transnationalism. He has written two books with a comparative understanding of nationalism: Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Stanford 1988, 1991). This study treats some of the basic themes in connection to the social and cultural history of modern China, which feature among Duara’s evolving interests since the 1980s. He deals with the changing relationship between the state, elites, and popular culture from the late imperial period until the present and has, in recent years, scrutinized many of the problems regarding these issues through the lens of gender and sexuality.

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Out of a growing concern about the uniform threat posed by North Korea, US Government officials have targeted the country with increasing sanctions. The UN Security Council, following North Korea’s test-firing of a missile with possible nuclear capability, imposed economic sanctions in August 2006. This followed a series of provocations by North Korea, including the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel and a shelling of a South Korean island. The US has responded with increased military exercises near the Korean Peninsula and reinforced its missile defense systems.

A cold shower during Summit Negotiations

By Keon De Ceuarter

North Korea is often no more than a blip on the radar screens of international news agencies. However, over the last two years it has attracted more media coverage, as a perfectly manageable crisis has led to North Korea being elevated to the status of a major international concern. In the wake of the nuclear crisis that first erupted, the US government has found itself having to respond to a wave of international criticism and accusations of isolationism.

North Korea has ordered a nuclear test, and the US has responded with increased military exercises and sanctions. The situation is tense, with both sides remaining steadfast in their positions. The US is pressing for a return to the Six-Party Talks, while North Korea is refusing to engage in any negotiations. The nuclear crisis has put the relationship between the US and North Korea on the brink of a new Cold War, with the possibility of a military confrontation.

However, there is still hope for a diplomatic solution. The Six-Party Talks, which were set up after the 2005 summit in Beijing, have shown some signs of life, with both sides agreeing to restart talks. The US has also offered to lift some sanctions if North Korea agrees to denuclearize. The challenge is to find a way to break the impasse and move towards a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

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Whither North Korea?
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Imagining Asian Studies

By Frits Staal

Andy’s prediction is relevant to the future of Asian Studies because power and technology depend on basic scientific knowledge, not only of mathematics but of languages, civilizations, and values. Asians have long been described as living in a cultural vacuum, forgetting that studying such topics is part of Euro-American culture, which they supposed to be superior to Asian traditions in these respects. But history shows that most of these disciplines originated and flourished in Asia long before they reached Europe, not to mention the Americas. Is the ascent of Asia perhaps a simple return from what was a temporary detour?

At Berkeley, I have seen it coming: a steady increase in the number of Asian students. Almost all of them return home if only because Asian regulations make it impossible or unbearable for them to stay. In Europe, students in the basic disciplines have also become rare and there are few Asians to take their place. The Dutch Academy of Sciences has reported that mathematics is declining in the Netherlands even faster than elsewhere. While Asians are progressing, Euro-Americans are slowing down, which is tantamount to sliding back. It is inevitable that technologies, economies, and all that depends on them will follow.

Reversals and asymmetries

It has not always been like this. During the Renaissance, Europeans were eager to learn ‘Arabic’ in order to update their meagre understanding of mathematics and astronomy. The trend has since reversed: Asians began to absorb Euro-American knowledge and Euro-Americans ignore Asia in spite of Asian Studies. Asian-Americans are equally uninformed about Asia. My postal clerk, who is Indian, believed that Tokyo was in China. And ignorance is compounded by inconsistencies: Why is ‘Oriental’ prohibited when ‘Western’ is not? It is the reason I use the ugly and erroneous neologism ‘Euro-American’ instead of ‘Western’.

Bernard Lewis disorients his readers when he writes: ‘until a comparatively recent date, there were no Occidentalists in the Orient.’ Lewis fails to mention that there were scholars writing in Arabic, such as al-Biruni, who were Orientalists avant la lettre. Lewis restricts his Orient to the Middle East, as did Said. But the greatest Orientalists of the time were Chinese, Japanese, Javanese, Khmer, Korean, Tibetan, and other Buddhist monks, who translated Sanskrit sources from the Indian subcontinent, which was situated to their west. In quality and quantity, these contributions are on a par with the translations from Greek and Latin, sometimes via Arabic, into the modern languages of Europe. The texts were similar insofar as they were not restricted to Buddhist matters but included astronomy, grammar, logic, medicine, and other scientific disciplines.

Clashes with modernities

Bernard Lewis’ What Went Wrong: The Clash between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East is strikingly relevant here. Modernity is a trendy concept, but the term modern is used in the customary manner: it refers to progress when the event has just occurred and is, therefore, a relative term. Prior to Islam, there was a clash between Christianity and modernity that thwarted scientific progress and is not quite over.

Progress in astronomy, for example, stopped around 150 AD when the most advanced worldview in existence was that of Ptolemy. The Chinese continued to work, however, and a millennium later, were vastly ahead of Europeans.

Some setbacks – such as the Swedish resistance to the use of Indian numerals – are of short duration. Others are more serious threat. In the nineties, the Hindutva government of India ordered ‘Vedic mathematics’ to be taught in all schools. The term modern is used in the customary manner: it refers to progress when the event has just occurred and is, therefore, a relative term. Prior to Islam, there was a clash between Christianity and modernity that thwarted scientific progress and is not quite over.

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Not so Asian values

‘Vedic mathematics’ is one of the mythologies that are sometimes referred to as ‘Asian values’ by politicians who have other motives up their sleeves. Malaysia’s former prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, did much for his country in his younger years. He wrote together with Shintaro Ishihara, now governor of Tokyo, that Asians need not bow to Americans and that the future belongs to Asia – a thesis largely in tune with what I am presently writing. A few years ago, Mahathir declared homosexuality a decadent Western vice that contradicts ‘Asian values.’ It has enabled him to put his rival Anwar Ibrahim in jail on unsubstantiated charges, following anti-sodomy laws that were abolished long ago in Britain and only very recently in all the states of the USA. All Asian countries that have made homosexuality illegal either belonged to the British Commonwealth or instituted Islamic laws. In all these regions, homosexuality prospered in the past. Mahathir ignores these facts and does not seem to know that Chinese literati have referred to homosexuality as ‘the cut sleeve’ since the first
something more practical as well. Perhaps it is they who should instigate it. I believe that Asian and non-Asian scientists should cooperate closely to create reliable introductions, curricula, and websites that explain the main facts about the universe, life, human language, and the world’s civilizations, societies, and values. They should be translated into numerous languages and made freely available to every citizen of the planet.

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- Professor Fritz Staal is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and of South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley. He is currently teaching a course on the History of Buddhism at Leiden University and is an IAS affiliated fellow. His interests include Sanskrit, logic, linguistics, ritual, and the history of science. See http://philosophy.berkeley.edu/staal/fdstal@socrates.berkeley.edu

The higher terrace of Borsukuler on central Java are circular. The lower galleries depict the life of the Buddha. Other episodes are similarly found all over the Buddhist world. A typical Mahayana story depicts the son of a merchant in search of enlightenment, identified in Chinese sources. Many of these legends remain popular in plays and theatrical performances in Myanmar and Thailand. They teach respect for human rights and non-violence towards all living beings, as exemplified by Emperor Ashoka and put in context by Romila Thapar. Amartya Sen draws attention to another Asian value that is universal: Reason.
The Poverty of Regionalism

Limits in the Study of Southeast Asia

The idea of Southeast Asia as an academic field has a European pedigree stretching back to the early twentieth century. The term arose partly for convenience — it was useful to have a concise name for the region lying between India and China — and partly from a sense that there was some form of identity in this part of the world which transcended the cultural diversity of the region and the numerous international borders cutting across it. Since the term was coined, the borders of ‘Southeast Asia’ as a region have been remarkably flexible.

We achieve similar insights by slicing the geographical pie in different ways. In this respect, the institutionalization of Southeast Asia in the form of ASEAN has probably had the paradoxical effect of galvanizing scholars, in their usual, per- versely counter-intuitive way, to search for alternative geo- graphical frameworks. In recent years, important new insights have arisen from defining the Austronesian world, which stretches from Madagascar through maritime South- east Asia to Polynesia, as a region of study. Something sim- ilar has been done by looking at the world of the Tai, which straddles the borders of Southeast Asia, China, and India. New historical research, and new preservation of the four south- ern provinces — Guangzhou, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan — are individually comparable in population and economic strength to their Southeast Asian neighbours. From an aca- demic-political point of view, this campaign is risky. In the past, the much larger and more self-assured field of China Studies has been fully prepared to see Southeast Asia as part of China’s world — as ‘peripheral areas’ in the memorable words of Reinhauer, He and Craig — and there is thus a danger that Southeast Asia’s academic identity will be undermined rather than expanded. Nonetheless, the propo- nents of this approach should be congratulated for their daring.

All the same, such experimentation with new borders sug- gests that the old ones have exhausted some of their analyt- ical power. If this is the case, however, the way forward may not be to keep cutting the geographical cake in different ways but rather to range beyond the region in a new and aggres- sive comparativism. The strong awareness of diversity which is the Siamese twin of any conception of Southeast Asian identity has had the unfortunate effect of closing our eyes to comparisons further field. With such a rich variety of his- torical experience, social form, and cultural expression in Southeast Asia, it seems to many of us that there is no greater advantage to be had than a border afled, at least no further afled than South and East Asia.

Yet for historians in particular, there is much to be learnt from looking at Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and North America. And, more important, there are many ways in which the experience of Southeast Asia can illuminate the rest of the world. Anderson’s Imagined Com- munities argument on the origins of nationalism is one of the rather few examples of an insight developed from an under- standing of Southeast Asian experience, but with global appli- cation. Similarly, important insights into the nature of geno- cide as a global phenomenon arise from examining the terrible history of mass killing in Cambodia and Indonesia. Good comparative work is difficult. The cases to be com- pared have to be selected carefully and the researcher needs either to develop a new field of competence in one region, or to find a congenial collaborator with such competence. For those who follow the new path, however, the intellectual rewards will be enormous.

Reference


Imagining Asian Studies

By Robert Cribb

The Portrait of the

Chi Minh looks down on a Chinese family

between approaches to Southeast Asia which focus on the states of the region as the most important (and, implicitly, as morally justified) historical agents, and approaches which seek to focus attention away from states and towards people. The avowed aim of these people-centred approaches has been to give voice to the voiceless, to women, to workers, to the poor, to sexual minorities, to isolated communities, and so on. Recognizing the existence of ‘Southeast Asia’ strength- ens our awareness of the contingency of the current state boundaries in the region. In something like the same way — though to a lesser extent — in which the European Union cre- ated a political framework that allowed the resurgence of regionalism in Belgium, Spain, and Britain, the concept of Southeast Asia strengthens the position of those who argue that states provide only a framework — not the framework — for studying social phenomena.

A third reason why Southeast Asia exists as an academic field is heuristic. One of the most fruitful techniques that scholars use to generate new insights is redefining their areas of study to include new elements and exclude old ones. The more daring historians delight in flouting conventional peri- odization by cutting the ribbon of time in new and unex- pected places, aware that different issues arise within differ- ent time scales. A history of Indonesia from 1950 to 1960 will not just differ in scale from a history covering, say, 1815 to 1998, it will deal with very different issues.

Chinese in Batavia. Is southern China part of Southeast Asia? Or is Southeast Asia part of southern China?

The case for treating Southeast Asia as a useful category is all the more surprising when one considers the relative intellectual, emo- tional, and institutional failure of other regional concepts such as Manilino (Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia), the ‘Malay World’, Mainland Southeast Asia, and so on.

Nonetheless, we should not blind ourselves to important instrumentalist reasons for the strength of Southeast Asia as a concept. The first of these relates to the politics of academic importance. Southeast Asia as an academic field is a stage on which specialists on Brunei, Laos, Arakan, Java, and even Indonesia can stand shoulder to shoulder, as it were (and sometimes head-to-head), with specialists on China, India, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and so on. Wherever our own individual fields of research, we stand as Southeast Asianists for half a billion people, for some of the world’s most dynamic economies and for a truly impressive body of scholarship.

The second reason for the strength of Southeast Asia as an academic field is political in a different way. For much of the post-Second World War period there has been a tension...
Writing Indian History from an Asian Perspective

Recent research has established the desirability, and indeed the necessity, of writing regional or national history in a somewhat wider perspective. Using this approach, the implications of the various interconnections across different geographical entities are more clearly recognized and assigned proper weights. This is likely to result in a more balanced and nuanced account of whatever one’s immediate area of interest is.

By Om Prakash

Let me illustrate with examples from different periods of Indian history. The Mughal Empire was one of the largest in terms of its time, comparable only to Ming China. The wealth of Hind was proverbial in the relatively less fertile and sparsely settled lands of the medieval Islamic world to the west. The standard of achievement attained by the Mughal Indian economy in the early modern period can perhaps best be assessed by its export trade, which was due to the midway location of the subcontinent between West Asia on the one hand and the Indian Ocean littoral and East Asia on the other. But perhaps even more important was the subcontinent’s capacity to put on the market a wide range of traditional goods at highly competitive prices. The most important of these were textiles of various kinds. While these included high value varieties such as the legendary Dhuba muslins and the Gujarati silk embroideries, the main export for the Asian market was the coarse cotton varieties manufactured primarily on the Coromandel coast and in Gujarat. There was a large-scale demand for these varieties in the eastern markets of Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, and Burma as well as in the markets of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa. While it is impossible to determine precisely what proportion of total domestic demand for mass consumption textiles in these societies was met by Indian imports, the available evidence does suggest it was not altogether insignificant. India’s capacity to manufacture these textiles in large quantities and to put them on the market on a high quality competitive terms, in a certain sense made it the ‘industrial’ hub of the larger region, consisting, in addition, of West Asia and Southeast Asia. If one seeks to assess the overall level of economic achievement attained by the economy of early modern India, it is much more meaningful to compare it with the export trade on the wider canvas of Asia or the Indian Ocean region as a whole, rather than simply at the level of the regional or national economy of India.

The rise of an early modern world economy, facilitated by the great discoveries of the closing decade of the fifteenth century also allowed India to trade more effectively and profitably into intercontinental trade between Europe and Asia. From the last quarter of the seventeenth century onwards, Indian textiles, as with several other products, were merely transhipped on the wider canvas of Asia to the Andaman island in the Indian Ocean region as a whole; rather than simply at the level of the regional or national economy of India.

Colonial states and the agrarian sector

An examination of the workings of the colonial state in India during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries invites interesting and worldwide comparisons with colonial states in other parts of Asia. One such state was the Dutch colonial state in Indonesia. One could perhaps argue that as opposed to the night-watchman character of the British Indian state concerned prima facie with low enforcement and the collection of revenue, the Dutch state in Indonesia adopted somewhat more interventionist policies. Here, I shall attempt to make a brief consideration of the agrarian sector in the two economies, for illustrative purposes.

By far the most important direct effect of colonialism was to increase the productivity of the agricultural sector. In the early modern period the mummis, tobacco and raw silk were the main export crops for which a plantation system emerged in India was tea grown mostly in Assam. Tea, however, was an entirely new product designed almost exclusively for the export market and did not in the least involve traditional peasant agriculture. A much more interesting case was that of raw cotton grown overwhelmingly in western India, primarily for domestic consumption. The interruption of American supplies of cotton to Lancashire and Manchester following the outbreak of the Civil War in 1860, created an enormous export market for the Indian cotton. The manner in which the Indian peasant responded to this sudden increase in the international demand for cotton is a great tribute to the market responsiveness and general resilience of the traditional peasant agriculture in the subcontinent. The significance of developments such as the ones described above is perhaps best appreciated in a comparative Asian context rather than in a purely national or regional one. Indeed, the colonial experience for Indian literary writing, an important point that emerges from even a cursory look at the work done on Indian history over the past several decades is the intellectual isolation that characterizes a very large part of this work. This isolation results essentially from the fact that while working on a particular theme in respect of a particular region over a defined period, the researcher almost always confines his attention exclusively to the ‘relevant’ literature, in respect of the theme, the region and the period. The overall limitation of this kind of research, useful as it is in its own right, is that it does not draw attention to the big picture and the broader context. In the process, it misses out on a lot of very interesting and instructive outcomes that might have emerged had it been carried out on a somewhat wider plane.

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The twentieth century has been a time of massive, far-reaching change on a global scale: a century of transitions from dynastic realms to nation-states, from agricultural to secondary industries, from elite to mass education, media, and politics. It has also been a time of rapid technological change, but also a century of crises and extremes, of the disruption of traditions, of widespread social dislocation and increasingly large gaps of understanding between generations. Around the globe, whole populations have been cut off from their pasts by seismic shifts in the crusts of their civilizations. At such critical times, people, and in particular the educated among them, reflect on history in order to gain self-understanding and retrieve some sense of stability and confidence in the present.

Conducting the nation

To produce a history of a nation, it is required that one pos-tulates a heritage, a coherent line of continuity. This readi-ness to find an unbroken historical dynamic for the nation is something of a paradox, for the present system of nation-states, and of international relations based on state sover-eignty, is a late and artificial notion of human history. But because people take the order of nation-states for granted, they seldom recognize that a profound name-change entailed a wholesale re-ordering of social, economic, and politi-cal relations has occurred. Citizens of nation-states now play and are played different roles in the affairs of subjects of former realms. But to give the score of contemporary times legiti-macy and security amidst rapid change, there is a need to trace it backwards, to find a lineage in which the present is foreshadowed.

This discovery, or invention, of a national historical dynam-ic is particularly important for Korea. By the same token, the natural centre of historical research on modern Korea is the Korean peninsula, and the topics and foci selected by histo-rians of modern Korea abroad have largely reflected those pursued inside Korea, where the dominant themes have been the rise of nationalism during the Japanese colonial period from 1905 to 1945 and the ideologically charged conflict over national legitimacy resulting from the national division of 1948. Over the past fifteen years, however, a growing recog-nition has emerged among historians in Korea, but perhaps more so outside Korea, that a preoccupation with these themes has kept attention away from precisely those momen-tous changes in so many realms of life that are the substance of Korea’s modern history.

But in going beyond the nationalist paradigm of modern Korean history, if we may so characterize the historiograph-ical task of the last decade and a half, those of us who work outside Korea in particular, we have to confront our own start-ing points and to consider seriously whom we are writing for. These points arise in relation to external factors and the gen-erational points and to consider seriously whom we are writing for.

Korea has changed over the last two decades. Although inter-esting in Korean history as such has not grown ahead as it has in Korea, there has been a shift in the focus of Korean Humanities disciplines. One reason for this was the realization among funding agencies such as the Korea Foun-dation and Korea Research Foundation that, in addition to language studies, it was important to ensure that knowledge of Korean history, culture, and society was provided to stu-dents in a systematic way. This has led to the appointment of Korean Humanities scholars in universities around the world, from Scandinavia to New Zealand.

Beyond the US

External support for Korean Studies is not without its prob-lems, insofar as it derives from agendas not necessarily in tune with why academics engage in the serious study of Korea. Though limited funding and paucity of other research support make historians of modern Korea vulnerable to the lure of outside agendas, tens of journals and monographs of the last decade and more indicate a consistent adherence to central academic motives and objectives. The success with which the distinction between modern and academic logic has been observed is a very encouraging element in modern Korean Historical Studies.

When it comes to examining our starting points and the question of whom we are interpreting Korean history for, there is, as one would expect, less clarity and greater diver-sity. On one critical point consensus is gathering, namely the determination to ‘thicken’ accounts of Korean modern his-tory to do justice to the multidimensional nature of the Kore-an people’s experiences and the depth and breadth of the social and cultural changes that have occurred. A self-con-cious move in this direction is reflected in the collection of chapters by scholars in different disciplines in the 1999 volume, Colonial Modernity in Korea, edited by G-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson.

In this and a number of other recent writings, a greater concern is expressed to write Korean history that is not so strongly focused on debates over the foreign and domestic policies of the writers’ own countries as has been the case hitherto. The move towards writing histories that recognize Korea as an active participant in the making of the modern world, without denuding the unique and distinctive features of its position in the world, is a welcome advance.

Yet this move remains entangled in superpower operations at the academic/cultural level. Until the mid-1990s and up to this day, many works on modern Korean history, especially those authored in the USA, but also those in the two Koreas, have often reflected with the Cold War and the rights and wrongs of US foreign policy, and to non-US scholars, seem to be addressed primarily to a US domestic audience.1 For scholars working outside North America and the Korean peninsula, however, there is something liberating about not having to approach Korean history under the shadow of a superpower, of not feeling obliged to relate modern Korea to one’s domestic or foreign politics, of not having to choose sides or be tempted into a patronizing defense of the hon-or, integrity or cultural value of the Korean people. It is thus not surprising that many of the pioneering works over the last two decades in literary history, microhistory, and non-American diasporas, together with reinterpretations of the postcolonial and the twentieth-century transformations in the historical agency of culture, thought and religion, have emerged in Germany, France, the Netherlands, the UK, Aus-tralia, and Scandinavia.2

Beyond imperialism

Interest both in the turn away from monothematic, nation-alist historical paradigms and in the benefits of considering Korea the story with which we started this essay is beginning to be gaining ground, and may contribute to better communi-cation between scholars in different countries in the future. In his very recent book, Korea Between Empires, Andre Schmid emphasises that the basic content of modern Kore-an nationalist discourse was formulated by intellectuals and scholars before the annexation by Japan, in the 1890s, when they were part of a world of ideas wider than narrowly defined indigenous Korean thought. He aims to correct an oversight of Benedict Anderson’s by giving the content of their national-ist thought, alongside political developments, a historical agency, showing that there was not just one idea of the Kore-an but various views and visions of the nation. In her recent oral history, Under the Black Umbrella: Voices from Colonial Korea (Boulder, Colorado: University of Colorado Press, 2001), Janice Kim has sought to move from an either/or approach, judging good and bad in relation to colonial rule, to a recognition of the complexi-ty of the period.

In both cases we see earnest and successful attempts to reveal the many concurrent ‘histories’ running through the modern period. Schmid’s book, a true achievement, warmly embraces the cockles of one’s heart, and yet he might have engaged more with works outside North America, such as those to the contributors to the special issue of Korea Studies (2001: 2). In some of their earlier writings, their concerns, insights, and at times, even judgements had been given central impor-tance.

Current developments in the world accentuate the impor-tance of giving views from the ‘periphery’ more attention. While it is inconceivable to me that Korea not remain of supreme importance in the interpretation of its modern his-tory, it is time to decentre historical investigation abroad. As it is, university departments are potent channels of cultural chauvinism however reluctant some may be to acknowledge the fact. Around the many benefits of studying modern Korea is its constant reminder of the historical consequences of imperialism in all its forms and the critical need to constantly re-examine our positions.

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NOTES

1. I restrict myself in all cases to historical studies (including literary, religious, and political history) and regret that space does not permit consideration of historical studies on North Korea. An example of self-conscious writing for a US readership with frequent allusion to US domestic and foreign policies, is Cumings, Bruce, Korea’s place in the sun: A modern history, New York: W.W. Norton (1997).

2. A convenient collection of works in this vein can be found in the Hawai’i journal Modern Korean History (vol. 2, 1999), articles by Boudewijn Walraven, Kather- neth Wells, Koen De Ceuster, Alain Delissen, and Kim Kichung.

3. Space does not permit titles, but books, articles, and dissertations by the fol-lowing authors, among others and in addition to those named above, reflect in modern historical studies outside the USA, from the mid-1890s: Paik Sungjong, Carl Young, Janice Kim, Gregory Evon, Kim Hyungja, Paik Byung-juan, James Grayson, Keith Howard, Ruediger Frank, Geir Helgensen, John Jorgensen, Song Changsoo, Andre Larkus, and Ruth Barra-clough. Resistance narratives have also emerged in the 1990s in works by modern historians in the USA, particularly those by Vigan Chandra, Michael Robinson, and DonaldClark.

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Where From, Who For?

Modern Korean Historical Studies

Ken Wells
Comprehensive Vietnamese Village Studies
From Ten Years of Research in a Small Village

By Yumio SAKUI

The concept of comprehensive Southeast Asian village studies, in terms of understanding village society and culture as results of the interactions between the cultural, historical, and natural environments, was pioneered in Japan by Kyio University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies. In the early 1980s, Prof. Fukui Hayao of the Center mobilized experts from various fields to investigate the many factors behind village structure in a Thai hamlet, Don Daeng. Based on the enormous amount of data acquired, Fukui concluded that the most significant impetus behind village formation in Northeast Thailand was the migration of peasants in search of better rice fields, termed the hau naa migitation.

In Nguyen Xa village, Vietnam, Prof. Terry Rambo led a team engaged in similar research, which took a human ecologists perspective, aiming to understand the interactions between human social systems and their ecosystems. Though these works of sociology and ecological science resulted in greater understanding of Thai and Vietnamese village formation, they would have further benefited from longer research periods and greater historical perspective in understanding the complex relations between contemporary village structure and the historically rooted cultural values of village inhabitants.

The Bach Coc project builds on the fruits of this earlier research. Since 1993, a Japanese village research group and the National University of Vietnam have cooperated on the comprehensive research of Bach Coc, which consists of five hamlets of the Coc Thanh Agricultural Cooperative (HTX) in Nam Dinh Province, Vietnam. Until 2002, 176 specialists from 17 Japanese universities: historians, sociologists, archaeologists, anthropologists, economists, geographers, agronomists, ecologists, geologists, and experts in architecture, irrigation, and gender studies, participated in the Bach Coc project under the historians’ leadership.

The Bach Coc project

The Bach Coc project began on a largely experimental, trial and error basis without a clear and established theory or methodology. The project has yet to achieve a shared, comprehensive understanding of Bach Coc among team members, the explication of new theory and methodology for comprehensive village studies, and the publication of its final research results. Tentative results have been published in 11 volumes of the discussion paper series Thong Tin Bach Coc (Bach Coc Information) between 1995 and 2000. Research for the Bach Coc project took place in three stages. During the general survey stage beginning in 1993, teams surveyed the entire Red River Delta, and in subsequent years, other areas including the Mekong Delta for comparative purposes. This stage aimed to understand the geographic and historical position of Bach Coc within the Red River Delta. During the second phase of research between 1994 and 1998, teams conducted a detailed land survey, measuring the entire inhabited area of the Coc Thanh Agricultural Cooperative. The resulting maps familiarized researchers with villagers’ use of space. During the third phase, from 1996 until the present, teams undertook specific research: excavation of old settle- ments, collection and analysis of stone inscriptions, collection of oral histories from villagers, agronomic research on rice and vegetable cropping, sociological research on Coc Thanh Agricultural Cooperative activity, and so on. For sure, some of the preliminary conclusions reached during this third stage, resulted from the multi-disciplinary nature of this research.

Bach Coc is situated in a transitional belt between natural levees and sand ridges, shaping three types of land usage: rice farming, vegetable cropping, and human settlement. The first fishing people settled in Bach Coc in the third century, while a small inter-regional river port developed between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries. After the port’s decline, agricultural reclamation was begun by immigrants from the northern Red River Delta. Subsequently, Xa (commune) Bach Coc was established as an administrative unit in the early fifteenth century, fixing the proto-village residential area. As a result of population increase, small intra-village groups were formed in the seventeenth century, while village systems composed of meetings, officials, rites, and lineage groups were in place by the early nineteenth century.

The cong dren (communal land) system developed in the eighteenth century to level villagers’ land holdings and to equalize their burden of taxation remains central in village culture and society. Bach Coc’s post-1955 social revolution in terms of land reform, the system of labour exchange, and the early policies of the Coc Thanh Agricultural Cooperative, can be seen as an extension of the cong dren idea to all villagers. The project terms the cong dren tradition domestic socialism and views the agricultural cooperative as an intermediate system between domestic socialism and state collectivism. The cooperative’s role is not limited to food production; it provides funds for basic infrastructure such as village roads, small bridges, and health centres. Based on traditional local society, the Coc Thanh Agricultural Cooperative cannot solely be regarded as an economic organization.

Depending on topography, two kinds of agriculture are pursued: the growing of rice in the back swamps is controlled mainly by the cooperative, which provides seeds, chemical fertilizers, and water at fixed cost. In gardens and private ponds, shadow agriculture, which entails the rearing of pigs and the growing of crops such as vegetables and fruits, is well managed by the private sector. Household economies can be divided into two sectors: kinh to de an (economy for eating) and kinh to lay tien (economy for money). Based on the activities of the cooperative, the economy for eating (subsistence economy) relies on assistance from the cash semi- economy. The latter is composed of shadow agriculture and non-agricultural sectors including the private activities of migrant workers who support village food production and the modernization of villagers’ lifestyles, through their fam- ily and lineage networks.

Despite their independent research paths, most teams have arrived at a similar understanding of village socio-economic life and the role of the Coc Thanh Agricultural Cooperative. They emphasize two basic points, which result from the inter- action between the natural environment and human activi- ty and are likely to endure through periods of transition. First, the Cooperative, as the successor to traditional village organiza- tions, supports the kinh to de an sector that is based on the concept of domestic socialism. Second, private activity in the kinh to lay tien is possible on the base of the cooperative-supported kinh to de an. The two sectors can thus be said to form an interdependent dual economy. It deserves mention that the comprehensive study of Bach Coc is not completed and that our preliminary conclusions will yet be refined through successive research and discussion. Nonetheless, it is my belief that the above conclusion for one, could not have been reached without synthesizing research results from numer- ous disciplines.

Notes

3. The result was published as Bach Coc Map in 1997, Thong Tin Bach Coc, vol. 2, pp. 149-157.
5. The project terms the cong dren tradition domestic socialism and views the agricultural cooperative as an intermediate system between domestic socialism and state collectivism.

List of abbreviations
- LP: Paper presented in IAS workshop, Vietnamese peasants’ Activity, 2002
- RRD: Red River Delta
United Nations (2002) data predict that the percentage of Indonesian over the age of 60 will rise from 7 to 8 percent of the population today to 13 percent in 2025. Comparable shifts in Europe took fifty years in the case of Britain and over a century in France. Not only is the speed of change remarkable, the scale of the Indonesian situation is mind-boggling. Due to a still rapidly growing national population, in absolute terms elderly numbers will increase by 500 to 500 per cent, while the approximately 16 million people over 60 already constitute the seventh largest elderly population in the world today.

Meanwhile, as the essays by Ruby Marianti and Peter van Ewijk show (on pages 14 and 15), government policy regarding health and welfare provision remains inadequate. Pensions, for example, reach scarcely more than 10 percent of the workforce. Recent plans by the Indonesian government to introduce a "universal" social insurance system in fact only aim at the minority of formal-sector workers; the most vulnerable will continue to be excluded. In short, the majority of older people will continue to depend on their family networks, community organizations, and ultimately themselves.

Community organizations

The contributions of family networks should not, of course, be underestimated. They remain fundamental in all societies but are subject to other constraints, such as adult children's need to educate their offspring, or restrictions imposed by class, status, distance, and other limitations. Where impoverishment is enforced by these constraints, community structures may step in. Amongst the majority of Indonesian, these structures are by tradition centred on the mosque, which now appears to be playing an increasingly active role. While Hindu and Christian organizations may be important, the sheer size of the Muslim population leaves the scope for religious influence at national and community levels preponderantly with Islam. This influence can be more subtle. Middle Western policy makers have generally recognized. It is worth remarking, in this respect, that the influence of more radical Islamic organizations in the Muslim world often stems largely from their activities in providing reliable social welfare to the end of fostering a shared sense of moral and political community (Kepel 2003). Issues of poverty and health raised by shifts in population age structure are thus not just about the elderly.

The unpreparedness and even perceived indifference of both the state and family networks towards the high and rising levels of poverty, insecurity, and frailty is becoming part of a wider experience in which people discover which institutions in society are really going to help and which are not. This is an issue of trust that potentially cuts very deep. It concerns not only the elderly, but all those who know them and who witness the inadequacy of traditional and state responses to vulnerability and the consequences thereof.

Family support

Returning for the moment to the standard figures for age-structural shifts, the broad demographics of population ageing in Indonesia appear to be reasonably typical. Life expectancy has risen rapidly to nearly 70 years for women and 65 for men, with further improvements expected. Moreover, as demographers emphasize, the main factor in population ageing is a fall in fertility. In the 1970s and 1980s women had four to five babies on average, but since then fertility levels have declined to an average of just over two (2.27) children per family. In the state of state perspective, children in this age of children increasingly face the need to assist their longer-living parents and, even, their grandparents. Commentators are generally inclined to view the implications of such figures as less alarming than they would be in Europe, on the assumption that in Asia older people rely not just on children but on joint families and extended kin with responsibility to provide a substantial web of support. Once again, however, we need to look beyond the standard repertoire of measures and the assumptions that accompany them.

Firstly, anthropologists have called to attention the fact that the family system of the Javanese majority is predominately nuclear and bilateral – a system in which children who are impoverished have few if any fixed responsibilities to older people. Even in other major cultural groups in which kin solidarity endures to a lesser or greater extent, such as the matrilineal Minangkabau of Sumatra, the women and their kin remain mainly independent. They provide aggregate inflows of money and other support to their home communities, some of which is channelled back to assist the poor. Nonetheless, not all older members are so lucky as to have access to these benefits. The permanent departure of children and grandchildren is common, a fact which not only endows children with a critical source of family continuity and status, but completely undermines their ‘identities (in both, private and public). Secondly, we should not neglect to consider the cosy assumption that whatever resources are outside the family, children can be counted on. Recent research drawing together studies on nuclear and joint family arrange- ments in Indonesia, South Asia, and Europe involved in the international projects on family constellations (see Kepel 2003), shows that while elderly parents have in the course of their lives borne the main responsibility for rais- ing children, many of these children have no strictly defined roles that enable them to reciprocate. Additional- ly, older people in Indonesia, as in Europe, commonly express a preference to live independently and also frequently continue in employment, even when the work may be physically demanding. As Marianti notes, many women do not have the means to support their elderly parents, but will instead be expected to provide themselves with a network of support.

On the positive side, some recent changes suggest that two demographic and other constraints behind childlessness are on the wane. First, previous levels of fertility, between four and five births per woman, were in fact relatively high by historical and also by Asian and European standards. Equally, factors that tended to drive down fertili- ty in the 1940s and 1950s, when many of today's elderly were in their prime childbearing years, are now much less potent. Medical intervention appears to have significantly reduced infertility due to pathological causes. The fall in divorce rates by one-third has reduced time out of wedlock and is attributed vari- ably to the impact of education and Islamic institutions. Thus, whilst women on average are now having fewer children, the factors that prevent- ed some 2.6 per cent from having any children at all are significantly lessened. This shift is encouraging in two respects. One is that it shows that spe- cific health and contraceptive interventions are likely to have positive long-term impacts on the elderly of the future. Second, currently high levels of childlessness amongst today's oldest generation indicate that at least at a local level, there is likely to be considerable awareness of some specific causes and consequences of elderly vulnerability. In both of these respects the projected increase of elderly Indonesians over the next two decades may not con- stitute as radical a change as the per- cations cited earlier suggest.

Migration and the family

On the negative side, the factors that limit the capacity of children to assist elderly kin and encourage de facto child- lessness may be increasing. As van Ewijk notes, migration will be responsible for many more elderly people living in less healthy urban envi- ronments. The young continue to dominate migration patterns, but the incentive for the elderly to move increases, as many of the agricultural roles they fulfilled in the past are not disappearing. Most will remain in agricultural commercialization. The increas- ing distances between family members tend to make enduring networks more difficult to maintain. Meanwhile, how- ever, due to the continuing absence of norms which fix the responsibility for elderly care on particular children, the distant homes, better education, and improved economic status that many children acquire will not accrue as ben- efits to their parents, but will instead lead to further alienation.

It thus becomes crucial to identify specific points of intervention that could assist local experience. For exam- ple, it seems that the pensions some elderly receive are redistributed to needy kin; these elderly may not be much better off in material terms, but their capacity to fulfill their extended kinship roles is transformed. While rising numbers of the elderly poor are receiving modest pensions, the bene- fits of this need to be considered in light of the changing needs of people’s social as well as economic well-being. It is in the area of advocacy for adequate yet affordable social pro- tection that national and international non-governmental organiza- tions (e.g., Yayasan Emang Liansi, HelpAge International) as well as – it seems to me – that national and international organiza- tions can, and sometimes already do, play an important role.

Improvements in the factors under- lying elderly vulnerability raise the question of whether interventions could be addressed to other specific issues, such as self-sufficiency. Partic- ularly important are health interven- tions that would ensure improvements in elderly mobility and the treatment of chronic diseases.

In the absence of concerted public programmes to assist the elderly poor, it may well be that only Islamic and other religious institutions will have the moral authority to take on at least at a local level, the issue of elderly vulnerability. In all of these respects the need to be considered in light of the shortcomings of family-based welfare.

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Understanding Elderly Vulnerability in Indonesia

Four of the ten fastest-growing elderly populations worldwide can be found in Southeast Asia, and Indonesia has perhaps the most striking profile of them all. As the strengths and weaknesses of current provisions for the elderly in Indonesia are indicative of those in many other countries, a clear understanding of the issues that are at present not adequately covered in the literature is a necessary baseline for any examination of the issue. Is current support adequate? What gaps are there?

How may a good level of support be defined? What capacity is there in current family and community arrangements to encompass a three or fourfold increase in the elderly? What role can local and international organizations fill here? These and other searching questions need to be asked, and the need to delve into the workings of local support networks means that answers will depend on data that economic and social surveys alone cannot provide.
Patterns of Kin and Community Support

Despite the lack of formal welfare provisions, it is often assumed that the elderly in rural Indonesia are nonetheless protected by social networks. These networks extend beyond the nuclear family and household by encompassing wider kin and community members. Whether kin and community support are genuine and reliable supplements – even alternatives – to support from children is best examined where dependence on kin and community is greatest, that is, in the absence of support from children. Rural East Java provides an apt setting for such an investigation, as levels of elderly childlessness are high (25 per cent).

Anak angkat

Most societies have more or less institutionalized mecha- 

isms through which adults without offspring gain parent- 

ing roles. Across Southeast Asia, adopting or acquiring an 

anak angkat (raised child) is common, though seldom record- 

ed officially. Two-thirds of childless respondents had at one 

time taken on a child. Most people adopt close relatives 

because kin are least able to refuse the request for a child. 

Moreover, by entrusting a relative with their child, biological 

parents can maintain contact with their offspring. Herein 

lies the adoptive parents’ greatest vulnerability, as the con- 

tinued contact with the family of origin often leads to con- 

flicting loyalties and the breakdown of the created filial link. 

Some elderly go to great lengths to protect their ties to anak 

angkat – by moving villages or providing generous inheri-

tances. Nonetheless, almost half of all adoptions fail, with the 

child ultimately feeling no particular obligation towards 

them. Nonetheless, almost half of all adoptions fail, with 

the child ultimately feeling no particular obligation towards 

its adoptive parents. Even where a child’s loyalty is not in 

question, support in the desired manner may not be forth- 

coming (see also Krasberry 2002:238ff). Children, be they 

adopted or one’s own, are considered at best unreliable 

sources of old-age assistance: they may move away, be unsuc-

cessful, or have other priorities. This means that most eld- 

eredly, with or without children, are potentially dependent on 

kin and community support. 

A better outcome is achieved by wealthy individuals of 

high social standing who ‘adopt’ younger relatives – typically a 

grandchild – late in life, when the former are in need of sup- 

port. Such cases are essentially contractual care arrangements 

involving a relative who would not otherwise be expected to 

help. Mutual obligations are made explicit – material wealth 

in exchange for old-age care – but the elderly person avoids 

losing face by coughing the relationship in the idiom of fili- 

ation (anak angkat).

Patron-client relations

Most elderly in rural Java, irrespective of whether they have 

children, are concerned with maintaining independence in 

old age (Schröder-Butterfill 2002). For the majority (80 per 

cent) of elderly without pensions, land, or savings, the abil- 

ity to preserve economic autonomy is premised on continued 

access to work. This is not trivial, as competition for work is 

quickly die.

Charity

Community charity is often invoked as a safety net of last 

resort for the elderly who are no longer independent and who 

lack support from a child, adopted or their own. The institu- 

tion of anak is one instance of the role of the elderly in giving 

rice and money which is then redistributed by the mosque. 

Other forms of charity include occasional gifts of food, 

money, or inexpensive medicine by neighbours or distant 

kin. For example, women will often take a plate of food to a 

poorer neighbour, playing it down with a comment like, ‘oh, 

it’s nothing – I’ve just cooked too much’. Food is also dis-

tributed as part of ritual celebrations (slametan), and although 

such gifts are not understood as charity, they can be impor-

tant sources of indirect support. For example, 91 per cent of 

poor households stated that they only consumed meat as part 

of a slametan meal. 

Zula, occasional gifts, and ritual exchanges alleviate mate-

rial need but are insufficient to guarantee a living for those 

without independent income. For the elderly poor who have 

failed to create and maintain close links with children, grand-

children, or patrons, the possibility of seeking assistance by a 

diffuse network of neighbours and kin may become the main 

source of livelihood. This form of unidirectional charity is 

motivated by pity and condescension and entails dramatic 

loss of status, autonomy, and social participation of the recip-

ient. Moreover, charitable support is premised on the recip-

ient not falling seriously ill, as physical care and expensive 

medicine are generally not forthcoming (see also Marianti, 
in press)). Once incapacitated, elderly who rely on charity 

quickly die.

As we have seen, Javanese villagers are typically part of 

social networks involving family, kin, and community. Yet 

the extent to which these networks entail reliable forms of 

old-age support depends on individual success in creating 

special, personalized bonds with specific network members. 

By adopting a relative, people come closest to fashioning the 

unique parent-child bond from which assistance in old age 

may most readily be expected. Provision by a rich patron is 

an acceptable alternative to filial support. Patron-client rela-

tions, despite being hierarchical, are often viewed positively 

because they are rooted in reciprocal exchanges and thus 

avoid outright dependence. Least reliable and most socially 

damaging is support from a diffuse network of kin and neigh-

bours, where notions of personalized obligation and mutu-

al respect are lacking.<

References


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Notes

1 Patronage is construed broadly here to include any hierarchical, dyadic relationship involving reciprocal obligations that are not merely economic but entail mutual social and ‘political’ responsibilities, like loyalty.
Pensions for Widows in Indonesia

By Ruly Marianti

This article, which focuses on pensioned widows, results from research on support for widows in urban Java (Marianti 2002). The dynamic interactions between recipients and providers of support are central to this research. The study involved qualitative and quantitative fieldwork between 1997 and 1999 in Malang, an East Javanese city with a population of 800,000. Malang gains its income chiefly from manufacturing and retail, but the city is also home to several universities and army barracks. Among the research population of 121 widows almost one-third are pensioners, a relatively high proportion that reflects the urban setting of the research. Most pensioner widows are entitled to their pensions because they were married to civil servants or army members; two were themselves part of the state apparatus.

The Indonesian pension system

There is no universal system of social protection exists in Indonesia. Those covered by pensions fall under one of three schemes: (1) A voluntary employer-sponsored pension programme, mainly found in public enterprises. (2) A mandatory social security programme JAMOSTEK, Jamuan Social Tenaga Kerja) providing pensions as well as insurance against illness and disability. Meant to cover all employees in the formal sector working for businesses with over ten employees or a monthly payroll of over one million rupiah (over EUR 100), it is, in theory, enforced by the Ministry of Manpower (Ramesh 2000:577). (3) The state-run pension programme for members of the civil service, armed forces, and the police consisting of three benefits: the actual pension, a lump-sum paid upon retirement, and post-retirement health care. The impact of pensions on widows’ economic position is also reflected by the fact that fewer pensioners still work (8 per cent versus 35 per cent for non-pensioners).

Like Indonesian widows generally, pensioner widows represent a heterogeneous group cutting across socio-economic strata. Consequently, they use their pensions in different ways. Some divert a significant part of their pension to support their families (see also Schroder-Butterfill 2003). One widow said that she had to provide an interest-free loan to her son whenever he needed additional working capital. Turning now to the degree of dependence on pensions, two categories may be distinguished: pensioners who depend on their pensions as their main source of income (82 per cent) and pensioners who have other sources and consider their pension to be additional income (18 per cent). In reality, gradations of dependence can be discerned, largely determined by two factors: the widow’s life stage and health condition. Pensioners who depend entirely on their pension are often older and have health problems. Most are acutely aware that their pension income is limited and that their purchasing power is threatened – approximately six million employees or 11.5 per cent of the Indonesian labour force (Esmara and Tjiptoherjanto 1986:56). Despite their small number these beneficiaries should not be overlooked when examining old-age security: their situation throws into sharp relief what the majority of Indonesians are excluded from, namely, direct access to state resources. Entitlement to social insurance shapes the importance of other sources of support, as pension incomes enable recipients to solve financial problems without depending too heavily on other sources of income and people.

The economic importance of pensions

Compared to non-pensioners, pensioners are generally better off. Although not a large sum of money – in the region of Rp. 500,000 to 500,000 (EUR 30 to 50) for widows – the pension is a stable source of income that allows beneficiaries a measure of economic independence. Using indicators like ownership of luxury goods (e.g. radios, televisions, refrigerators), my study shows that pensioners often enjoy greater purchasing power. Without a doubt, a pension can guarantee a certain amount of stability and independence for pensioners and their families. The extent to which pensions can provide real protection from economic problems or facilitate improvements in economic conditions depends on the actual problems faced by beneficiaries. The greatest beneficiaries are widows with the fewest economic responsibilities: those who do not need to provide economic support to relatives, who do not rent a house or have debts, and who do not suffer from serious illness. Nonetheless, all widows agreed that regardless of the amount of money a widow has, it was better to be entitled to a pension than not. In their words, pensions represented an income which could be dicokot-cokot alot: ‘you can bite it, but it’s tough!’

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Dr Ruly Marianti is affiliated to the Bell’s van Zuylen Institute, University of Amsterdam, and the Law Faculty, Brawijaya University, Malang, Indonesia. She also works as a journalist at the Dutch World Service Radio (Indonesia Section). Her research interests include social security, ageing, gender, and poverty. marianti@xs4all.nl

For most Indonesians in times of hardship, there is no alternative to seeking assistance from family or neighbours. A fortunate few are entitled to formal social protection: civil servants, military men, industrial workers and farmers. Others are threatened – approximately six million employees or 11.5 per cent of the Indonesian labour force (Esmara and Tjiptoherjanto 1986:56). Despite their small number these beneficiaries should not be overlooked when examining old-age security: their situation throws into sharp relief what the majority of Indonesians are excluded from, namely, direct access to state resources. Entitlement to social insurance shapes the importance of other sources of support, as pension incomes enable recipients to solve financial problems without depending too heavily on other sources of income and people.

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Growing Old in the City

Indonesia is the fastest-aging society in Asia. While in Western Europe and North America substantial demographic transformations took place over 100 years, in Indonesia these processes have occurred within the lifetime of a single generation. The health status of elderly Indonesians is elderly increasingly being affected by rapid changes of lifestyle and adverse environmental conditions. They perceive chronic illnesses as processes leading to immobility, uncertainty, and helplessness. As HelpAge International (2002: 7) states: ‘For elderly people in the developing world, personal health constantly ranks alongside material security as a priority concern.” Our case study shows how the urban elderly are experiencing their chronic illness in times when limited means of social and economic security are becoming gradually more unreliable and insufficient.

Urban elderly and the meaning of chronic illness

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A Post-Colonial Poet with a Quest for Identity

Interview with Malaysian Literary Laureate, Muhammad Haji Salleh

Muhammad Haji Salleh is a leading poet of Malaysia and one of the country's literary laureates. Writing both in Malay and English, Muhammad has devoted his life to the development of the Malaysian literary tradition. He has not only distinguished himself as a poet but also as a literary scholar.

As a post-colonial poet and a professor of literature, Muhammad is known for his passionate quest for identity. He first started writing poetry, in both English and Malay, when he was studying in Britain in the early sixties. Having established himself as a writer, he virtually stopped producing poems in English, and henceforth has exerted his creative energy mainly on writing poetry within the national literary tradition. As a scholar, he also devotes his time to the difficult search for Malay poetics.

With the colonial heritage as a springboard, Muhammad embarks on a homeward journey in quest for identity and roots. In fact, this quest is the hallmark of his poems as reflected especially in the outstanding collections of Si Tenggang (Poems of the Outsider, 1973), The Travel Journals of Si Tenggang II (1979), Time and Its People (1978), Siak-ujak dari Sejarah Malaysia (Poems from the Malay Annals, 1981), and Running Down Two Rivers (2006). To the poet, it is necessary for one within a transnational society to be as open and international as possible. But, in being open it is important not to abandon one's tradition and lose one's identity. The ideal is to strike a balance. Muhammad's poems reveal that negotiating such a balance in defining oneself and one's roots could be a difficult and painful process.

Muhammad was in Leiden from 1993 to 1995 as the first holder of the European Chair of Malay Studies. Last May he returned to present a paper at the International Seminar on Malay Literature jointly organized by the IAS and the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP), Malaysia. During the opening ceremony, Muhammad read a selection of his poems.

In between my chores as seminar convenor, I had an opportunity to interview him at the Faculty Club while he was sipping coffee among friends and catching up with old times.

MSY: 1. The poem ‘the circle of the road of return’ seems to reflect your fond memories of the campus and your many colleagues, some of whom are here today. Could you describe some of the significant observations you made and the experiences of your stay and the impact these had on you?

MHS: I came to Leiden as an academic and as a poet, and was lucky in being able to perform both functions. I transcribed the Sulalat al-Salatin (Malay Annals), worked on the translations of my poems, and wrote quite a few papers. My fondest memories were both working in the KITLV and university libraries; two of the best libraries in my field. Dutch scholarship in Malay-Indonesian Studies was also dynamic. Interest in new theories was subsequently reflected in their studies and writing on the archipelago. In Leiden I was more theory-conscious, and became more aware of the mode of Malay-Indonesian thought on literature. My book Paiko Sastera Melaw (Malay Literary Poetics) partly grew from this consciousness.

2. Now, about your poetry. From my reading, the theme of the quest for identity, of defining oneself, seems to be central to your poems both in Malay and in English. To me, this quest is interesting, but rather problematic. It is difficult to express, and many readers have difficulties in understanding you.

MHS: Having lived in many countries in Europe and Asia, these countries, their languages and literary cultures, have seeped into my natural desire to get the best out of them. At the same time, having been a foreigner for such a long time, I think my poems were fighting ones, in trying to understand the whole. It is this dilemma of trying to get the best out of the two worlds, and at the same time to remain sane, that is the difficult part he has to negotiate. Yes, Si Tenggang II is partly me too, as I wrote the poem on my return from the U.S. In that country, I had to define myself as a Malaysian. On my return I had to define myself again – the new Malaysian who was proud of his roots, but proud too that he has been part of a bigger world. Yes, this poem reflects also, as you say, the inner conflict, or perhaps the difficult mix that is me, the new Malaysian. It may be seen as a poem written in self-definition and self-search.

4. This search for one’s roots and the need to define oneself and who are we in this post-colonial age? How do you do it? Has it to do with the colonial experience, or the post-colonial situation, and that the fact Malaysia is society is undergoing a rapid change?

MHS: I think you have put your finger on two of the most important points. First, as a colonized people, we were a conquered people. Our land and ways were looked down upon as inferior. Our language was replaced. Our traditional works were not taught in school, and our civilization put on ice.

In a way, all of us are still grieving this great tsunami of globalization almost swept us all away. What little gain we made we are going to lose in the next generation. Sadly, we have become mere citizens, consumers par excellence, more insensitive than the westerners. We have even marginalized our own language and culture to make way for English and popular culture.

5. Am I right then in referring to you as a post-colonial poet, one who is intensely post-colonial and Civilizational? How do you define post-colonial? Has it to do with the colonial experience, or the post-colonial situation, and that the fact Malaysia is society is undergoing a rapid change?

MHS: Yes, I have always been interested in theories, and I have written about post-colonialism in Malaysian literature and have come to realize that I was and am quite involved in deconstructing the colonialism within myself, my past. Having reacted quite strongly against the stifling British educational policy, I therefore started writing poetry, in both English and Malay, when I was studying in Britain in the early sixties. Having established myself as a writer, I virtually stopped producing poems in English, and henceforth have exerted my creative energy mainly on writing poetry within the national literary tradition. As a scholar, I also devote my time to the difficult search for Malay poetics.
language as a political statement of my total return to the language that was marginalized and humiliated by the British. The British educational system prescribed that Malay could only be used for the primary school level. So I was disconnected from the language, my intellectual language was English, and it stayed there for a long time until I taught myself to write in modern Malay, for more than 40 years. A choice of a mother tongue over a colonial lan-
guage is a traumatic choice for people like me who went to school in that lan-
guage.

Many of my poems return to the fif-
teenth-century Melaka, the contempo-
rary traditional village, the market, which still keep the character of the Malaysians. These are post-colonial poems – the poet who has been col-
ized has come home, and found him-
self there. Some of my poems even deal directly with England as in ‘England in the spring’ contained in Rowing Down Two Rivers. I think I have another side of the post-colonial. As a student of literature, I worked out projects to retrieve the important achievements of my people – I collected and am still collecting pant-
suns throughout the archipelago, sought out traditional concepts in life and literature, transcribed some old and rare texts. These I think, humbly, are also acts of post-colonialism.

In the dim lanes i meet a stranger from a continent
built by the sun, history and need brought him here, making him a sceptical british the shops and the bright saris are reminders of a past century, a history and times edges blending sand and currents, flow and move like the oceans, dashing limestone cliffs and river mud, chaining jamaicans to boats bestowing dreams on hong kong coffee shop owners, or a quiet exile for ugandan cloth merchants. time’s ditch rushes in between.

now on the lanes of the municipal houses, a caribbean boy falls in love with a punk girl, a welsh is hugging a punjabi woman. all make love in cockney.
greek children queue up for the oily chinese fried rice, in the restaurant was steaks meat from his shrinking savasla northern Indian tandoori perfumes a whole street, merging into the odour of fish ‘n’ chips. promptly he curses the smell of spices.

the grey eyes of the english stare upon the fog and history’s break-point, they have learnt to be angry or accepting that history must be paid with history, sins collected in a hundred island and states, must be explained in the centre of london, in the dirty mills of birmingham or the news-stands of oxford.
The political identity in India, especially in the Hindu belt, are dominated by ethno-religious conflict. Since 1984, the symbol of these tensions has been Ayodhya. In the sixteenth century, the Moghuls built a mosque in this Uttar Pradesh town, which Hindus regard as the birthplace of the god Ram, and named the structure Babri Masjid. After the Moghul emperor Babur, Hindu nationalists put claims on the site in 1857 to ‘protect’ it. The dispute was reignited by the mosque in 1992. This ethno-religious mobilization has exacerbated conflict between Hindus and Muslims.

Hindus vs. Muslims

Clashes were already commonplace during the colonial era. Ever since Muslims organized a movement in defence of the Caliphate in the 1920s, the Hindu majority has felt threatened from within by the presence of a pan-Islamic power in Uttar Pradesh. Hindu demand for a separate homeland and fed on this irratically perceived notion of vulnerability, which gained further ground in the 1960s and 1970s, when narrated by the Congress government’s leniency towards instances of Islamic mobilization. The Shah Bano affair, conversions to some Muslim sects, and even before that the spectre of the Iran revolution, rekindled feelings of vulnerability among sections of the Hindu community, emoting that the Hindu nationality movement skillfully exploited. The ideology of Hindu nationalism, which equates national identity with Hindu religious identity, is one that religious minorities, Christians as well as Muslims, show public allegiance to the ‘Hindu’ identity— for instance by paying respect to Ram as a national hero and that they keep their own religious observances private. The resurgence of Hindu nationalism also was due to a wave of communal riots which politicized the electorate. With Hindus voting en masse for Hindu nationalist, their self-appointed ‘defenders’, the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP – Indian People’s Party) moved from two seats out of 544 in the People’s Assembly in 1984 to 178 seats in 1998. In that year the BJP formed the governing coalition, and its leader, A.B. Vajpayee, became Prime Minister. Most of the parties in the coalition, however, did not share the BJP’s Hindu nationalist agenda. The coalition thus reinforced the government from the outside.

Following a string of electoral defeats from 1998 to 2002, which ousted the BJP from leadership in all of the main official side.

The political culture of caste has grown in tandem with the spread of Hindu nationalism. These two trajectories are not easily distinguishable: one cannot reinforce one another. During the colonial period, and under Nehru’s government after 1947, the emancipation of the Untouchables and the creation of a system of affirmative discrimination that the British had devised. The Untouchables benefited from quotas in the electoral system, and the independency, which spawned a new elite, designated by a novel term. In place of administrative euphemisms such as the reservation of OBCs, and in the upper castes and in the middle and lower castes respectively.

IndepedIndia’s first government also took interest in those categorised just above the Untouchables. Nehru, already in his first speech before the Constituent Assembly, named them the ‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBC), implying groups ‘other’ than the upper castes. The Backward Classes Commission was appointed and assigned the task to identify these groups and to suggest measures that would improve their condition. Its report concluded that one common denominator behind indicators of social backwardness was the membership of a lower caste. The Other Backward Classes were, in other words, merely a collection of castes. The government rejected the analysis, arguing that an official recognition of caste in this manner would only perpetuate the archaic social institution that had been abolished by the modernization of society. The second Backward Classes Commission was appointed in 1978, owing to the elections. The then Prime Minister, B.P. Mandal, became its president. His report again retained caste as the relevant criterion for economic disadvantage in 3,734 castes that made up India’s Other Backward Classes, which according to him, accounted for 52 per cent of the population. The Mandal commission recommended reserving for them 27 per cent of civil service posts to promote their social and economic development.

Hindu-Muslim tension continues to structure the public arena in India, as the riots in Gujarat brought to the surface a year ago. But at least in the Hindu belt, the repertoire of caste appeals seems to be just as powerful. While communal politics have not crystallized to the degree of caste identities has redefined the political cleavages of North India. The emergence of caste-based politics has blurred religious divisions, evident in the recent success of political parties that cater to lower-caste voters. Political campaigning for the state elections in four provinces of the Hindu belt this year, vividly illustrates this competition between the two political identities: the religious and the caste-based.

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Only after Congress had been ousted for the second time, the new Prime Minister V.P. Singh embarked on implementing the recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report in 1990. In reaction, the upper casters, especially students, launched a series of mass protests against the sudden diminution of their job opportunities and the outright challenge to the socio-political order they dominated. V.P. Singh’s decision and subsequent developments sparked a counter-mobilization, in which the OBC for the first time joined forces to defend their quotas against upper-caste agitation. In this context of social polarization, the Dalits, previously reluctant to bear the brunt of the backlash against positive discrimination, made an alliance with the OBC. New political parties emerged and formed alliances, such as the Samajwadi Janata Party (Socialist Party)’s attempt to represent the interests of all lower castes, and the Bahujan Samaj Party, whose leader, Kanhaiya, is a Dalit. All these new political groups have built on the electoral victories of lower-caste candidates, in acknowledgement of the fact that the OBC – constituting the relative majority all over India – voted for them. In this way, the OBC has become not only a major political group but a serious, if not upper-caste notables. As a result, the proportion of OBC elected representatives in northern India climbed from 11 per cent in 1984 to 25 per cent in 1996; that of upper-caste elected officials dropped from 47 to 35 per cent. It was during these years that lower-caste parties started participating in the OBC quota in the two states where they still reign today.

The involvement of the BJP in the Ayodhya affair is in large part explained by the rising power of the lower casters. The BJP perceived the crystallization of a caste-based movement as a threat to an undivided Hindu community and sought to avert this threat by dissolving this identity into a broader movement stamped with the seal of Hinduism. While the party aimed at attracting lower-caste voters by co-opting lower-caste leaders, its success was rather limited and it continues to appeal disproportionately to upper-caste voters. Interestingly, the BJP stood up to protect the upper castes against lower-caste mobilizations while the lower-caste parties were gaining momentum. Co-opted lower-caste leaders will deliver smaller numbers of supporters, but, as was evident in the 2001 break away of Kalyan Singh, an OBC leader from Uttar Pradesh, the BJP cannot rely on the mechanisms of co-option.

The key election issue: reservations or Ayodhya?

The conflict between these two political identities – the caste-based and Hindu nationalist – will dominate the election year that begins this fall. In December 2003 four states of the Indian Union: Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh, will go to the polls. Less than twelve months later the country will hold its fourteenth general election. In this context, a shift in the Congress Party towards the representation of the low castes is still possible. Congress, which already governs over half the states, is far from exclusively championing the cause of the lower castes. In September, Prime Minister Vajpayee and his New Delhi government have promised that in Madhya Pradesh, Digvijay Singh, is campaigning for the OBC quota in the state’s civil service to be increased from 14 to 27 per cent, the Chief Minister in Rajasthan, Ashok Gehlot, is promising a quota in the state’s administration for the poor from the upper castes.

The BJP is a fix. Extremist components of the Hindu nationalist movement, including the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), promise the party to return to its strategy of ethno-religious mobilization. In September, to Madhya Pradesh, the two most important states going to the poll, VHP leaders have, once again, identified Muslim themes as the best way to appeal to state governments, however, have prevented their campaigning. Consequently, the VHP resuscitated the Ayodhya issue following its defeat in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections in February. The RSS, together with its partners refused to pass a parliament bill on the banning of cow slaughter, yet another Hindu nationalist rally cause. Not only has it been impossible for the BJP to return to its strategy of ethno-religious mobilization, the party has had to accept Congress initiatives such as debate on reservations for the upper casters.

Caste issues may blur Hinduism’s distinctions in a war-like situation against Muslims. From the perspective of the right, the Jihadist threat can be conveniently instrumentalized. In August, when four bombs attacked 53 innocent in Bombay, Vice-Prime Minister L.K. Advani congratulated the militant Muslim-based Islamist groups. Many Hindus follow Advani’s reading, even though the police found the guilty men to be Indian Muslims anxious to avenge the Gujarat pogrom. In 1999, the BJP thanked its victory in the general elections to the resurgence of patriotic feelings during the Kargil war. It may yet repeat this achievement if it successfully projects itself as the protector of Hindus in a war-like situation against Jihadists and fifth columnists.
Cultures of Confinement

While the history of the prison has become increasingly fashionable in the work of Michel Foucault, much research has tended to focus on Europe and the United States. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that prison reform should be viewed as a global phenomenon, as the penitentiary project was embraced by a movement from Rio de Janeiro to Tokyo. As ideas on confinement moved across borders, they were adjusted to specific local conditions: incarceration, rather than acculturation, characterized a penal regime that was inflected in a multiplicity of ways by different modernizing elites. Captured in the overarching rationale based on the idea of humane punishment, the prison was multivalent, capable of being adopted in a variety of mutually incompatible environments, ranging from the bagee, in Vietnam, to the cellular prison in China or the concentration camps in South Africa.

Making matchboxes in a Beijing prison
By Frank Dikötter

In colonial contexts, prisons were part of the ‘civilizing mission’, as existing penal practices, which were often based on physical punishment, were viewed as ‘barbaric’ and ‘uncivilized’. However, the transfer of penal discourse and penitentiary institutions was not a one-way process: diversity rather than uniformity characterized the use of the custodial sentence in a variety of colonial contexts, as prisons both changed and adapted to existing notions of crime and punishment. Confinement, in short, acquired specific cultural meanings and social dimensions which long outlived the colonial context. Rather than assigning a passive role to Asia and Africa, historians should point to the acts of resistance or appropriation which actively transformed the penitentiary project. A comparative approach to the history of the prison highlights the extent to which common knowledge was appropriated and transformed by very distinct local styles of knowledge was appropriated and transformed by very distinct local styles of thinking. In the case of modern China, the prison was not only a new tool used to pursue a more sophisticated penal project. Rather than assigning a passive role to Asia and Africa, historians should point to the acts of resistance or appropriation which actively transformed the penitentiary project.

Confinement discourse

Discourse with the existing legal order based on banishment and physical punishment was already open expressed in the eighteenth century. Statecraft officials such as Chen Hong-mou emphasized the rehabilitation of criminals, proposing that repentance be encouraged while the physical discomforts of punishment like the cage should be reduced. When the first Qing envoy to Europe visited Pentonville Prison in the 1840s, they were full of admiration: confinement appeared to be a viable alternative to banishment, as prisons, it seemed, could more effectively induce repentance (zhipu) and self-renewal (zixian). Some reformers like Wang Tuo even viewed foreign institutions as the modern embodiment of Laojia Confucian values, writing that ‘the excellence of the prison system is what China has never had since the Golden Age.’ The prison was widely perceived by reformers as a modern tool capable of implementing traditional values like the idea of reform and repentance in confinement – abandoned in Britain and the United States by the end of the nineteenth century – was vigorously advocated in the movement in twentieth-century China. The Pentonville model was widely adopted across China, except in the International Settlement of Shanghai and in colonial Hong Kong, where faith in the rehabilitative potential of the panopticon was on the decline.

In republican China the prison was a new tool used to pursue a more sophisticated penal project. Rather than assigning a passive role to Asia and Africa, historians should point to the acts of resistance or appropriation which actively transformed the penitentiary project. A comparative approach to the history of the prison highlights the extent to which common knowledge was appropriated and transformed by very distinct local styles of thinking. In the case of modern China, the prison was not only a new tool used to pursue a more sophisticated penal project. Rather than assigning a passive role to Asia and Africa, historians should point to the acts of resistance or appropriation which actively transformed the penitentiary project.

A new penal system: Beijing No.1 Prison

As the ruling elite under the Qing Dynasty started to promote the adoption of European models of government after the defeat of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the compilation of new legal codes as well as reform of the judicial system became a priority. Traditional penalties such as dismemberment were replaced by a process of moral transformation. Anticipating repentance and moral reformulation, the panopticon term gaohua was the core value of penal philosophy in modern China.

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The Swami and the Sister

Hindu ascetic tradition, much like its Christian counterpart, glorifies world weariness (vairagya) which, for all its aims and purposes, stands as a renunciation of woman and wealth: kami-mukta, despising the sumnum bonum, thereby rejecting his mankind. Therefore, a yogi is to achieve his ultimate goal (i.e. realization of the divine or epiphany) by the process of his systematic castration. The drama of the struggle to accomplish self-nihilation in order to realize the self, reached a tragic denouement in the life of Swami Vivekananda (Narendranath Datta) after he had come in contact with Margaret Noble (Sister Nivedita), a popular young sannyasi (female ascetic), in the West.

By Narasingha Sil

The relationship between Nivedita and Vivekananda has been virtually canonized in the hagiographic literature, written to glorify the Anglo-Irish disciple of a world conquering missionary and visionary of colonial Calcutta. Consequently, generations of Indians, as well as enlightened foreigners, have become familiar with the image of a Western woman shaped by a princely Hindu apostle for the great task of social and spiritual regeneration of renascent India. However, a sober, critical reading of the sources reveals a different side to these two fascinating personalities: their triumphs and tragedies make them truly human, and bring them down from artificial, Olympian heights to be closer to us.

Margaret Elizabeth Noble’s (1867-1911) life as a school teacher was moulded by her twin religious and romantic heritage. On the one hand, her father was a minister and she went to a Congregationalist school, on the other, her grandfather had been an Irish revolutionary. According to her brothers Richard, she was also a highly sentimental and romantic woman easily drawn to men of intellectual disposition. Prior to meeting Vivekananda in London, she had harboured no ideal of a socio-spiritual mission in life. No doubt she was acquainted with Christian literature, had read Matthew Arnold’s poetic biography of the Buddha, The Light of Asia, and acquired a smattering of Hindu religious philosophy. She presumably made these readings in preparation for her visit to the Hindu monk who had created such a sensation in London high society, thanks in part to the most effective publicity work of his English host, Edward T. Sturdy.

Noble had experienced two failed romances. Her first lover and fiancé succumbed to tuberculosis before marriage. A second lover jilted her for another woman. When she first met her future guru in October 1895, she was immediately charmed by the attractive, extraneously dressed young man muttering ‘Shiva Shivə’ in a rich baritone voice. Thus she easily overcame her disappointment with his sermons, which she had initially considered unoriginal, and continued to cultivate his company.

Vivekananda, too, must have been struck by the personality of this energetic young woman of immense charm and charm. Indeed, Margaret was almost a female counterpart of the handsome, eloquent, and beautifully attired young monk from a far-off land. On numerous occasions, during conversation, Vivekananda made numerous claims and innuendos, encouraging Noble to think of him as a heroic figure. It was the Swami who first suggested Margaret work for the social betterment of India, promising her all the necessary help. She was so overwhelmed by this invitation and, at the same time, by his solicitude, that she offered herself to him unhesitatingly. Noble was so possessive of Nivedita that he disapproved of her paying attention to men such as Tagore, Geddes, Okakura, or Bose. He, however, never gave her any of the divine arcana while claiming that he had a vision of the Lord Shiva and had received the boon of voluntary death (ichchamrityu) from the great god. The original manuscript of Margaret’s diary contains her frustration, her outrage, and her demand that her guru treat her with respect, be it as a woman or as a disciple. Her disappointment was aggravated a few months later when Vivekananda initiated her as a bhakundirani (female monastic initiate), which she deemed lower in status than the sannyasi she had wished to become.

However, Nivedita (Margaret’s new monastic name) never actually believed in the career of a renunciant. She loved good clothes and the company of the Calcutta elite, and had a strong opinion about womanhood and the role of a wife. She was even quite candid about the ‘union of sexes’. Most probably she had decided to leave home permanently for the sake of working with Vivekananda in India, and was given to understand that her responsibilities would lie in social work and women’s education. Yet she was disappointed by her assignation and meagre abode and her work teaching English to a sınıf and meagre abode and her work teaching English to a class of children but pay attention to adult India, more particularly to adult males, to make them ‘manly’. Meanwhile, she had overcome her ‘womanism’ and, following Swamiji’s death in July 1902, severed her connection with the Ramakrishna Order, and plunged headlong into nationalist politics.

Her fascination with intellectuals had always been acute. In 1899-1900, while in the West, Nivedita was temporarily attracted to the famous sociologist Patrick Geddes. She was also quite fond of the brilliant Bengali scientist Jagadishchandra Bose, whom she regarded as her ‘saints’ (child in Scotch), though her letters referring to Bose are full of erotic rhetoric. She had elicited Rabindranath Tagore’s attention, was even offered a portion of his residence for her school, and was the poet’s guest in his houseboat at Shilaidaha in eastern Bengal. Thoughtful and idealistic, she found in her remainders, under the ‘thrall of the visiting’ the learning and culture, she found he was not ‘manly’ enough for her ideals. During the last months of Vivekananda’s life, she remained, in her own words, under the ‘thrall of the visiting’ and was so possessive of Nivedita that he disapproved of her paying attention to men such as Tagore, Geddes, Okakura, or Bose.

Both the Swami and the Sister were tormented by the explosion of spontaneous eros, resulting from a natural attraction between two young adults, and both failed to overcome this normal human emotion. They thus remained prisoners of their chosen vocation. As a result, the vira sannyasi was reduced to the state of a helpless child of Kali, the Divine Mother, while the Sister became increasingly aware of her failing femininity. She came to realize that her femininity was being replaced by manliness, as she confided to Josephine. Her odyssey in India was thus truly tragic, much like the heroes’ storms and droughted short life of immense possibilities.

By Narasingha Sil

This article is based on my Prophet Disarmed: Vivekananda and Nivedita. My other research interests lie in the social and cultural history of renascent Bengal. sil@wu.edu

Margaret Noble (Sister Nivedita), a popular young sannyasi (female ascetic), in the West.

Sister Nivedita (1867-1911)

Margaret Noble (Sister Nivedita), a popular young sannyasi (female ascetic), in the West.
A Suitable Boy provides a synchronic view of post-colonial Indian life in the 1950s, in many ways a 'tranche de vie'. It aspires to provide an idea of India through a realistic approach that has an almost photographic quality. Seth's narrative technique has invited comparisons with novels such as R.K. Narayan, George Eliot, and Leo Tolstoy, because his novel is strongly endorsed.

Seth has a statistically and secu- larist approach to the idea of nationhood. He writes about the nation-building from the point of view of India's rising middle class, informed by a secularizing Nehruvian ideology. Focusing on four upper-class Indian families—three Hindus, one Muslim—Seth's makes no attempt to hide the essentially bourgeois viewpoint of the narrative, which is contained in part within a progressive teleology of the nation. Many events in the book can be seen as symbolic moments in the nation-forming process, characterized by gradual, rather than violent, social change. The land reform acts implemented by the Congress Party during the 1950s are evolved in the novel by the fictional Zamindari Abolition Act, which aims to abolish feudal land-holdings in the invented state of Purva Pradesh. It is portrayed as the cause of one of the most important social and economic transformations of post-Independence India. In the narrative it symbolizes the passage from feudalism to the rise of the middle-class, traditionally seen as a crucial moment of transition in the development of a modern industrialized state.

A Suitable Boy as a national narrative

The more leisurely stretches in realistic fiction also convey the immersion of meaning in time. The well-trained reader of novels knows when to look for the referent has a containing function, in that it directs the description towards the production of a meaning. On the other hand, the assumed reality of the referent prevents the description to turn into fantasizing. This fact becomes very apparent in the crowd scenes in A Suitable Boy. As in many Indian English novels, these scenes communicate a sense of India's multiple realities con- tained by a unifying national con- sciousness, which is represented by the omniscient narrator and often filtered through the consciousness of individual characters. As Maan Kapoor takes a fateful step towards the old part of the city of Brahmputra, this is what he sees:

"Crows cawed, small boys in rags rushed around on errands (one balanc- ing six small dirty glasses of tea on a cheap tin tray as he weaved through the crowd, monks in their saffron robes, a man bound about a great shining-leaved papal tree and tried to avoid unruly cus- tomers as they left the well-groomed fruit stand, wandering along in anonymous burqas or bright saris, with or without their menfolk, a few stu- dents from the university lounging around a chaat-stall, dressed at each other from a foot away either out of habit or in order to be heard, mangy dogs snarped and were kicked, skeletal cats mewed and were stoned, and flies settled everywhere..." (Seth 1993: 97).

The naturalness of Seth’s portrayal of India in descriptions such as this one is a great achievement. It’s almost as if the purpose of the walk were to famil- iarize the reader with the town, which is the main setting of the plot. Such familiarization is a recurrent rhetorical strategy and is characterized by an informative yet affective tone, calculat- ed to make the reader ‘feel at home’ in every setting. The description of the crowd carries an immediacy that makes us ‘enter’ the scene in some way, as if we were present at it, thus imbuing it with an impressionistic quality. This technique resembles that of nine- teenth-century realist fiction such as Balzac’s, where the stylistic unity of the description is not established rational- ly but ‘presented as a striking and immediately apprehended state of things, purely suggestively, without any proof’ (Auerbach 1953: 47).

Nehru employs a similar naturalizing technique by touching upon the diversity of the Indian crowds. There is the sense, in both Seth’s and Nehru’s texts, that the nation is waiting to get out, ‘come into its own’. India is assumed to be an undivided subject whose apparent ‘diversity’ stops at the surface. It is the narrator/protagonist of the text who ‘realizes’ the unity of an undivided India through his descrip- tion:

The novel’s Nehruvian perspective must be seen in context. Published in 1993, when the Hindu right wing steadily appropriated Indian national identity, A Suitable Boy can be read as a response to the aggressive communi- zation of politics in the 1990s, by recu- perating a Nehruvian vision of the rela- tionship between religion and society. The novel was immensely successful in India, and its translations in Hindi and Bengali met with great critical acclaim, showing that it could be ‘translated back’ into the vernacular languages which are represented in the novel. A Suitable Boy thus remains an influ- ential secular and realist narrative of India, whose linguistic creativity and intense engagement with recent histo- ry has effectively contributed to its canonical status in the post-colonial lit- erary context.

References


Acknowledgements

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With his representation of India in the 1950s, Vikram Seth’s A Suitable Boy (1993) has appropriated the nineteenth-century realist tradition in novel writing to his own ends. The Nehruvian vision of India as a ‘unity within diversity’ and a secular approach to religion features prominently in this novel. Its vast descriptive horizon is contained within a deceptively styleless language, naturalizing what is in fact a carefully constructed ‘imagined community’.
Islamic Youth Movements in Indonesia

In order to understand the various developments in Islam in Indonesia, we need to consider the post-1970s activities of Islamic students. The nature of Islamic life in Indonesia has changed significantly compared to the 1960s, due to the emergence of activism in the 1970s and 1980s which sharply changed the landscape of Islamic movements. As these changes took place very quietly, however, they have by and large escaped the academic eye. This article compares the mainstream of Islamist student movements that made up the Justice and Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), and the counter-Islamism movement, known as ‘Islamic Left’.

Origin of the Islamic Left

Urban youths’ interest in organizing social and religious activities sprang from the failure of political movements. After students’ anti-Japanese demonstrations turned to riot in 1974 (the Malari incident), the government blamed the Masyumi Party, which was composed of Islamic modernists, and arrested 770 people. As the government’s grip on political activities tightened during the 1970s various NGOs, such as the LBH (Legal Aid Association) and the LPJES (the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information), were founded by former-students-turned-political-activists. Although many Islamic modernists were involved in these NGOs, their outlook was not religious: the LPJES, in particular, was heir to both the Indonesian Socialist Party and the Masyumi Party, which were banned in 1960. At the time, socialism rather than Islamism was the way for social reform and transformation, and it was the LPJES who introduced the latest leftist thinking, such as the dependency theory and theology of liberation, through the publication of books and its journal Prisma. It also conducted a training programme to lead community development, thus attracting young intellectuals from various backgrounds.

Among those joining this leftist intellectual network were prominent figures from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Masdar F. Ma’rufi. Notwithstanding the NU was the biggest Islamic organization, only a few of its members were active as urban intellectuals, the reason being that NU leaders used to be educated at traditional Islamic boarding schools (Pesantren) and, therefore, did not qualify as urban intellectuals. This changed in the 1970s, when National Islamic Institutes (IAIN) opened their doors to those educated at pesantren, and when the number of students at IAIN increased significantly from 2,748 in 1979 to 8,729 in 1989.

This youngest generation of NU cadres with an IAIN education inherited the leftist intellectual network and formed the Islamic Left, working with non-religious and leftist social-political movements. They read anything from Marx to Gramsci to Foucault yet, in respect of Islamic discussion, often refer to Western-educated Muslim intellectuals such as Hasan Hanafi and Mohammed Arkoun: indeed, the term Islamic Left itself is derived from Hasan Hanafi’s writing. Today’s Islamic Left is critical of religious authority (whether exerted by certain individuals, by using the written word, or by using historical examples) and, especially, of the ‘one and only’ and ‘pure and glorious’ Islam. Rather, it tries to revivify pluralistic Islamic traditions, by linking with contemporary Islamic Studies in Europe. In its strive for a religiously pluralist nation it opposes the so-called Islamists, the ‘rightist’ group in the Indonesian political context.

At the beginning of the 1990s, some Yogjakarta IAIN students established the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies (LIKIS), with the aim of spreading a ‘transformative and tolerant’ Islamic discourse. The ‘I’ of the LIKIS, which denotes Islam, is quite intentionally written in lower case, to under-score that the LIKIS is squarely against the type of Islamism that emphasizes superiority over other existing social systems. By contrast, the Islamic Left does not deny indigenous traditions and customs, which are often branded as un-Islamic or pre-Islamic, and thus it attracts grass-rooted, spiritual and mystic ‘islams’ as well as ex-Communists in rural areas.

Young Japanese Researchers on Southeast Asia - Series

Ken Miichi is the fourth contributor to a series that aims to present current research of young Japanese scholars on Southeast Asia. Original Japanese research on Southeast Asia has a long tradition, is abundant and sometimes takes different routes from European or American research on the region. Moreover, many Japanese scholars publish in Japanese or in Southeast Asia and do not publish in English. Therefore, their work remains being somewhat limited. By means of this series we draw attention for the original research of young Japanese scholars with research interests in Southeast Asian affairs. In case you would like to introduce your own research on Southeast Asia, please contact the editors of the IAS Newsletter.

By Ken Miichi

Students in prayer during a student movement rally, in 1998, symbolizing the return of Islam to the political arena.

Prominent figures from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Masdar F. Ma’rufi. Notwithstanding the NU was the biggest Islamic organization, only a few of its members were active as urban intellectuals, the reason being that NU leaders used to be educated at traditional Islamic boarding schools (Pesantren) and, therefore, did not qualify as urban intellectuals. This changed in the 1970s, when National Islamic Institutes (IAIN) opened their doors to those educated at pesantren, and when the number of students at IAIN increased significantly from 2,748 in 1979 to 8,729 in 1989. This youngest generation of NU cadres with an IAIN education inherited the leftist intellectual network and formed the Islamic Left, working with non-religious and leftist social-political movements. They read anything from Marx to Gramsci to Foucault yet, in respect of Islamic discussion, often refer to Western-educated Muslim intellectuals such as Hasan Hanafi and Mohammed Arkoun: indeed, the term Islamic Left itself is derived from Hasan Hanafi’s writing. Today’s Islamic Left is critical of religious authority (whether exerted by certain individuals, by using the written word, or by using historical examples) and, especially, of the ‘one and only’ and ‘pure and glorious’ Islam. Rather, it tries to revivify pluralistic Islamic traditions, by linking with contemporary Islamic Studies in Europe. In its strive for a religiously pluralist nation it opposes the so-called Islamists, the ‘rightist’ group in the Indonesian political context.

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Mainstream Islamism on campus

Although they are ideologically opposite, Islamicists have a similar history. The Action Unit Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI) and the Justice Party (reorganized as the Justice and Welfare Party in April 2001), both founded in 1958, have their origin in the dakwah (propagation) movements on campus (dakwah kampus). The dakwah kampus originated in the early 1970s at the Salam mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology, but did not spread substantially until the crackdown on the political student movement that had resisted Suharto’s re-election in 1993. The dakwah kampus provided an alternative avenue to political participation. Without a doubt, their religious cause was first encouraged by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and, later, by intensifying propagation from the Middle East and, especially, from Saudi Arabia, seeking to shed light on this new perspective.

Thousands of students have received LIKIS training as social activists and have since formed a multitude of NGOs in large and small cities, which aim to tackle various social problems.
Liberalism, Communism, Islam: Transnational Motors of ‘Nationalist’ Struggles in Southeast Asia

In my reading and teaching on Southeast Asia over the past several years, I have come to believe that existing scholarship has underestimated the role of crucial transnational forces – most notably sixteen-nineteenth century Liberalism, twentieth-century Communism, and Islamic reformism – in fostering the region’s modern and ‘national’ politics. Therefore, in the course of two years of research and writing, I shall be working to elaborate and substantiate a revisionist account of what scholars have described as nationalist struggles in Southeast Asia, one which shows how the driving forces behind these struggles were profoundly transnational in nature.

By John Sidel

The intellectual backdrop to this project is, of course, the influential account of nationalization provided by Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, which draws on Southeast Asian history and has powerfully shaped its subsequent historiography. Anderson’s account has been profoundly influential. It allows us to trace and explain much of the variation in the trajectories and forms of nationalisms in the region.

Yet Anderson’s and other scholars’ subsequent writings suggest alternative accounts, in which the boundaries of national identity and sovereignty are understood not as externally imposed limits and dominating constraints on others, but as the products of historical process. These accounts show that so-called ‘nationalist struggles’ – as they are usually glossed – are driven by transnational networks, movements, and horizons. Arising out of Southeast Asias’ encounters with capitalist modernity and colonialism, the intellectual backdrops within international ideological currents and institutional networks, these currents and networks extended beyond the boundaries of the colony and even of the colonial state. They included also an ‘exotic’ Iberia, with its own particular range of ideas and networks, and by the mid-nineteenth century, after all, brought the ascendant bourgeoisie, who occupy centre stage in most historical narratives, decisively different from those of the transnational horizons soon to leap for Ho Chi Minh to begin working on Vietnamese culture and its own Islamic reformism emanating from the Middle East had begun to wash up on the shores of Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi, carried by Arab immigrants from the Hajad, and in the 1920s, the red flags of modernist madrasah and the formation of modernist organizations like Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam, and Al-Irly, drawing hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Muslims into new circulations of education, experience, association, and consciousness. On the other hand, the sources of inspiration and organization which had carried Ho Chi Minh and his comrades from Paris to Moscow to southern China, the vanguards of ‘nationalism’ in Asia, must be demonstrated rather than merely asserted. In the trajectories of movement recruitment and mass mobilization, moreover, this new history ‘from above’ must be connected to existing histories ‘from below’. Finally, the complex pattern of variation in the forms, outcomes, and afterlives, of those struggles primarily understood as nationalist, must be made compellingly clear, by using various points of comparison within and beyond the region.

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At the invitation of Oskar Verkaik (IAS), John Sidel presented a lecture at the University of Amsterdam on the broad outlines of his two-year research project on 8 May 2003.
Time, Space and Music in the Kathmandu Valley

Musical performance in Bhaktapur seems designed to reinforce a sense of individual location within social and divine orders. Devotional dālp songs, for example, are sung by groups of men, mostly drawn from the farmer caste, based at particular temples and resident in the neighbourhood (tosh) in which the temple stands. The group celebrates its identity with regular feasts, organizes recruitment and training, and offers social support to its members. Dālp songs, sung during auspicious seasons, festivals, and full-moon nights, bear the signatures of local kings of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and are in praise of various deities, most of whose shrines are located outside the tosh (in some cases outside Bhaktapur), singing them constitutes, inter alia, a ‘virtual pilgrimage’. In performance, the song is divided between two sub-groups, who repeat each line many times, at slow and fast speeds, in complex patterns of alternation. During this musical expansion of the song, temporal location is established by metrical patterns played on small cymbals (tīh) of penetrating tone. Playing this instrument is an important responsibility, often performed or directed by the lead singer.

The structure and time of space

Time and space are both viewed as cyclic in Bhaktapur, in each of the 12 months a cycle of Mundane time is cyclic in the annual rotation of the seasons, the monthly sequence of lunar phases, and the diurnal alternation of night and day; musical forms, repertoires and instruments are linked to these cycles. Cosmic time is again cyclic, with both the individual and the universe undergoing repeated processes of destruction and re-creation. The cosmic order is celebrated by means of festivals in which music plays an important part. The Buddhist festival of Gīla, for example, celebrates the coming end of the present universe. The sound of animal-horn trumpets (sōkā), played exclusively at this festival is believed to call the spirits of the departed back to this world for their next cycle of reincarnation (Greene 2004).

Space can also be articulated in cyclic fashion. People worship temples and shrines, where physically possible, by walking, clockwise around them (praādaṇaka), while the route from one to the next may be part of a larger praādaṇaka, for example around the neighbourhood. A praādaṇaka of the whole town, following a traditional procession route, is an important feature of major festivals, and an occasion for much music-making and dance, giving locally-based musical groups an opportunity to pay musical homage directly to deities in other parts of the town. At the New Year festival of Biskh, in March 2009, for example, I accompanied a dālp group on a clockwise musical circuit of Bhaktapur, during which songs were sung at 42 different shrines. Musical time, articulated through metre and form, is also cyclically complex. Most compositions comprise a number of sections, each of which is then repeated several times, if not many times. Successive sections may be of the same or different metre, and the piece as a whole may constitute a larger cycle, where the first section returns periodically or at the end. The ringing sounds of the tīh help performance groups to negotiate changes of metre and tempo in the more complex pieces.

Musical structure, function and meaning

The Gājatīrka, or Cow Festival, is an example of a calendrical festival in which music-making has an important function and which takes place on the processional route round Bhaktapur. It is held at full moon in August each year to commemorate all those who have died in the city during the previous 12 months. Each bereaved family decorates a tall bamboo structure intended to represent a sacred cow, indicated by the help of a cow. To add to the amusement, some dancers wear face-paint or fancy dress, and one sees men dressed as women, demons (dhālp), Hindu gods and goddesses, or even Father Christmas taking part in the procession.

The dance and music is richly woven. A musical invocation, called dālp-bhugos, ‘invoking the god’, is played at the beginning of the dance, at the end, and at intervals during the course of the procession. There is no dance accompanying this piece, which has no regular metre, and features free-rhythm drum rolls.

These three distinct musical sections, in binary, ternary, and irregular metre respectively, can be related to urban geography and Hindu-Buddhist concepts of sacred time and space. The binary-metre section A is a walking rhythm, during which the dancers progress slowly through the narrow streets. When they come to an open space where a crowd is watching, they switch to the ternary-metre section B, which allows them to make more vigorous dance movements, showing off their skill and stamina. Similarly, when the dancing group approaches an important temple or other shrine, the leading drummer changes from the A section to the B section a few metres ahead of the temple so that the dancers can entertain the god with vigorous movements. As the procession passes the shrine he changes to the dālp-bhugos, so that the drummers, walking behind the dancers, can make their own salvation.

The formal and metrical structure of this music thus relates to the space in which it is performed, but it also reveals deeper meanings. The rhythm of section A is identical to that of a child’s song that everyone in Bhaktapur knows. The first line asks: ‘What shall we do with the straw cow? Let’s put it in the gōdkā (a small niche in the wall of a room).’ The second line answers: ‘Let’s have the drum for the night, if we throw it into the river.’ This song articulates the underlying issue of the Gajatīrka festival: do we hang on to the souls of our departed loved ones, or do we entrust them to the river of sánanda, the eternal cycle of reincarnation? The answer is of course the latter, and at the end of the day the straw cows are indeed thrown into the river. Although this song is not normally sung while dancing, it is explicitly evoked by the rhythm of the music.

Section B of the music represents a compression of the eight-beat music of section A into six beats (and further compression occurs in the dālp-bhugos). The compression of longer into shorter time-spans, of the same or different metre, is a feature of Newar music, which Gert-Matthew Wegner has compared with the multiple roofs of a Newar pagoda-style temple, becoming smaller as they ascend (Wegner 1986). While this analogy may be fortuitous, a possible link between temple architecture and music is the mandala, a type of cosmic map in which the universe is represented as a symmetrical arrangement of concentric areas of differing geometries, contracting towards the centre, with the presiding deity of the mandala occupying the central, smallest space. This recurrent motif in Newar culture applies equally to the universe as a whole, to the country Nepal, to each city, to each temple and shrine, and, tantrically, to the worshipper’s own body. The realization of one’s own identity with these larger designs is the attainment of salvation (Gellner 1992:190 f.). Wegner, an ethnomusicologist who has lived for many years in Bhaktapur, writes: ‘To be part of the whole mandala is really what matters here, what gives people their deep-rooted sense of security and happiness.’ (pers. comm.) Thus music and dance connect individuals not only with each other as a community, but also with cultural constructions of sacred space and time, within which each person can find their place.

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**Notes on the Opaque Seduction of (Canto) pop: Sonic Imaginations**

Western journalists and academics routinely ignore Cantopop. Hence two events that profoundly shocked Chinese audiences worldwide: the death of Leslie Cheung and Anita Mui’s illness, passed unnoticed in the West. Whereas Western scholars are fond of the rebellious sounds of Beijing rock, pop sounds from Hong Kong and Taiwan are trivialized and reduced to ‘sickly sweet songs’ (Wilde 1998: 239). With this bias against the sounds and images of pop, one ignores a rich and complex domain of cultural inquiry. Inspired by Oscar Wilde’s sledge that ‘we should treat all the trivial things of life seriously, and all the serious things of life with indifference’, the time is ripe to move from the ‘serious, rebellious’ sounds of rock towards the ‘trivial, superficial’, and less missionary, sounds of Chinese pop.

Jennifer Tang

By Jeroen de Kloet

I

one should expect Chinese pop to reveal aspects of Chi-

nessness, rather than the contrary: apart from the lan-

guage, ‘things Chinese’ are strikingly absent. In Chinese-

pop, the rest merges with the West, making it difficult, if

difficult to draw a line between the two. Its sounds strike

most as fleeting; no discernable youth culture surrounds it.

What then makes Chinese pop an important domain for

academic inquiry? First, it has the power to link Chinese

worldwide – to create an imagined sonic community beyond

borders, to foster a form of transnational citizenship, to pro-

vide diasporic Chinese and Chinese in Greater China a

shared sense of place. Second, pop creates large audiences,

enabling its fans to position themselves in contemporary Chi-

ese society: studying pop’s role in the everyday lives of its

fans provides insights into the belongings of Chinese youth

in mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and overseas. Final-

ly, focusing on pop may help combat a bias in popular music

studies – a bias towards genres such as punk and hip hop

that seem more spectacular, more present with meaning,

but appeal to smaller audiences.

I would like to map out, briefly, possible trajectories for

studying the opaque sounds of Hong Kong Cantopop and

Taiwan Mandopop, with a particular focus on their roles in

creating shared senses of place in a world increasingly in

flux. In using the adjective opaque, I aim to grasp the paradoxical

struggle the analysis of pop entails: how to define its param-

eters while acknowledging the sheer impossibility of unpack-

ing the genre. The opaque, after all, is intrinsically unappro-

achable. In order to simultaneously do justice to its opacity and

throw light on how it produces a sense of place, I propose

studying pop along three trajectories. First, by analysing the transnational opacity of pop. It is neither here nor there but everywhere. Second, by mapping out its intertextual opacity: pop stars are intertextual chameleons slipping between musical, stage and TV identities, as noted by Lawrence Witzelbeen (1999) on pop diva Anita Mui. And finally, by exploring the camp multi-vocal opacity of pop, constantly destabilizing the boundaries of gender and sexuality, of real and fake, seri-

ousness and playfulness, performer and audience.

Transnational opacity

Chinese filled the stadium when Cantopop star Leon Lai

performed in the Netherlands a few years ago (at midnight,

so restaurant owners and workers could attend the show). Studies on transnational cultures often ignore the power of popular culture to create imagined transnational communi-

ties, let alone its political implications. Pop music is one of the domains (the other that comes to mind is Hong Kong cin-

ema) through which diasporic Chinese create an identity out-

side the parameters set by the local culture. Pop stars from

Hong Kong and Taiwan are global icons, linking the Chinese
diaspora across time and space, producing new forms of

transnational cultural citizenship.

If the cliché goes that music has no boundaries, I argue

the contrary: the popularity of Cantopop stars is confined by
definite ‘ethnic’ boundaries while many of their Western con-
temporaries defy these. Cantopop is used by the Chinese dias-

pora as a tactic of distinction, to contest the dominance of

Western pop icons, to claim their own cultural space beyond

the surveying eyes of Western contemporaries. In China-
towns worldwide, Chinese buy the latest CDs, talk about

releases with family and friends and secure popular cultural

capital out of reach to non-Chinese around them. This is

empowering and alienating. The invisibility of Chinese

pop – the opacity of this global pop music fan culture – makes it

all the more pervasive as it refuses to be contained under

the scrutinizing eyes of Western contemporaries, journalists,

and academics.

Intertextual opacity

As they play different roles, pop stars are more media per-
nalities than musicians. Intertextuality is, as Derrida (1995) wrote, intrinsic to any text: ‘nothing is extratextual’. Yet, the intensity with which intertextuality proliferates differs pro-

foundly. The intertextuality of pop, both Chinese and West-

er, is more intense than that of rock. Pop star Leon Lai, for

example, is a star in a complex intertextual universe: sexy pop

star dancing on a videoclip; dangerous gangster on the silver screen; sharp salesman advertising Orang’s new mobile

phone; Uneer ambassador helping the Brazilian poor. It may

well be this intertextual chameleoney that explains why pop

travels so well globally: pop generates more mediated spaces

than musical forms for multiple identities among divergent dias-

poric audiences. While some audiences will relate to the bad

girl image of Anita Mui, others will adore her glamorous lifestyle. Yet others will relate to her as an actress.

The intertextual dimension interests us as a discourse of inauthenticity. Pop, be it Chinese or Western, not only refus-

e to disguise the importance of packaging, control, and arti-

ficacy – as rock does in order to produce the authentic artist – it celebrates it. As composer, lyricist, artistic director, record com-

pany, and producer are intimately involved in the production of

a pop song, the author – a crucial actor in the construction of

authenticity – is impossible to define, present in his or her absence. In pop, authenticity is just another style: the only possible claim to authenticity is derived from the knowledge and admission of your inauthenticity (Grossberg 1993: 206).

The praxis of inauthenticity applies to a different art of liv-

ing where we no longer try to find, but lose, ourselves, true to

the Foucauldian ideal of escaping from the identities soci-

ety moulds for us.

**Multivocal opacity**

Given the disappearance of the author in pop, it becomes

possible to speak in different voices. Pop stars change

overnight, mirroring metropolitan lives lived in constant flux.

In Anthony Wong’s song ‘Ave Maria’ this change is cele-

brated:

I want to be high every day

And change by night and day

Like, Maria, reincarnated

Pregnant by night and day.

Pop’s multivocality comes into its own through the karaoke

phenomenon, where each and every singer appropriates the

songs with his or her own voice. Through karaoke, the bound-

ary between performer and audience becomes blurred. A K-

song (94.3) refers to a pop song particularly suited to karaoke,

in sentiment and vocal range.

Pop performances are spectacular displays of the multi-

vocal pop aesthetics. Gone is the importance of ‘real’ live

music – what counts is pleasure: the better the pop star enter-

tains the audience, the better he or she is. Multivocality thus

takes a deliberate and exaggerated artificiality, which res-

onates with the aesthetic strategy that Susan Song has labelled
camp. ‘The essence of Camp is its love of the unnat-
ural: of artifice and exaggeration.’ (Sontag 1966: 275) The

spectacular multimedia performances in which the star

changes outfit and hair time and again should be seen in this

light. Pop allows stars as well as fans to speak in dif-

erent voices, voices that remain ambiguous and opaque, that

resist fixation in clear-cut meanings.

Chinese pop is neither here nor there, but everywhere: the

pop star is an intertextual chameleon; and by speaking in

many voices, subverts the notion of being true to a coherent self. Chinese pop is no different from Western pop and it is

precisely this refusal to be contained by nationality that may

explain why pop globalizes so well while remaining invisible
to the eyes and ears of academics and journalists.

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Bali’s Last Resort: Writing Ethnography of Balinese Adat

The End of Ethnography?

‘Ethnography’, writing about the others, has until recently been a genre which is supposed to throw light on anthropological investigations. Ever since its ‘post-colonial turn’, however, anthropology has become quite different from what went before, as we have now realized that we cannot assume other cultures are absolutely different and detached from those of the anthropologist. As Cohn has been condemned for having exoticated other cultures as commodities for Western consumption, it follows that ethnography, in a conventional sense, is simply impossible. What is meant by the ethnography of Balinese adat (custom), however, is not writing about the Balinese traditional way of life, but about how Balinese people interpret their way of life in terms of its historical background.

After being in power for many years, President Suharto was finally forced to step down in May 1998. His so-called ‘New Order’ regime forcibly promoted a programme of development aimed at achieving both economic prosperity and national stability. In the pursuit of realizing these aims, his authoritarian regime too often oppressed local people by ignoring their interests and suppressing their voice, so as to standardize various cultural traditions and bring about a uniformity in the name of the ‘state’ and its ‘prosperity’. Even though this was done against the local people’s will, Suharto’s regime was generally permitted to get away with it because of the economic growth, which, it was claimed, was the direct result of his development programme. (The fruits, however, were on the whole enjoyed by his family and cronies.) This modernist discourse of development was supplemented with that of traditional values, celebrating family and paternalism. Ideological support for the regime lay in the claim that the interests of the state should precede the rights and interests of the individual citizens, using the metaphor of ‘a family’, with Suharto as its patriarch and the citizens as its children. It therefore became very difficult for local societies to justify their desire to resist the ‘New Order’ regime’s development programmes and cultural policies, which aimed for uniformity and standardization at various levels. Under these circumstances, Balinese people responded to the pressures and interventions from the authoritative centre by drawing upon their traditional culture. In Indonesian political discourse, ethnic culture could be preserved as long as it served the interests of the state governing apparatus. Thus, religion is firmly positioned within the Indonesian state, Bali Hindu religion (agama) as a myth constructed under Dutch colonial rule and within the three-times-a-day worship). It should precede the rights and interests of the individual citizens or families include celebrating the anniversaries of family or clan temples and the ceremonies of the life cycle such as marriages, funerals, and other rites of passage. Village or communal rituals comprise the rituals in the village temple (including both temple festivals and agrarian rites) and rites for the purification of the village territory. The private rituals are characterized as more or less pur-Balinese and sanctioned by authorities such as the PDHI, governmental agencies, and leading Balinese intellectuals. The communal or village rituals, by contrast, vary from village to village and are idiosyncratic to each community. If anything, they are part of Balinese cultural tradition, or traditional (and heathen) practices, adat. Although Balinese intellectuals do acknowledge adat, they do not consider tradition to be part of their religion. Consequently, the village rituals are excluded from the Bali-Hindo orthodoxy. Religious rituals must be construed to modern religion while other customs and practices are enclosed in adat. This has had serious consequences, although it is quite understandable considering the Balinese struggle to obtain the official recognition of their religion. Its official recognition has in effect made Balinese Hinduism more a part of state apparatus than a belief. Whereas the Balinese understood their culture as an integral unity of Hinduism (agama) and customary practice (adat) and used it as a means to counter the Indonesian state, Balinese Hindu religion (agama) has been on the government handwagon against Balinese tradition (adat). Adat was not so compatible with the modern state apparatus as religion was and, under the New Order, local tradition seemed to be in a precarious position. Studies in the 1970s argued that Hinduism and Balinese adat were increasingly dependent on the Indonesian state agencies. Unlike other provinces in Indonesia, Bali had retained its traditional communities alongside administrative units. Though an administrative unit had no official relation with a customary village or with an irrigation society, in practice they were closely related because the customary village obtained financial aid from the organization for village development. This organization was established under the guidance of the Department of Internal Affairs and was headed by the administrative village head. Likewise, it was predicted that a traditional chief would become increasingly dependent on the administrative chief, and that his function as chief would be attenuated.

Subjected to administrative authorities on a national scale, Balinese Hindu intellectuals, Balinese adat seemed to be in an awkward position. However, due to the fact that ‘the cultural traditions of Bali [had been] the major asset for the tourist promotion of the island’ (Picard, M., ‘Cultural Tourism’ in Bali: Cultural Performances as Commodities, p.37), tourism was one of the main causes of change, even in the context of the development of tourism in Bali under colonial rule. Balinese culture or tradition could occupy a special position even under the repressive New Order regime. Traditional culture became a commodity for the tourism market, which would eventually contribute to the success of the development plan. Rituals dismissed by the authorities as heathen practices are indeed quite often supported by the traditional land tenure system, which is also a part of adat. The image of Balinese culture has undergone commoditization to bring revenue to the state. Thanks to Bali’s international fame as a tourist resort, Balinese people could attempt to weave a discourse of resistance against authoritative regime and its ideology by appropriating adat as a last resort. The ‘appropriation of adat’ is not so much a timeless essence of culture though there are those who claim to have it. Indeed, every ethnic identity tends to draw on the assumption that some such essence exists. The ‘appropriation’ of traditional culture such as adat is neither new nor peculiar. It is a common practice limited to a certain period such as the Suharto or colonial era, but rather, so I believe, ubiquitous and general rule. It should be noted, however, that the particular history of Balinese society made it much more prominent than other communities in Indonesia. The Dutch Indologists found ‘real’ Bali in the village communities which, they assumed, retained indigenous pre-Hindu elements, and held Hindu court court to be a remnant of ancient Javanese culture. Then and now, Balinese society is represented as living in a timeless tradition, which should be commoditized, whether in the interest of tourism or scientific investigation. Despite its marginalization by religion and government institutions, Balinese adat as a myth constructed under Dutch colonial rule has continued to flourish even under the pressure of the Indonesian state. Under the ongoing influence of decolonization towards regional autonomy, contemporary Balinese, increasingly acknowledge the great importance that adat has for them and appropriate it progressively more. The proliferation of mass media attention for Balinese culture and adat-related issues also reflects this process. Regional media has a greater opportunity to promote local identity, because it bears closely on the needs of the local people. Even after the passing of the New Year’s regime, during which the ‘Open Policy’ allowed more media freedom, and after its collapse, various local media have emerged all over the Republic. Notably, the newly emerged Balinese magazines and tabloids concentrate on Balinese culture and, in particular, on Balinese Hindu religion and adat. The ethnography of adat should be written in such a way that it sheds light upon such situations as those that existed under the colonial rule or the New Order regime, and those in the post-New Order era, not in a way that tries to depict an essence of Balinese culture in timelessness. Realist ethnography of conventional anthropology might be destined to die (Clifford 1988), but the description of a particular setting, in which tradition is reconstructed, is still needed.

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* Various books and magazines on Hinduism and Balinese local tradition are sold at a local market place, Gianyar (bali) on 4 August 2000.
The Making of a Myth
The Amazing Life and Death of the Sixth Dalai Lama

By Simon Wickham-Smith

Whether or not the Lama’s narrated claims were true, the relationship between the text and the life it describes is telling of the culture, ideas, and circumstances of the time. We have, in any case, precious little to confirm the facts of Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho’s existence: his official dates (1683–1706) and a temple guide—which of him or her, nor is it by any means certain that the poems attributed to him are in fact his. What we do have is a series of possibilities that occasionally morph into possibilities, a set of ‘myths’ which, when framed in a certain way, take on the appearance of reality.

Our understanding of the life and work of the sixth Dalai Lama boils down to the following. Born in Tsho-na on 1 March 1683, his birth was accompanied by the kind of miraculous events that traditionally accompany the rebirth of a lama. As the death of the ‘great’ fifth Dalai Lama in 1682 had been hushed up, his recognition as the sixth Dalai Lama in 1685 was kept secret. It was only in 1689, when he was twelve, that his true identity was confirmed to him.1

That Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho was formally recognised at twelve and enthroned at fourteen made his position extraordinary, even for a reincarnate lama, as they were generally recognised and enthroned at a very young age. In Tibet in the late seventeenth century, fourteen was, if not the age of majority, at least young adulthood.

His regent, Sangs-rgyas rGya-mtsho, had been chief minister for the fifth Dalai Lama and was arguably the greatest all-rounder produced by the Tibetan monastic system. Having held the country in his grasp since the death of the fifth Dalai Lama, Sangs-rgyas rGya-mtsho was fiercely reluctant to give up power. Again and again, as he moved towards majority, at least young adulthood.

This denial probably had as much to do with the Dalai Lama’s own waywardness as with the regent’s reluctance to hand over the reins. Despite being an outstanding scholar of subjects both sacred and profane: Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho preferred writing poetry, practising archery and carousing in the red-light district of Shol behind the recent hand over the reins. Despite being an outstanding scholar of

One of the key points of the story is that Lhazang Qan had unilaterally invited the Dalai Lama to Beijing, which seemed to have put the Emperor’s nose somewhat out of joint. We can see Dar-rgyas Nomunqan’s text as a narrative of extraordinary mythic power. The creation of Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho rests as much on the secret biography as on the 60 or so poems commonly ascribed to him. To regard the sixth Dalai Lama merely as a historical figure makes one oblivious to what he has come to mean in Tibetan cultural and religious perceptions. Many have believed – known – that the story is the true narrative of the sixth Dalai Lama’s life, as told by him to Dar-rgyas Nomunqan.

Like any reincarnate lama, Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho in death, on a thang-kha, transcends time and space – he resides in his mandala in a different way than his physical body once did. We can see Dar-rgyas Nomunqan’s text as a kind of oral thang-kha, accessible to us on a number of levels, in a number of different dimensions, just as his songs (ngag-nga) can be seen as sung thang-kas.

Acknowledging this context has allowed me in my research to approach Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho’s secret biography in various ways. I have suggested a number of levels on which the more fantastical sections might be understood. To read the remainder of the story from both this contextualized and decontextualized viewpoints may likewise prove instructive, to better understanding the mythology and mythmaking surrounding Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho. Not only would such a perspective render due appreciation to Dar-rgyas Nomunqan and his text, it may allow us to see Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho – whoever he might be – as equally individual and exemplar.

Thang-kha showing Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho in the teaching mudra

\[1\] Dar-rgyas Nomunqan is the name commonly used to identify Ngag-dbang lJun-grub Dar-rgyas.

\[2\] Only the 1981 editions of the Tibetan Peoples Publishing House, Lhasa, and the Peoples Publishing House, Beijing, use the term ‘secret biography’. The original title uses the standard word for biography, rnam-par thar-pa. Nonetheless, ‘secret biography’ is used in reference to this particular text and fits my purposes here.

\[3\] Aris, Michael, Hidden Treasures and Secret Lives, London: Kegan Paul Interna-
tional (1986).

\[4\] We cannot say whether his distaste for formal religious study found expres-
sion in Ber-mkhar, or whether his distaste for formal religious study found expres-
sion in his other writings.

\[5\] We cannot say whether his distaste for formal religious study found expres-
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sion in his other writings.

\[7\] We cannot say whether his distaste for formal religious study found expres-
sion in Ber-mkhar, or whether his distaste for formal religious study found expres-
sion in his other writings.
Can laws and policies surrounding Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) sustain economic growth? Through an examination of the evolution and operation of Taiwan’s FDI legal regime, I would like to suggest that the essence of Taiwan’s success lies in its specific combination of liberalization and regulation. Well-considered policies can act as ‘doorkeepers’ to economic development and if the government maintains a legal regime consistent with public interest-oriented economic policy, it can promote Taiwan’s development without risking its economic sovereignty.

In the 1960s Taiwan turned to FDI to replace hitherto substantial aid from the United States. The government sought to combine FDI with the availability of cheap labour to achieve industrialization. Credit and rebates on imported components and raw materials to government approved initiatives. The strategy produced impressive results: instances of FDI in Taiwan shot up, pushing its value from USD 15 million in 1960 to USD 139 million in 1970. In the 1970s the government adopted the Secondary Import and Export Substitution Policy. The economy’s export orientation, it targeted for future growth capital, skilled labour, and technology-intensive manufacturing industries (Ranis and Schive 1985:93). The approach called for sloughing off industries that were deemed internationally uncompetitive, such as low-end textiles, electronics, and footwear, while increasing local and foreign investment in strategic industries, e.g. microelectronics and capital equipment (Gold 1988:186-197). Results of the new policy included the construction of a high-technology industrial park and a new tier of import-substitution industries.

To promote FDI, the government simplified investment procedures. Through the 1970s the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (SEI) was revised nine times. The new policy included the construction of a high-technology industrial park and a new tier of import-substitution industries. To promote FDI, the government simplified investment procedures. The new policy included the construction of a high-technology industrial park.

Faced with these dilemmas, the government redrafted its development strategy. In 1974, the policy of liberalization, internationalization, and institutionalization aimed to upgrade industry. A new policy of liberalization, internationalization, and institutionalization aimed to upgrade industry. The SEI enacted in 1960 was considerably reduced the number of industries restricted to investment by foreign nationals and overseas Chinese.

In 1991, the Statute for Encouragement of Investment (SEI), which targeted specific industries, was replaced by the Statute for Upgrading Industries (SUI), designed to encourage domestic and foreign investment across industries. Similarly, the Statute for investment by foreign nationals and overseas Chinese, SIFN, and SIOC, were revised in 1990 and 1996, respectively for overseas Chinese. Most restricted industries and foreign investment across industries. Similarly, the Statutes for investment by foreign nationals and overseas Chinese, SIFN, and SIOC, were revised in 1990 and 1996, respectively.

The high-tech growth of the 1980s is now the focus of economic development policy in Taiwan. As manufacture-oriented industries gradually transform into innovation-oriented ones, it is hoped that Taiwan’s acquired advantage in high-tech manufacturing, along with its strategic geographical location, will continue to attract FDI into the 2000s. Taiwan’s entry into the WTO in 2002 and opening of the domestic market have created further opportunities for FDI. The National Listing, reformed once more in 2002, includes the WTO rules, contains only 10 prohibited industries and 25 restricted industries for investment by foreign nationals and 8 and 22 such industries respectively for overseas Chinese. Most industries in the prohibited and restricted categories comply with the WTO’s national treatment principles: giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals. Preferential tax measures, including incentives for investment in R&D and five-year exemptions or shareholder investment credits for important emerging industries were extended until 2009.

China’s entry into the WTO and pro-FDI legal reforms, one would have expected FDI flows to further increase. This was not the case. FDI to Taiwan dropped from USD 7.608 billion in 2000 to USD 3.727 billion in 2002. In part, this was due to the effect of global economic recession on investor confidence; the rise of China as an economic power also played a part.

Taiwan’s future prospects are threatened by developing nations following closely on its heels. China – with its abundant labour force, market size, land costs and tax incentives – is catching up fast and attracting ample FDI. More recently, China has begun developing its high-technology industries, necessitating Taiwan’s further upgrading and innovation. In 2002, public and private inputs in R&D remain insufficient. Taiwan today does not exercise solid control over critical technologies. However, Taiwan’s labour-intensive, capital-intensive, and then technology-intensive phases, industry in Taiwan has been to become knowledge-intensive. Failure to create higher added value will ensure loss of FDI to China and a slowdown of economic growth. The question of how to achieve these ambitious goals lie open to further research.

References

By HO Ming-Yu
The study of word prosody is in flux. The typology determined by the word-prosodic systems of the world’s dominant languages is being challenged by an increasing number of exceptional languages. This research project focuses on one of these exceptional types: a hybrid word-prosodic system featuring contrastive lexical stress in addition to distinctive tone. The results will enrich our understanding of the form languages can take.

The study of speech, it is useful to make a distinction between segmental and prosodic features. The vowels and consonants that make up utterances constitute the segmental part of speech. Prosody, on the other hand, comprises the properties of speech that are unpredictable on the basis of the sequence of vowels and consonants. The prosodic properties are fundamental frequency (f0, the acoustic correlate of perceived pitch), duration, intensity (the acoustic correlate of perceived loudness) and, to some extent, vowel quality. These prosodic properties serve a wide range of functions in speech communication: flagging word boundaries, encoding pragmatic differences, such as statement versus question, expressing emotion, and so forth.

At the word, or lexical, level, prosodic properties encode lexical tone, lexical stress, and lexical pitch accent, briefly explained as follows. The function of lexical tone is to distinguish words from one another, and so does it by means of f0. The Papuan language Iau, for example, has a tone system with eight lexically contrastive or phonemic f0-patterns. In this language, the syllable /be/ means ‘fire’ when f0 is low, ‘snake’ when it is high and rising, and ‘path’ when it is low and rising, etc. Apart from lexical tone, there is lexical accent. In languages with this word-prosodic feature, one syllable per word is marked prominently by means of a single, specific f0-pattern. This is the case in Japanese, where the syllable that carries the lexical pitch accent is marked by a fall in f0. Lexical stress, on the other hand, is lexical accent encoded by prosodic parameters other than f0. As an example in point is English, where the first syllable in ‘pervert’ stands out from the second syllable in that word by the fact that it has a longer duration, a less schwa-like vowel, and higher intensity. Dependent on position in an utterance, the stressed syllable may also feature as an f0-pattern, but if it does, this f0-pattern is a matter of utterance-level prosody (intonation), often with a pragmatic function. In general, in languages that feature lexical stress, the stressed syllable can be marked by intonational f0-patterns.

The above overview of word-prosodic features follows the typology reflected in landmark studies such as Trubetzkoy’s Grundzüge der Phonologie (1939) and in Beckman (1986). However, there are languages with word-prosodic systems that do not match any of these types exclusively. While some of these atypical configurations have been known for decades, others have been discovered only in recent years. From the clear-cut distinctions of the above-mentioned typology, new data are leading to a considerably less restricted word-prosodic typology.

The best known of these ‘atypical’ configurations straddles the fence between lexical tone and lexical pitch accent. That is, a considerable number of languages have lexical tone contrasts that are restricted to a single syllable in the word. In such languages, the syllable or a micro-sequence to which the tone contrast is limited stands out from among the other syllables in the word, just as is the case with lexical accent. For example, the Austronesian language Ma’ya features a three-member toneme tone contrast that is limited to the final syllable of content words (Remijien 2004). Such systems show that there is a continuous between lexical tone and lexical pitch accent: lexical tone contrasts can be less or more restricted to certain syllables within the word.

Secondly, there appear to be languages that feature none of the three above-mentioned word-prosodic features. French, Indonesian, and possibly Tamil fall in this category. These languages have no lexical tone, lexical pitch accent, or lexical tone. In Indonesian, for example, there is no regular encoding of lexical prominence. And whereas intonational pitch accents are aligned with lexically-accented syllables in languages that feature lexical stress, their association is more random in languages like Indonesian (Gorderedo and Van Zanten, publication pending). Consequently, there are lexical stress languages in which stressed syllables do not carry intonational pitch accents. Both for the Niger-Congo language Wolof (Riisland and Robert 2001) and for the Papuan language Kuot (Lindström 2002), it has been reported that emphasis is not marked by intonational accents on stressed syllables, and that the intonational contours are not anchored to lexically prominent syllables in any way. No detailed phonetic analyses have determined whether the encoding of stress in these languages is the same as in ‘traditional’ stress systems such as English, where stressed syllables do tend to carry intonational pitch-accents.

Finally, there are to be hybrid word-prosodic systems, which combine lexical stress with lexical tone or lexical pitch accent. In most of these, stress is fixed, but at least two of these hybrid systems feature one of these: the above-mentioned Ma’ya language. Ma’ya features lexically contrastive stress in addition to the three-tone word system. Examples of minimal pairs for lexical tone and lexical stress in Ma’ya are listed in tables 1 and 2, respectively. It has been demonstrated (Remijien 2004) that in Ma’ya stress and tone each have their own acoustic encoding: as expected, the tonal contrast is encoded by f0. Additionally, stress is encoded by duration and vowel quality. The other hybrid word-prosodic system with contrastive lexical stress is the Creole language Papiamentu, whose prosodic system has not yet been subjected to a detailed phonetic analysis.

There is a striking similarity between Ma’ya and Papiamentu: both have developed in a contact situation where members of different language families share linguistic features. Ma’ya lies on the geographic boundary between the Austronesian language family and the Papuan languages of New Guinea. Papiamentu is the result of contact between West-African languages and Indo-European languages. In both cases, one (group of) source language(s) involved in the contact situation has contributed the lexical stress feature, and another has given rise to the tonal contrast. In other words, the limited data available suggest that hybrid word-prosodic systems with contrastive stress cannot develop within a single language but only through contact between languages with stress and languages with a tonal feature.

Hybrid word-prosodic systems with lexical stress are interesting because they show how to exploit prosody: without evidence that such systems exist, one could assume that lexical stress, lexical pitch accent, and lexical tone are mutually exclusive. The main focus of this project is to determine exactly how Ma’ya and Papiamentu use prosody. For example, is it possible for such languages to encode intonational contrasts, in addition to the two word-prosodic contrasts they feature? Also, research will also be carried out on other atypical word-prosodic systems (e.g. the Papuan language Kuot), in cooperation with descriptive linguists. In conclusion, the discovery of more and more ‘atypical’ patterns in recent years constitutes a challenge to word-prosodic typology: we will need to move beyond classifying such systems as atypical and arrive at a new synthesis of what kind of word-prosodic systems are possible in languages of the world. To arrive at that stage, however, we need detailed phonetic studies on the word-prosodic systems of less-studied languages. Obviously, the typology outlined above reflects the world’s dominant languages, and that is its limitation. But now that a laptop and a good quality speech lab, there is no reason to exclude such analyses from fieldwork research on minority languages, which is where the surprises will be found. In short, it is impossible to know what word-prosodic typology will be like twenty years from now, but it will be a very different picture from the one outlined above.

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By Bert Remijien

New Perspectives in Word-Prosodic Typology

The study of word prosody is in flux. The typology determined by the word-prosodic systems of the world’s dominant languages is being challenged by an increasing number of exceptional languages. This research project focuses on one of these exceptional types: a hybrid word-prosodic system featuring contrastive lexical stress in addition to distinctive tone. The results will enrich our understanding of the form languages can take.
Books Received

General


Books Received

China


South Asia


South Korea


Central Asia


India

India


India


Politics: By Other Means

The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India

Paul Brass' latest book The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India is an extraordinary work that sums up almost 40 years of research on politics, religious identities, and violence in Northern India. Focusing on the politics of Hindu-Muslim relations and communal violence in Uttar Pradesh, Brass argues that riots are permanent features of Indian politics, produced and staged by 'institutionalized riot systems'. Condemning and bemoaning riots and casualties have become part of India's modern political culture, as much as the riots themselves.

Brass' introductory chapter takes aim at what he sees as the untutored and, ultimately, mystifying explanations that have been advanced in explaining riots. 'Naturalizing' accounts of communal conflicts as the results of enmities divided by deep and incommensurable differences. Other views as pathologies of Indian political life, resulting from the cynical manipulation of religious passions by criminal business people and ill-intentioned politicians focused on short-term electoral gains. These explanations, Brass argues, not only obscure the processes at work; they are complicit in the very regime that enforces an irrational reality in the shaping of religious identities and communal violence. Portraying them as either 'justified' or as short-lived 'aberrations', these explanations fail to recognize the immense value of sustained and local mobilization.

Brass presents the context and development of a sequence of riots in Aligarh since 1953 and explores the changing roles of Aligarh Muslim University, Muslim artisans and local rivalries over space and livelihoods, and policing strategies. He presents data on the changing spatial and demographic configurations of Aligarh, testing the popular thesis of Hindu-Muslim economic competition as the source of rioting. In subsequent sections Brass analyses the nature of political competition and local electoral arithmetic with cogency and precision, while the role of the police and the media are treated in separate chapters.

The sheer volume and complexity of this unique longitudinal study comprising interviews, official reports, statistical evidence, campaigns, local rivalries over space and livelihoods, and policing strategies all figures present strong conclusions. Brass reminds us that riots do not happen in most places most of the time, not even in times of generalized low tension between communities. His material convincingly demonstrates that over the decades, riots have repeatedly occurred in only four or five specific localities in Aligarh. These localities are all characterized by the presence of political compulsions, men whose activities span business, politics, and cultural-religious organizations, men who are willing and able to translate rumours and general discourses into local mobilization.

Riots as routine politics

Brass argues that explanation of the persistence of riots in India stand up to scrutiny? The book is the work of a mature mind and does not discount the broader cultural and psychological explanations of how the history of Hindu-Muslim enmity has, over time, produced a rich archive of mythical knowledge of the other which defies logic and reasoned argument. Brass is more interested in where, when and how; and by whom, this archive is activated and transferred into arguments for action and violence. His insistence on 'demystification' is refreshing and this book once again shows the immense value of sustained and localized field research.

The most suggestive conclusion to emerge from this book is that riots are integral and embedded into the fabric of India's modern political culture, and that condemning and bemoaning riots and their casualties have become as much a part of the culture as the riots themselves. Recent studies of lower-caste movements and other forms of political mobilization in India suggest that activists are groomed to regard politics as a permanent state of warfare. Violence no longer represents the breakdown of political communication, but lies, rather, at the heart of contemporary Indian political practice. For all its merits, the book leaves a range of questions unanswered. We hear a great deal about the 'riot systems' constructed over decades by various Hindu nationalist figures in Aligarh. The riot systems on the other side, among Muslims, appear less documented — almost non-existent — despite stories of links between Muslim criminals and politicians at Aligarh Muslim University. Is it due to the difficulties involved in gathering information from marginalized communities? Or is it because riots are organized in a differently organized? Or absent? Is the whole idea of symmetry, of equally apportioning blame and culpability to Hindus and Muslims, maintained, assumptions of underlying mechanisms organized and orchestrated? Or is the whole idea of symmetry, of equally apportioning blame and culpability to Hindus and Muslims, maintained, assumptions of underlying mechanisms organized and orchestrated? Or is the whole idea of symmetry, of equally apportioning blame and culpability to Hindus and Muslims, maintained, assumptions of underlying mechanisms organized and orchestrated? Or is the whole idea of symmetry, of equally apportioning blame and culpability to Hindus and Muslims, maintained, assumptions of underlying mechanisms organized and orchestrated?
The last decade in Japanese Studies has been marked by a deep interest in Japanese minorities, namely the Ainu, Koreans, Okinawans, and burakumin. Scholarly work has embarked on a mission to deconstruct the myth of the unique and homogenous Japanese nation. The book *Japan and Okinawa*, which deals with Okinawan identity, is an excellent contribution to this deconstruction.

Okinawa, known in the past as the Kingdom of Ryukyu, was incorporated into the Japanese state by 1879. Although Japan succeeded in assimilating its southernmost province, it never treated it as an integral part of so-called ‘Japan proper.’ Notwithstanding the terrible sacrifice that Okinawa was forced to make during the Second World War, it would later be abandoned and ceded to the USA. Even today, thirty years after recovering to Japan, Okinawa is still disproportionately burdened with the presence of American military forces. Japan and Okinawa is divided in two parts, ‘Structure and Subjectivity’ consisting of fourteen essays covering various aspects of modern Okinawa. Part one discusses the political and economic structure that built Okinawan hostage, and the ways in which Okinawans are trying to loosen its constraints. The province’s main problem, we learn from the essay by the retired sailor, McCormack, is its heavy dependence upon economic development, designed, sponsored, and controlled by the Japanese state. This makes Okinawa’s identity not only subject to, but mainly on, tourism, revenues from military bases, and public construction works. Since the government is not willing to give up public housing (see the chapters by Gabe Masaki and Ota Masahide), and the bases obscure the development of Okinawan economic, government can only be sustained through the promotion of public construction works and tourism, both of which have almost reached their limits in terms of opportunities. The Okinawans are trying to break this vicious circle by proposing a free-trade zone, which would help Okinawa emerge as a self-sustaining microregion in Asia. This plan, however, meets with little support in Tokyo, as the government fears the prospect of ‘one state, two systems’ as a consequence of the privatization of the market (see the chapter by Glenn D. Hook). Still, as Ota Masahide informs us, ‘the Okinawan problem’ is not only a matter of Okinawans’ lack of government support. It is also a matter of omnipotent Japanese bureaucracy which does not want to give up its power and which obstructs the government’s efforts to decentralize the state.

Part two, ‘Subjectivity,’ gives us several different insights into Okinawan identity. The variety of subjects discussed corroborates the idea that this identity is highly complex and ambiguous. Richard Siddle examines the revival of Okinawan ethnicity and demonstrates how the Okinawan people are trying to gain worldwide recognition by drawing upon the notion of ‘indigenous people’. Myume Tanji, on the other hand, examines voices of Okinawan women and environmentalists who seek international support for their struggle against, respectively, military violence and the ‘construction state’. These two essays demonstrate that Okinawan negotiates and articulates identity not only in reference to Japan proper. Yet, Japan still seems to be the leitmotiv in the Okinawan narrative. Julia Yotani discusses the controversies over attempts to politicize memories of the Okinawa Battle, and in her chapter we learn how sensitive the issue of ‘being Japanese’ is in Okinawa.

This book deserves special credit because it breaks with certain conventional approaches towards the study of Okinawa. It proposes we stop looking at the province as a mere victim of Japanese and American imperialism and colonization, an image we have tended to take for granted thanks to sympathetic studies by, for example, Kerr (1958) and Christy (1997). Okinawa, we learn, is not a passive subject in a history of subjugation, owing her ‘Okinawan business’ only to unilateral designation on the part of the powers to which she was subjugated. The book demonstrates that the political and economic structures imposed upon Okinawa are double-faced: on the one hand it constrains the right to self-determination, but on the other it provides opportunities. What Okinawan society can realize and articulate its identity. As Glenn Hook and Richard Siddle emphasize in their introduction, Okinawans, in spirit of being ‘subjected’, do have the power to negotiate, challenge, and even subvert the structural constraints. To what extent they can turn their disadvantageous position into benefits depends on how they negotiate their political principles, history, identity, culture, and environment. Politics and recent history predominate in the book and it is to be regretted that culture has been covered only rather superficially in two essays. Also, there is little reference to the pre-war years and the history of Ryukyu. Still, the contemporary focus on the examined topics and the innovative approach places this work among the most important works in Okinawan Studies. It is an excellent book that should be recommended to all interested in contemporary Japan.

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By Margarita Winkel

The essays in part one, ‘Translation and the Articulation of the Modern Episteme in Japan’, discuss translation as part of a creative process of adoption and adaptation into a new environment, a process that inevitably requires a creative reinterpretation of the original. Michael Schiltz, in his essay on the essential meaning of translation, problematizes the relation between translation and notions of society and territorial boundaries. Vande Walle traces the historic development of the Japanese scientific concepts in Japan and China, which began with Jesuit translations in the seventeenth century, against a background of existing linguistic traditions in these countries. In an essay on the artistic impact of the Western linear perspective in Japan, Sluiter points out the transformation of this European linear perspective and reveals how this painting principle was not passively adopted, but was reinterpreted to fit into existing Japanese artistic tradi- tions. Kanuliku Kasaya views the translation of Dodonæus’ book from a political perspective. He places it against the background of the official shogunal policies promoting the local production of medicinal herbs.

The essays in part three, ‘Japanese Renditions of Dodonæus’, trace the effects of these translations further into the actual adoption and impact of these works in Japan. By examining the history of the adoption of Christian knowledge in Japan, we learn about the critical role of Deshima surgeons in introduc- ing Western medical science and materia medica into Japan, and Frederik Cryns presents the Japanese translation and adaptation of the mechanical concept of the human body, developed by the Dutch medical teacher Herman Boerhaave (1668–1738), as an exercise in the translation of concepts. The other two essays in this part extend the scope of this book to the role played by non-Dutch European science and scientists. Although foreign science practices were known as ‘Dutch Studies’ (van-grook) because they were introduced through the Dutch East India Com- pany (VOC), the VOC employed many who came from elsewhere in Europe. Yoko Hayashi examines the role of Deshima in bringing to Japan were translations from other European languages, notably French, German, and English. Yoko Hayashi and Hideyuki Hayashi discuss the importance of Chinese science in Tokugawa Japan. Hayashi and Shigemi Inoue, take the fourth of Dodonæus’ book on prominent non-Dutch VOC employee, the Swedish botanist Carl Peter Thunberg (1743–1828), who seems to be the leitmotiv in the Okinawan narrative. Julia Yotani discusses the controversies over attempts to politicize memories of the Okinawa Battle, and in her chapter we learn how sensitive the issue of ‘being Japanese’ is in Okinawa.

This book deserves special credit because it breaks with certain conventional approaches towards the study of Okinawa. It proposes we stop looking at the province as a mere victim of Japanese and American imperialism and colonization, an image we have tended to take for granted thanks to sympathetic studies by, for example, Kerr (1958) and Christy (1997). Okinawa, we learn, is not a passive subject in a history of subjugation, owing her ‘Okinawan business’ only to unilateral designation on the part of the powers to which she was subjugated. The book demonstrates that the political and economic structures imposed upon Okinawa are double-faced: on the one hand it constrains the right to self-determination, but on the other it provides opportunities. What Okinawan society can realize and articulate its identity. As Glenn Hook and Richard Siddle emphasize in their introduction, Okinawans, in spirit of being ‘subjected’, do have the power to negotiate, challenge, and even subvert the structural constraints. To what extent they can turn their disadvantageous position into benefits depends on how they negotiate their political principles, history, identity, culture, and environment. Politics and recent history predominate in the book and it is to be regretted that culture has been covered only rather superficially in two essays. Also, there is little reference to the pre-war years and the history of Ryukyu. Still, the contemporary focus on the examined topics and the innovative approach places this work among the most important works in Okinawan Studies. It is an excellent book that should be recommended to all interested in contemporary Japan.

By Margarita Winkel
The Burdens of Economic Growth

Prior to World War II already, Japan was the first non-Western country to become successfully industrialized. From the 1970s onwards, Japan again transformed its backward position, which resulted from the War, into one of world leadership in terms of its economy, its wealth, and its position at the forefront of technology and science, but not, or much less so, of its political institutions or culture. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was widespread belief that Japan’s economic model was far superior to both the European Rhineland model and the free market ideology and practices of the United States and Great Britain. Only in the 1990s, when Japan’s growth faltered, was this assumed superiority called into question.

By Benno Geljant

The British sociologist Runciman has pointed out that, in a social science there are four different meanings of understanding something: to report what happened, more or less as a journalist does; to explain why something happened; to describe how what happened was experienced by the people concerned (that is, how it felt); and, finally, to evaluate whether what happened was a good thing or a bad thing. This book is a mixture. It concentrates on what happened; to describe how what happened was experienced by the people concerned (that is, how it felt); and, finally, to evaluate whether what happened was a good thing or a bad thing.

Japan, up to the end of World War II, the American occupation; the foundations of the economic miracle (1952-1965); the miracle itself (up to 1973); a discussion of the shock absorbers in place to 1978; the dilemma of power (1980-1993); and a final chapter on the end of the Japanese model (up to 2000). In each chapter occurrences and changes in the economy, the policy, the society, and the international relations of Japan are dealt with.

Development is a multidimensional phenomenon but, although a positive long-term correlation between dimensions clearly exists, in the short term progress in one dimension may occur at the same time as stagnation or deterioration in another. Japan is to some extent an example of this contradiction between long term and short term. Bouissou explains that, prior to as well as after World War II, Japan’s phenomenal economic growth was directed by the state. In both pre- and post-war periods, the main goal was independence. Before that war, independence was seen as the tool which would enable Japan to be an imperial power like Great Britain. Since the late 1950s, independence as a national goal has been seen not in military but in economic terms: it means independence from foreign technology and foreign finance. This is not to be achieved through autarchy but, on the contrary, by exporting as much as possible while importing as little as possible. Growth, however, not only implies that production is increased but also, after a while, that value is added and wages increase. In turn this means that labor is more expensive for certain goods to be produced. Growth may in the end benefit most people in society, but it also creates hardship because some industries or sectors go out of business, or because the push to produce cheaply causes environmental and health problems. Faltering businesses may temporarily be kept going by handing out subsidies, which becomes prohibitively expensive, or by restricting cheaper imports, which meets with international resistance and, eventually, sanctions. Japan did both, rather successfully, until the late 1980s. Belief in and optimism about the Japanese model, not only on the part of foreigners but, also, of the Japanese themselves, led to spec-ulation of Japan’s terminal exhaustion, which burst in 1989. Since then, the economy has stagnated.

There has been, and still is, debate about who rules Japan. Bouissou refers to the ‘Iron Triangle’, which consists of the LDP (the party that has ruled Japan with only a minor interruption since the mid-1950s), the bureaucracy, and the large business groups (p. 247). This elite managed to stay in power and, in the process, created the economic miracle. What also helped was the doctrinal rigidity of the main opposition party, the Socialists. The victims of growth had no political alternative.

Whereas the subtitle of the book, ‘the burden of success’, suggests some causal connection between the earlier economic successes and the stagnation of the nineties, other than that the latter followed upon the former, it is only in the introduction of each chapter that an attempt is made to establish a causal relation between economy, polity, and society. It is a rich book in the sense that it contains a staggering amount of facts; but, for that very reason, readers need to build a somewhat more simple causal chain for themselves. The same elite that created the miracle – more scandal-ridden now than ever, Bouissou seems to suggest – now stands in the way of a resumption of growth, because it does not want to sacrifice its power.


Bibliography


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The Treasurer of the IAS with Richard Boyer is currently editing a reader comparing development in Latin America and East Asia.

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Over the past two decades, scholarship on East Asian, and in particular on Chinese literature has been transformed by the application of Western critical theory. From being the exception, theoretically informed approaches have become increasingly prevalent. Although old-fashioned, plain-speaking humanistic criticism has far from disappeared, the work of scholars such as Roy Chow and Lydia H. Liu has had a significant impact on the field and on upcoming generations of researchers.

The jury is still out on the implications of these developments, and on the compatibility of critical theory with literatures and cultures so distant from those of the West. Is this Western cultural imperialism that imposes its own misunderstandings on East Asian literature? Does the application of Western theories to East Asian literature welcome ‘marginal’ literatures into the modern, Western global canon at the expense of ‘local’ critical approaches, thereby keeping non-Western literatures and critical practices culturally subordinate to the West? Not unimportantly, does ‘theo-speak’ tend to produce frustratingly obfuscating analyses?

These, and other relevant questions, have been raised in various public forums since the early 1990s. Reading East Asian Writing is the latest contribution to this debate. Growing together Konrad Schubert and thirteen scholars of Chinese and Japanese literature to consider the question: does Western literary theory work in East Asia?

The contributors vary widely in their approach to the issue. Some plunge straight in with practical applications of theory to specific works of literature, others concentrate on the theoretical structures inherent within the organization and study of literature; again others consider the uses and pitfalls of critical theory. Roy Chow, the doyen of theoretical analyses of modern Chinese literature, takes a direct approach, drawing together a short story by the modern Chinese writer Lao She and texts by Walter Benjamin, in order to illuminate the complexities of Lao She’s position as a patriotic, nation-loving global cultural nigro. The Haruo Shirane, by contrast, uncovers the theoretical assumptions behind canon formation in Japanese literary history.

Later chapters grapple with the relevance of specific theoretical schools and thinkers to East Asian literature, such as Descriva, Krivatea and new historicism. Two essays are devoted to the application of the sociological ideas of Pierre Bourdieu to Chinese and Japanese literature. Michel Hocks finds that, in the 1920s and 1950s literary scene, Bourdieu’s ideas about position-taking and strategies of accumulating cultural capital shed helpful analytical light on the behaviour of the avant-garde literati of that time. Hock also notes, however, that the usefulness of Bourdieu’s theories is dimished on considering the strong impule to collective, as opposed to individually discrete, action within modern Chinese literature.

Stephen Dodd’s essay offers a valuable personal view of the function of theory. Instead of regarding literary theory as a tool for the critic to achieve a quasi-scientific objectivity (one of the aims that fuelled its genesis in the twentieth century), Dodd asserts that ‘everyone is involved in some kind of theoretical position’. While established literary theory can offer a stimulating smorgasbord of choices, it is crucial that the critic maintains a flexible self-awareness of the personal intellectual baggage he or she brings to a text.

Dodd’s thoughtful perspective is representative of the balanced, non-polemical tone that unites these essays, whose authors never delve from careful, reasoned argument. More nominative than conclusive, this stimulating collection offers a wide-ranging discussion of questions, most of which there can be no definitive answers.


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The Ca Mau Shipwreck, 1723-1735

By John Kleinen

Sometimes between 1723 and 1735, a Chinese junk sank off the coast of Vietnam's farthest point in the South China Sea. Its cargo consisted of chinaware, porcelains, blue and white ware, porcelains decorated in brown, and various stoneware, all originating from different kilns in southern China. The best-known pieces are the porcelains from Jingdezhen in Jiangxi province, where ceramics have been produced since the fourteenth century; other notable pieces include those from the Dehua kiln complex in Fujian and from Guangdong. The variety of the chinaware and the different kilns indicate that this vessel was part of the large Asiatic porcelain trade that developed in the early fifteenth century and in which the Portuguese and the Dutch played an important role. The exact prove-
tion of the Ca Mau wreck is still not clear, but the author believes that the ship was on its way to Batavia or another port in order to deliver wares for the European market. Similar shipwrecks, such as the well-known Vung Tau (1690) and the one recently discovered off Binh Thuan, north of Saigon, belong to a regular trade route along the coast of Vietnam. Although the VOC was connected to the porcelain trade, private traders had already taken over the exports to the European and Dutch markets at this period. Apart from cataloguing a large amount of Chinese porcelain, the book includes a series of photographs of blue and white dishes, sometimes in sets of five, deco-
rated with the well-known so-called ‘Scheveningen’ landscape (formerly known as the ‘Deshima’ décor), a typical Dutch fishing village. In the background the sails of fishing boats are visible in between the roofs of houses, a church, and a fire beacon (executed in Chinese style). Chinese dishes with European motifs were made to order and are known as ‘Chine de commande’.

European motifs were, apparently, very popular. They appear not only on dishes, but also on cups, plates, and other kitchen- or tableware. A number of beer mugs, clearly made for a European market, also make up part of the large collection.

This bilingual publication traces in detail the history of the recovery of the wreck and its cargo. The dating of the wreck is based on information gleaned from outside sources. Sources include Chinese porcelain inscriptions reading ‘Made in Yongsheng Great Qing’, and two coins bearing the inscriptions ‘Kangxi issued’, indicating that they were produced in the reign of the Qing emperor Kangxi (1662-1722), which unit-
ed China during the seventeenth century. This author also makes clear that the ship was involved in trading Chinese ceramics and participated in the inter-Asian trade between East and West. Vietnam was an important hub in the flourishing ‘single ocean’ trade (a term coined by the late histori-
er O.W. Wolters), which stretched from the coasts of eastern Africa and west-
ern Asia to the immensely long coastal line of the Indian subcontinent and on to China. The Dutch linked up with the inter-Asian trade by trading Chinese and Vietnamese porcelain through the VOC network or by ordering special cargos through private traders. To get an insight into this trade, it proves use-
ful to compare cargos of porcelain arte-
facts that were intended for different cli-
ients, as these cargos hold important keys to the history of inner-Asian trade in which Vietnam’s rulers of the southern domain, Dang Trong (the inner region), took part. Ultimately, the research on wrecks found off the coast of Vietnam contributes to unrav-
elling Vietnam’s troubled internal his-
tory between the fifteenth and seven-
teenth centuries.

Notes


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One into Many: Translation and the Dissemination of Classical Chinese Literature is the first anthology of its kind in English that deals in depth with the translation of Chinese texts, literary and philosophical, into a host of Western and Asian languages: English, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Hebrew, Slovak and Korean.

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One into Many

NEW TITLE
Khams pa Histories: Visions of People, Place and Authority

By Audrey Prost

Khangs pa Histories, along with the other regional investigations emerging from Tibetan Studies today, offers a more local and unique perspective on Tibetan border politics. This collection of essays brilliantly demonstrates the political fluidity of Tibetan border worlds and the agency of local actors in negotiating both Tibetan and Chinese assimilationist projects.

Both Wim van Spengen and William Coleman investigate the causes of the ongoing political unrest in Khams at the turn of the twentieth century. Van Spengen examines the political backdrop to the 1906 siege at Sangguling monastery in Khams’ Chating district, and the monastery’s problematically liminal political position at the Sino-Tibetan border. Coleman convincingly contends that a network of indigenous leaders, monasteries, Qing Empire representatives and merchants was responsible for maintaining a precarious regime of order in the region until the twentieth century. This fragile nexus was irrevocably lost after the 1906 uprising, when Qing influence over the region overwhelmed both monastic and indigenous authorities, irreparably drawing Khams into the Chinese nationalist project.

As Alexei Melnichenko draws us into the tumultuous story of one of Khams’ leading trading families, the Pangdatsangs, and the intricate identity politics at work behind the murder of its patriarch Pangdang Nygros in 1930, Lhasa The family penetrated the Chinese aristocracy by building alliances with other powerful families and establishing themselves as patrons of the three monasteries (Sera, Drepung, Ganden). Melnichenko’s investigation of the circumstances that ended in Nygros’s murder and his interview accounts of the Pangdatsangs, in what is a testimony to the enduring evocative power of leading Khampa figures in the contemporary Diaspora. Peter Schweiger proposes a perspective on the cultural history of Sera’s circles in the political and religious institutions that delimitates the contours of communal identity. Tsering Than discusses the life of the prestigious nineteenth-century Bon scholar Shar rdzis Bka’i rgyal rtsens and the main body of his hermitage collection, with the aim of illuminating the Bon religion’s political history, particularly in the pre-nineteenth century period, and one awaits with anticipation what upcoming histories of Ano and Khams will bring to the debate on changing identities and identities themselves, but also external parties and institutions. The book’s contention that its hydrocarbon resources to become more effectively used by the national states are a stake in the debate on changing identities and identities themselves, but also external parties and institutions. The book’s contention that its hydrocarbon resources to become more effectively used by the national states are a stake in the debate on changing identities and identities themselves, but also external parties and institutions. The book’s contention that its hydrocarbon resources to become more effectively used by the national states are a stake in the debate on changing identities and identities themselves, but also external parties and institutions.
The House in Southeast Asia

By Catherine Allerton

T he collection, edited by Stephen Sparkes and Signe Howell, is the result of a conference organized by the Nordic Association for Southeast Asian Studies. The twelve ethnographic papers cover a wide variety of topics and, in addition to considering more familiar examples from Sulawesi, Sumatra, and Malaysia, introduce material on the house in Thailand, the South Ryukyus, and among the Baba of Melaka. Previous collections on the house, most notably that edited by Carsten and Hugh-Jones (1995), have focused on the application of the concept of house to new areas in Southeast Asia, and considering transformations in the meaning of houses during times of social, economic, and political change. In doing so, what new analytical tools are opened to the Southeast Asian house?

In recent years there has been a considerable decline in the average number of children born to women in Andhra Pradesh. The bottom line seems to be that women increasingly perceive children as consumers and not as producers. Challenging the pervasive notion of women as mere providers of nourishment and incubation to the seed that contains the potential of life (Dube 1986, Eliade and Sullivan 1987), Minna Sävälä’s notion of women as mere providers of nourishment and incubation to the seed that contains the potential of life (Dube 1986, Eliade and Sullivan 1987), Minna Sävälä’s women’s personal narratives. By Nita Mathur

By Nita Mathur

In the present day, women need to negotiate their fertility choices rigorously within family structures. As a result of this change, the reproductive, social, cultural, and familial repercussions of the fact that women now give birth to fewer children than their own mothers did, and (4) examine how the quest for a small family and the adoption of female sterilization as the most accepted contraceptive method have a bearing on gender relations and intergenerational dynamics. At another level, the work may be located in the larger framework of the studies of rice culture and gender and culture. It examines the implications of low fertility at grass-roots level in terms of women’s choices and the interplay of power and social control in families. To pursue this discussion it is imperative to identify the processes and framework within which women make and pursue their fertility choices. Given the fact that, in the traditional Indian situation, a woman’s body and its processes are largely under the control of men, the author cites interesting cases of women who opted for sterilization of their bodies, overthrowing their husbands’ authority. This comes out succinctly in the case of a young woman who pressed her right hand to decide on the number of children she would rear, in spite of the forced demands of her husband and mother-in-law. A sterilization scar is an emblem of the symbolic mother/woman, challenging the authority of the mother-in-law as a post-procreative woman who wields considerable influence in familial affairs. Such self-assertion appears to have sparked off a wave of conservation and repression. Fertility may be treated as a part of the larger cultural complex, consisting of beliefs, values, myths, rituals, and cultural practices. Against this backdrop, cultural interpretation of conception and birth, as well as indigenous methods of birth control, assume considerable significance, and had Sävälä examined this she would have added a welcome dimension to the argument developed in the book. Nonetheless this is a fine piece of work with clear objectives, pursued by the author through out the text, and opening up several interesting possibilities for further research.

References


Dr Nita Mathur is an anthropologist, and is currently working at the Indian Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, India, where she is preparing a thsaurus of Santhal (a ‘tribal’ community in the eastern part of the Indian subcontinent) words for body, worth, and seed. Her research interests range from arts in lifestyles to emotions across cultures and indigenous vision. She has edited the book Santhal Worldviews, and is the author of Cultural Rhythms in Emotions, Narratives and Dance.

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The Encyclopedia of Religion

By Catherine Allerton

Rebathing a ‘round house’ (mbaru niang) in southern Manggarai, Flores, Indonesia.


References


Dr Catherine Allerton is lecturer in Anthropology at the London School of Economics. Her research concerns kinship, houses, and landscape in Flores, Indonesia.

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The House in Southeast Asia

By Catherine Allerton

Rebathing a ‘round house’ (mbaru niang) in southern Manggarai, Flores, Indonesia.


References

The Anatomy of Betrayal

Over 2,700 delegates at the Papuan Congress gathered in West Papua’s capital of Jayapura in June 2000 to proclaim their independence from Indonesia and call for a major historiographical revision that would straighten the history of West Papua. Indonesian nationalistic historians have depicted the incorporation of West Papua into their nation’s fold as a transparent and uncontested process. Leaders of the 2000 Papuan Congress, many of whom have contested Indonesian rule since it began in the 1960s, were aware that their perspective had been written out of history. The Anatomy of Betrayal responds to Papuan nationalist calls for historiographical revision and argues that the transfer of West Papua from the Netherlands to Indonesia violated international agreements. John Saltford’s timely book examines whether the people of West Papua were ever given a genuine opportunity to exercise their right to self-determination.

By S. Eben Kirksey

On 15 August 1962, representatives of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia signed an accord at the United Nations headquarters in New York. According to Saltford, this accord, which is known as the New York Agreement, ‘explicitly acknowledged and guaranteed the right of self-determination for West Papua’. The Agreement obliged the UN, the Netherlands, and Indonesia to protect the political rights and freedoms of the Papuans and to hold a referendum in accordance with international practice. Saltford argues, however, that Cold War politics and the interests of ‘big power’ meant that Papuan self-determination would never be considered a serious option.

While Saltford outlines the gross anatomy of West Papua’s betrayal, he does not explain how this treachery was orchestrated. Racist colonial discourse, for example, was one tool used by ‘big power’ for denying Papuans the right to self-determination. At the time of West Papua’s transfer to Indonesia the international community deplored Papuans as cannibals, headhunters, and Stone-Age savages: as a people not fit to govern themselves.

The United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) administered West Papua from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1969. According to the preamble of the UN Charter, one of the aims of this international body was ‘to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained.’ The Anatomy of Betrayal details how the UN ignored the obligations of the New York Agreement and violated its own mandate in West Papua, for example by banning Papuan nationalist marches during this period.

The Anatomy of Betrayal is an important reference work for historians of the Cold War, scholars of post-colonial South-east Asia, and policy makers who seek to understand the roots of Papuan nationalism. Saltford’s documentation is thorough, and at times daunting. An Indonesian language translation of this study – eagerly awaited by Papuan intellectuals – is already in the works. Saltford’s exhaustive study of UN sources about the Indonesian acquisition of West Papua is one of the very first academic books about the post-colonial history of the territory. This book has broken significant ground and sets the stage for future research on related topics given the vast wealth of rich and varied source materials that remain unstudied.

Malaysia, the Making of a Nation

Ethnic pluralism has long been a Malaysian hallmark. Prior to independence from Britain in 1957, the policy was fashioned by the integration strategies of the colonial government and the distinctive roles of – and potential frictions between – the major ethnic groups. The complexities of the Malaysian case stem from the make-up of the population: Malay (58 per cent), Chinese (24 per cent), Indians (8 per cent), and others (10 per cent). Efforts to integrate these diverse groups in the interests of national unity have been, and remain, at the heart of the Malaysian enterprise of nation-building.

By Marie-Aimee Touras

Malaysia, the Making of a Nation is the first in a five-volume series on nation-building histories in Asia. Defining nation-building as ‘both economic progress and socio-political integration of a nation, i.e., prosperity and national unity’, Cheah Boon Kheng conceptualizes Malaysian nation-building as an ongoing process with each successive Prime Minister adding a stone to the larger construction. From this perspective, the author, himself a Malaysian national, reviews the legacies, responses, and roles of four Prime Ministers towards the various ethnic groups since 1957.

The book is comprised of six chapters. The first two provide background to nation-building in Malaysia and Malay dominance within the process, indispensable to understanding the country’s contemporary politics and political economy. Given the salience of ethnicity in the early 1950s, it was hardly surprising that most of the effective parties formed to contest the first federal election for the legislative council in 1955 were ethnically based: Malay, Chinese, and Indian. That year, an informal ‘historic bargain’ or ‘social contract’ between the different parties was struck, establishing the political framework within which ethnic groups would henceforth operate. Laying the basis for sharing power, this contract also upheld the ‘social position’ and ‘rights of the Malays – Bumiputra (son of the soil or indigenous people).’

The following four chapters devote themselves to the Prime Ministers: Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak, Tun Hussein Onn, and Mahathir. According to Cheah Boon Kheng, every one of these Prime Ministers started off their political career as an exclusivist Malay nationalist, but ended up as an inclusivist Malaysian nationalist. Each Prime Minister was influenced, above all, by the extent of political support from his own party: United Malay National Organisation (UMNO). When, however, their positions were weak, Prime Ministers had to rely on the other parties in the Alliance: ‘Tunku Abdul Rahman, according to the UNTEA’s protocol of February 1962, was dependent on West Papua’s ‘voluntary’ relinquishment to Indonesia, and Mahathir Onn continued this policy but Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir first adopted pro-UNTEA policies given the vast wealth of rich and varied source materials that remain unstudied.

The book’s breadth is matched by its depth. Malaysia, the Making of a Nation is an important reference work for historians of the Cold War, scholars of post-colonial South-east Asia, and policy makers who seek to understand the roots of Papuan nationalism. Saltford’s documentation is thorough, and at times daunting. An Indonesian language translation of this study – eagerly awaited by Papuan intellectuals – is already in the works. Saltford’s exhaustive study of UN sources about the Indonesian acquisition of West Papua is one of the very first academic books about the post-colonial history of the territory. This book has broken significant ground and sets the stage for future research on related topics given the vast wealth of rich and varied source materials that remain unstudied.

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The Anatomy of Betrayal
The Chinese Minority in Southern Vietnam

By Volker Grabowsky

Although Engelbert has concentrated on the period after the beginning of French colonial rule (1859), his lengthy chapter on the ‘China policy’ of pre-colonial Vietnam is particularly interesting as it provides us with a clearer understanding of the determinant factors of Vietnamese ethnic policies, shaped by geography and historical experiences.

Given the political and cultural dominance of imperial China over the Vietnamese heartland in Tonkin, the ability of the Vietnamese people to integrate into and, in the longer run, also assimilate numerous Chinese immigrants, seems remarkable. The author explains this achievement by the attitude of almost all Vietnamese dynasties towards the ‘People of the North’, which in sum entailed: ‘assimilation of the immigrants and separation of the aliens’ (p. 33). The fact that China as the Middle Kingdom remained a model for Vietnam even after the latter had achieved full independence, by the late tenth century, may have made it easier to implement this paradigm.

Notwithstanding renewed, albeit temporary subjugation of Vietnam by the Ming rulers (1407-1427), after the final withdrawal the Vietnamese crown allowed all Chinese who preferred to stay equal rights as Vietnamese citizens, provided that they adopted the country’s customs. This also implied the encouragement of marriages with Vietnamese partners. ‘The separation of the own [i.e. Vietnamese] population from foreigners (who refused to integrate) while at the same time integrating and assimilating those who wanted to stay in Vietnamese society, were always official policies of the state’ (p. 39).

The Vietnamese 16 dynasty used ethnic Chinese as well as Vietnamese to found settlements on the Chinese territories of central Vietnam, which, in 1477 were incorporated into the Vietnamese realm. The recruitment of Chinese as settlers in former Cham and Khmer land seems to have been a characteristic feature of the Vietnamese Nam Tién (‘Movement to the South’). Ethnic Chinese had played a pivotal role in the colonization of the Mekong delta since the seventeenth century. Thus by the end of the eighteenth century a mixed Vietnamese-Chinese society had emerged in this sparsely populated region, transforming a landscape dominated by dense mangrove forests into fertile agricultural land. Cochinchina was able to support the region around the capital Hué and the provinces further north with rice (p. 100). Thus, even before the Chinese mass immigration to southern Vietnam in the period between 1880 and 1929, Chinese migrants made a significant contribution to the development of the Mekong delta (p. 114).

During the period of French colonial rule the Chinese in Cochinchina maintained a high degree of autonomy through their congregations which relied on clan and speechgroup structures. When the conflict between the French administration and the Vietnamese anti-colonial movement escalated during the 1930s, the Hoa remained in Vietnam, the conditions for their mark on those Chinese who remained in Vietnam, the conditions for the resilience of the Hoa in southern Vietnam. Though the anti-Chinese excesses in the years in the aftermath of the reunification of Vietnam (1976) had left their mark on those Chinese who remained in Vietnam, the conditions for a successful and gradual process of integration and assimilation of the Hoa exist today. The absence of Chinese mass immigration, like in the previous century, will prove to be a crucial factor in achieving the positive future that Engelbert predicts. Engelbert’s study of the historical relations between the Hoa and their Vietnamese environment is also an important contribution to the history of the ‘Nanyang Chinese’ in general. The reviewer hopes that this work will attract scholarly interest, even beyond the German-speaking world, as it certainly deserves.

Notes

1. Hoa is most probably derived from the Chinese word, pronounced in Mandarin as hua (lit. ‘beautiful’, ‘magnificent’, ‘culture’). Ancient China was called Hua Xia, abbreviated to Hua. The traditional Tai Yuan (Northern Thai) designation of the Chinese, Hò, could also be derived from Hua. I am grateful to my colleague Ming Liew for elucidating the etymology of this ethnic term.

2. Nàn ‘means ‘south’, and yén ‘means ‘ocean’ or ‘sea’. Thus ‘Nanyang’ can be rendered as ‘Southern Sea’. ‘Nanyang Chinese’ refers to the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, notably those in the insular parts of the region.

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Engelbert, Thomas, Die chinesische Min-" nität im Süden Vietnams (Hoa) als Para-
digma der kolonialen und nationalistischen Nationalitätenpolitik, Frankfurt am Main (etc.): Peter Lang (2002), pp. 703, ISBN 3-528-18404-X (originally written as a postdoctoral thesis (Dissertationsschrift) at the Faculty of Philosophy, Humboldt-University of Berlin).

Grabowsky, Volker. Professor of South- east Asian History at the Westfälische Wil- helms-Universität Münster. His recent pub- lications are on the history and traditional literature of Laos and northern Thailand. He is currently jointly responsible for a DFG (German Research Foundation) project on the Tai polities in Southeast Asia and south- western China.

Grabowsky@uni-muenster.de
A n explosion of creativity from India is taking place in India since the mid-1800s, whose influence has shaped the role played by popular Indian imagery in the construc- tion of cultural, social, and national identities. This ‘eclecticism of visuality,’ as Jain calls it, relates directly to major cul- tural and technological transformations that have taken place in India since the mid-1800s, whose influence has shaped both the India we know today and the debates about its future. Nine interconnected sections, such as ‘Camera Indi- ca,’ ‘Representing the Other,’ and ‘Manipulating the Image,’ allow the audience to ascertain the struggles within India’s consciousness of itself to resolve questions of colonial and nationalist politics, a polity composed of multiple linguistic, religious, and ethnic communities, and the function of reli- gious practice and imagery within a secular context. To my mind, Jain’s exhibition gives ample opportunity to an unini- tiated audience to properly evaluate many of the strategies and references being employed by the artists in Kapur’s show. ‘Actors at Work’ is the title given by Anuradha Kapur to her programme of performing arts for ‘body.city.’ Adaptation and assimilation are key attributes in the six works chosen by Kapur, professor at Delhi’s National School of Drama and theatre director. Quotation of previously existing works ties together these dances, plays, and performances, whether they are sourced from traditional Hindu contexts (such as ‘Shakun- tal’s Identification’ which is being presented by Ammanur Chachu Chakkar Smarak Shaikulal and Natasa Khairalal, or ‘Ganapat’ by the Adishakti Laboratory for Theatre Art Research) or European (such as Kapur’s collaborative work ‘Ganapati’ by the Adishakti Laboratory for Theatre Art Research) or European (such as Kapur’s collaborative work ‘Ganapati’ by the Adishakti Laboratory for Theatre Art Research) or European (such as Kapur’s collaborative work ‘Ganapati’ by the Adishakti Laboratory for Theatre Art Research).
Fried Jam,’ performance artist Maya Rao teams up with musician Ashim Ghosh to present both political and anthropological meditations in an informal, comedic, cabaret style. Most of the works in ‘Actors at Work’ display the same uninhibited experimentation with technology and formal hybridization operative in the visual arts presentations.

Finally, film historians and theoretist Ravi Vasudevan takes on the multi-headed monster that is film in India, with his programme entitled ‘Selves made Strange: violent and performative bodies in the cities of Indian cinema, 1974-2005.’ Vasudevan’s tactics are all-embracing, giving equal attention to the commercial Hindi-language cinema generated out of Bombay (Bollywood), regional cinemas in Bengali and Tamil, documentary film-making for social and political purpose, as well as diasporic story-telling. Directors included in the programme are Satyajit Ray, Yash Chopra, Kumar Shahani, Mani Ratnam, Malesh Bhatt, Anand Patwardhan, and Ram Gopal Varma, amongst others. ‘Selves made Strange’ celebrates a certain dissipation of coherence that has taken place in Indian cinema since the 1970s, asserting the ‘mutability of personality’ as a possible emergent critical vocabulary. With Vasudevan’s programme, ‘body-city’ achieves its cathartic melting point, identifying Indian culture as inherently and necessarily complex and contradictory.

Contemporaneous with ‘body-city’ but not officially allied to it is a comprehensive survey of work by the New Delhi-based photographer Dayanita Singh. Having begun her career in photojournalism, she has pursued a variety of subjects of her own volition and tested the strategic foil to nationalistic exhibition paradigms? Parallel to ‘Privacy’ is ‘Myself…’ provides a poignant rendering of the life of an individual who is both marginalized by mainstream society and her own milieu, a portrait of the tremendous tolls taken in the creation of an independent identity. As the vast majority of Singh’s images in both shows in Berlin have been shot in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, her corpus should make an appropriate addition to the collective format of Kapur’s show (and isn’t this perhaps the case for installation operative in the visual arts presentations). With Singh’s portrait of India is intimate, patient, privileged, and refined, light-years away from the garishly coloured visage of touristic India and the disaster-driven images that feed the international media. Her realistic portraiture provides the Berlin audience with an in-depth look at a single artist’s accomplishment, which unfortunately, is not possible with the collective format of Kapoor’s show (and isn’t this perhaps the case for installation operative in the visual arts presentations)? Parallel to ‘Privacy’ is ‘Myself…’ provides a poignant rendering of the life of an individual who is both marginalized by mainstream society and her own milieu, a portrait of the tremendous tolls taken in the creation of an independent identity. As the vast majority of Singh’s images in both shows in Berlin have been shot in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, her corpus should make an appropriate addition to the collective format of Kapur’s show (and isn’t this perhaps the case for installation operative in the visual arts presentations).

Peter Nagy is an American artist and curator, frequently working on the subject of contemporary art. Since 1992 he has been based in New Delhi where he runs Nature Morte, a gallery promoting a wide variety of art forms by both Indian artists and those coming to India to work. naturemorte@hotmail.com

‘Chopra Cousins’, New Delhi 1999

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Asian Ceramics in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is often considered a Mecca for scholars and devotees of several types of Asian ceramics. The abundance of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Asian porcelain in the Netherlands is the logical outcome of Dutch prominence in the large-scale porcelain trade between Asia and Europe. Considering this abundance it is important that Dutch institutions are encouraged to study their own collections, that they make these available to international scholars and add new information to this particular chapter of ‘Asian ceramics’: seventeenth- and eighteenth-century export porcelains. Four Dutch museums with impressive collections of Asian ceramics (Princessehof Leeuwarden, Groninger Museum, Gemeentemuseum Den Haag, and Rijksmuseum Amsterdam) have recently started up a cooperation project to these ends.

By Jan van Campen

In the late sixteenth century: not much was known about the Chinese empire, but China was already beloved in the Netherlands. In the early seventeenth century, and, perhaps, even more left the Netherlands at a later date in the hands of foreign collectors, there still is no other place with such a comparatively high density of kraak ware. Kraak porcelain is a type of Chinese export ceramic produced from c. 1560 to c. 1650 and was originally developed for the Portuguese and Spanish traders as a light ware, with standard forms which enabled them to store the objects economically in their ships. The thin body is often warped in the kiln and always painted in Underglaze blue, while most saucers and dishes are painted with alternating broad and small panels in the rim. It is exactly this type of porcelain that the Dutch began to trade in the early seventeenth century. Dutch trade started in 1613 with the capture of a Portuguese ship, San Lasso, loaded with porcelain, subsequently auctioned off with much success. Whereas the Portuguese had restricted their porcelain trade mainly to the Asian markets, the enormous success of this sale incited the Dutch VOC to aggressively pursue an active trade bringing Chinese porcelain to the Netherlands.

Five scholars were invited to lecture on a symposium that accompanied the exhibition. They focused on the impact of the sudden increase of Chinese porcelain in Europe, the kraak ware imports being the first opportunity for Europeans to easily acquire Chinese objects. China was already beloved by well-read Europeans in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not merely known about the Chinese empire, but they were familiar with rumours of a mythical, rich country where a wise man reigned as emperor over contented subjects. The arrival of relatively cheap kraak porcelains, decorated with Chinese plants, flowers, animals, landscapes, people, mythological animals, and other motifs, enabled Europeans to acquire samples and proof of the incredible riches and miracles of this exotic country.

The museums are now working on the website publication of their complete collections of kraak porcelains. Rather than publishing a selection of the most attractive objects, with lengthy and extensive commentary, in a catalogue, we want to make as many kraak ware objects as possible accessible on the website for scholars and all those interested in Asian ceramics all over the world. The kraak ware collection of the four museums is expected to be available on the website in autumn 2001. Another cooperative exhibition, scheduled for this year, will consist of highlights from the four porcelain collections. Objects have been deliberately chosen to show as clearly as possible the various collecting accents and historical development of the collections. Hopefully, the exhibition programme and website will help to gain wider recognition for the importance of these Dutch collections of Asian porcelains.

Jan van Campen is curator for Asian export art and ceramics in Museum Princessehof Leeuwarden and for the Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.

References
1. ‘Ceramic’ is a generic term for earthenware, stoneware, and porcelain. Porcelain is much harder than stoneware and earthenware and requires high oven-temperatures.
3. Kraak ware is a type of porcelain exported, initially, by the Portuguese and, from 1602 onwards, especially by the Dutch. Its thinness, lightness, and standardized forms and decoration, made it cheap and easy to transport.
4. The results of the symposium have now been published in the periodical Voor- mer uit Vaeuwen-Mededdengheidsboeken (Nederlandse verzameling van vrienden van ceramiek en glas) (Issue 18/3/18), 2001-2.
5. www.asiatiekenkeramiek.nl
Until 5 January 2004

Museum für Ostasiatische Kunst

The exhibition offers an overview of the development of 15 young contemporary artists from ten ASEAN countries. Their work is displayed in a variety of media, including paintings, sculptures, installations, and video works. The exhibition is organized by SAM and is touring Europe in 2002-2003.

Until 29 February 2004

Singapore Art Museum (SAM)

To commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Singapore Art Museum, this exhibition features a collection of over 400 pieces that provides an introduction to East Asian textile art. The exhibition also includes works from the gallery/art institute while exploring the shifting role of the artist as both actor and player in the changing of societal values.

Until 29 February 2004

National Museum of Asian Art-Guimet

“India: Art of the First Temples” is an exhibition of early sculptures from India, predominantly from the city of Mathura. These sculptures are characterized by their great variety of religious images and practical functions, and through an examination of these objects, the exhibition explores the connection between daily activity and religious practice among the citizens of the region.

Until 31 December 2003

Palais de Tokyo

This exhibition features the work of 15 international and contemporary artists, including Wong Hoy Cheong and Cai Guoqiang. The exhibition offers a timely evocation of Confucius and his influence on modern Chinese culture. It explores relationships between the individual and the collective, between the self and the social. The multidimensional exhibition space is full of interactive opportunities for experiencing art and collaborations between diverse artists and media such as performance art, animation, video, photography, dance, and theatre.

Until 31 December 2003

Kunsthalle Wien

Although long suffering from the lingering effects of the Cultural Revolution to 1990s, contemporary Chinese art is currently thriving. This exhibition explores the role of contemporary people depicting the life in the present day China, whose life is still affected by the digitization of society. The exhibition includes monumental pieces as well as series of the artist’s drawings. The exhibition includes a recently donated collection that includes window panels, partition panels, lattice windows, and railings.

October 2002 – 2003

The Tokyo National Museum holds a special exhibition to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the National Palace Museum, Taiwan, which was established in 1946. The exhibition includes a set of uniquely hand-coloured photographs of China’s art, culture, and history. These photographs were taken by the photographer Ye Xin, who documented the various aspects of Chinese culture, including architecture, costumes, and daily life. The exhibition also includes a recently donated collection that includes window panels, partition panels, lattice windows, and railings.

November 2002 – 2003

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Art Agenda

6 October 2003 – 1 January 2004
The exhibition of 45 major works selected by 45 highly respected individuals commemorates the 45th year of the establishment of the National Gallery of Canada. Various styles, media, themes, and techniques represent the diversity of Malaysian art. Included are works by Mohd. Dahlan, G. Bin and child prodigy, Dulkifli. Enjoying is interpreted by individuals in their respective art field.

New Zealand

Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa
Cable Street, Wellington
T +64-4-381 7000
www.tepapa.govt.nz/

Until late January 2004
From Woodblocks to Comics: The Japanese Impression
This exhibition brings together traditional Japanese woodblock prints and watercolors by European artists and manga (Japanese comics) to illustrate two hundred years of Japanese and European artists drawing on other cultures for inspiration – from traditional woodblocks to modern comics.

Until September 2004
Aaina: Reflections Through Indian Weddings
This exhibition celebrates the diversity of New Zealand’s Indian communities through the customs and rituals surrounding marriage, including the jewelry, customs, food, religious objects, music, and colors that make the Indian wedding unique. The exhibition explores ways in which Indian people in New Zealand, both immigrants and locally born, identify themselves as Indian, and how they express and maintain their culture in this country.

Russia

State Hermitage Museum
34 Vosstaniya Naberezhnaya (Palace Embankment)
St Petersburg 190000
T +7-812-211 2457
www.hermitagemuseum.org

18 November 2003 – 18 January 2004
Video Art Festival Featuring Shirin Neshat (Art Pontoons)
Singapore

The Museum of East Asian Art
12 Bennet Street
Bath BA 1 2QJ
T +44-122-54-640
www.bath.co.uk/museum/museum

Until 11 January 2004
Death and Burial: The Chinese and the Afterlife
This exhibition examines Chinese beliefs and rituals surrounding death, burial, and the afterlife, primarily through an exploration of the development, diversity, and historical meanings of tomb objects from the Neolithic period through the Tang Dynasty. These mingles (spirit goods) had various functions to provide sustenance for the spirit (illustrated by various bronze and ceramic vessels); to provide servants, entertainers, and companions for the deceased (illustrated by tomb figures of servants, dancers, singers, and officials); and to provide servants (illustrated by wood and ceramic tomb guardians). Representations of animals and architecture are also displayed to illuminate Chinese beliefs about immortality.

The Royal Scottish Museum
Chambers Street
Edinburgh, EH1 1JF
T +44-131-247 4319
www.rsm.ac.uk/royal

Until 4 April 2004
Aina: Reflections Through Indian Weddings
This exhibition examines Indian artists’ practices engaging in diverse technologies and media, and reflects upon encounters with the digital in contemporary life. Includes artists Michael Fanning and Leong Choon Yew.

Thailand

The Center of Art and Culture
Sanam Chandra Palace Campus
Muang District, Nakorn Pathom Province
T +66-3-455 3217
www.inter.net.th

Until 6 December 2003
International Print and Drawing Exhibition on the occasion of 60th Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of Silpakorn University
Sanam Chandra Palace Campus
Muang District, Nakorn Pathom Province
T +66-3-880 7730
www.inter.net.th

Until 4 January 2004
Hunt for Paradise: Court Arts of Iran, 1500-1576
Los Angeles County Museum of Art
5905 Wilshire Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90036
T +1-310-828 0200
www.lacma.org

Until 18 January 2004
Purpose of the exhibition is to explain the notion of human perfection, the methodology needed to achieve it, and the visual imagery used in its service. It is comprised of approximately 150 Tibetan, Nepalese, and Indian, and Chinese paintings, sculptures, textiles, and ritual implements from North American, European, and Nepalese collections.

American Museum of Natural History
Central Park West and 79th Street
New York, NY 10024
T +1-212-676 5100
www.amnh.org

Until 1 January 2004
Spirit: The Art of Digital Media
This exhibition includes paintings and objects made in traditional media of porcelain, lacquer, and ivory created between 1910 and 1936, as powerful illustrations of the call to arms of the Cultural Revolution in China. The 200 prints on display include subjects drawn from earlier printmaking as well as newly developed categories of prints. The selection includes multi-block wood prints with water-soluble and oil-based inks, and other techniques such as abridging, waste-block printing and embossing. Items of note include book illustrations printed from a single block of wood and a series of 50 prints depicting musical instruments by Chen Qi, and The Back of the Sky by Xu Bing.

Seattle Asian Art Museum
1000 5th Ave East
Seattle, WA 98102
T +1-206-654 3100
www.seattleartmuseum.org

Until 21 March 2004
Seattle Asian Art Museum
1000 5th Ave East
Seattle, WA 98102
T +1-206-654 3100
www.seattleartmuseum.org

Until 11 January 2004
Artist Yoyoi Kusama. Through the repetition of colors and forms, the pavilion’s surface vanishes into pattern and pulls the viewer into Kusama’s potent hallucination.

Sea of Buddha
The exhibition contains more than 75 objects, including miniature paintings and arts of the book, ceramics, carpets, textiles and metalwork. Organized historically, it explores the development of the Safavid artistic style and the context in which it emerged, with a focus on depictions of paradise as a garden and the hunt, both of which played major roles in Safavid court life.

Until 15 February 2004
TODOSA: Shīrō Neshat
This 12-minute, double-screen video installation by Shirin Neshat serves as a contemporary counterpart to Hunt for Paradise: Court Arts of Iran, 1500-1576.

American Art Museum
200Larkin Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
T +1-415-581 3500
www.asianart.org

Until 11 January 2004
Leaning Forward, Looking Back: Eight Contemporary Korean Artists
This exhibition explores connections between the present and both the tangible and the intangible past in the artworks of Korean artists living today: Cho Duck- hyun, Jung Jong-mee, Kim Hong-joon, Kim Young-ju, Lee Jungjin, Song Hyeon-ook, U Sunok, and Whang Inke. The exhibition examines the digital dialogue underlying the works of these eight well-established contemporary Korean artists who have bazil new tails in a range of media.

Seattle Asian Art Museum
1000 5th Ave East
Seattle, WA 98102
T +1-206-654 3100
www.seattleartmuseum.org

Until 11 August 2004
The Feast – Li Jin
Li Jin’s 13-meter handscroll, A Feast, takes us on a historic culinary tour of China, providing contemporary insights into the central role of food in Chinese culture. Juxtaposed with Li Jin’s depictions from tradition are classical Chinese painting and calligraphy.

Smithsonian Freer and Sackler Galleries
National Mall
Washington, DC
T +1-202-357 4880
www.asia.si.edu

Until 4 January 2004
Freer Gallery of Art
Tales and Legends in Japanese Art
This exhibition of 120 objects explores the role of popular stories based on religious literature, biography, history, and legends were the subjects of Japanese painting from the earliest historical times to the most modern period.

Until 21 March 2004
Arthur M. Sackler Gallery
Perspectives: Yoyoi Kusama
The Sackler Gallery inaugurates its five-year program of contemporary installations with two works by the Japanese artist Yoyoi Kusama. Through the repetition of colors and forms, the pavilion’s surface vanishes into pattern and pulls the viewer into Kusama’s potent hallucination.

Maritime Piracy in Asia

Along with cowboys and knights in shining armour, the pirate is a classic romantic figure in the imaginations of yeptadators. Indeed, the romance of the pirate extends to a broader audience than that, as the success of the recent film Pirates of the Caribbean demonstrates. However, however, hee the stereotype of the charming pirate rogue so wittily played by Johnny Depp. Over the past 15 years, the incidence of piracy has surged, with the busy seas of Southeast Asia playing host to the largest number of attacks. Pirate attacks have become increasingly violent, and have come to represent a growing threat to maritime trade.

By Derek S. Johnson and Erika Pildade

In response to the challenges posed by contemporary piracy in Asia, the IIAS, in collaboration with the Amsterdam-based Centre for Maritime Research (MARE), has launched a long-term initiative aimed at stimulating research on piracy. The goal is to create a new generation of criminologists who will provide support for international cooperation in countering the crime. This document demonstrates the contemporary reality of piracy, and an understanding of the activities of the key international organizations operating in the area. International Maritime Organisations (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) provide support for piracy research that emerged repeatedly in the presentations and discussions was the strength of the argument. The IMO conforming to the United Nations Law of the Sea (Art. 101) definition of piracy that restricts it to illegal acts of violence or detention against ships within national waters. The IMO defines acts of violence or detention committed against ships that occur within the jurisdiction of a state as armed robbery at sea. All states thus have to pursue and arrest pirates, which occur within their national jurisdiction. In the last five years, the IMO has issued a much broader definition of piracy: an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime with the intent to use force or to cause harm to the vessel. The IMO definition of piracy has long allowed families to maintain a direct control over their territory. Paradoxically, they were able to withdraw from the post-11 September environment. Gerard Ong rightly observed that ships ‘can be dangerous too’ as vehicles for attacks on vital shipping lanes or sensitive environments. In early September, the IMO reported that a new surge of piracy in the Malacca Straits may be due to attempts by Achref rebels to fund their activities through vessel capture and hostage taking (ICC 2003). While increasing state anti-piracy naval and coastguard capability is important, the formulation of effective counter-piracy policies also requires that increasing research attention be directed at macro-economic and political factors such as those we have sketched here. It is our hope that the programme of piracy research that has arisen from the IIAS-MARE initiative will help in this effort.

References
- Ong, Gerard. ‘Ships can be dangerous too: Coups and terrorism in Southeast Asia’s maritime security framework’, conference paper: People and the Sea II: Conflicts, Threats and Opportunities, (Amsterdam 4 September 2003).
- Dr Derek S. Johnson is a senior researcher and postdoctoral fellow at the Centre for Maritime Research. His principal research interests include social and economic change, resource degradation, and management in the fishery of Ceyspat State, India. djhynson@sogulif.org.ca
- Erika Pildade, MA is a PhD candidate in criminology at Erasmus University, Rotterdam, and in the International Program Concerning Transnational Crime in Trento, Italy. She is also a lecturer in criminological theory. erikapildade@hotmail.com

Local Land Use Strategies in a Globalizing World

Shaping Sustainable Social and Natural Environments

Over the last few decades, globalization processes have taken centre stage in most development debates. Developing countries have been particularly vulnerable to these processes, and are acutely exposed to economic crises, natural disasters, epidemics, or other adversities drain local and national resources. But how do local rural people react to such events? Having been managers of delicate or sometimes hostile environments for generations, local peoples are not strangers to crises. How do they combine management of their land and natural resources with the challenges and opportunities of globalization?

By Reit de V. Wadding, Eric More and Andrea Eelke Renzenboer

During the last decade, a number of developing countries have experi-enced rapid economic growth and were then faced with even more rapid eco- nomic decline, particularly countries in Southeast Asia that fell victim to the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Meanwhile, in some places, increases in state power have placed greater constraints on local peoples. The first step in their research was to explore how state power elsewhere has fostered local autonomy, but has also increased outside threats, mainly the threat of uncontrolled resource exploitation. In sum, this has led to heightened concern among government officials, development specialists, and local peoples over the sustainability of their social and economic systems. Local peoples in many areas have been faced with apparent increases in climatic variability, population growth and urbanisation, land degradation, deforestation, land degradation, and poverty. Other changes include increasing commercialisation of the economy, and changes in the political economic and social environments. Constraining in their economic agency by their natural and social environments, local rural peoples (whether indigenous or migrant) have dealt with these changes by adapting their earlier local land use strategies to the new circumstances.

The globalization process may affect these constraints through, for example, land degradation, shifting opportunities for labour migration, and changing conditions for the provision of natural and social environment for use. This multiplicity has long allowed families to remain flexible in uncertain natural environments and changing economic circumstances, most recently brought on by intensified global forces.

At the conference, we debated issues revolving around the mission of the Danish University Consortium on Sustainable Land Use and Natural Resource Management (DUCED SLUSE). Participants in fields ranging from anthropology and geography to political science and ecology debated the question of how do they combine management of their land and natural resources with the challenges and opportunities of globalization?

Notes
- Over a five-year period, the IIAS-MARE research programme on piracy will consist of regular workshops and conferences on piracy that will feed into a publication series. The latter will include volumes dealing with scholarly and policy concerns, covering both contemporary and historical periods. For more information see: www.iias.ni

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**India’s Ship-Scraping Industry**

**Monument to the Abuse of Human Labour and the Environment**

For the 36,000 migrant labourers working in Alang, Gujarat, the sound of the magnificent Arabian Sea is drowned in the deafening ship-breaking activity and the fresh ocean air is clogged with the fumes of welding torches. They have come from the most backward states of India: Bihar, Orrisa, and eastern Uttar Pradesh. Extreme poverty and unemployment has compelled them to migrate to the ship-breaking yards of Alang. Desperate for work, they have taken up jobs that the local Gujarati labourer considers too risky, cutting open toxic-laced ships using the most primitive methods, under hazardous working conditions.

The ship-breakers, who own the ship-breaking plots, buy scrap ships in the international market and get them dismantled by the migrant labourers that they have employed on a contract basis, are rather feudalistic in their attitude towards the labourers. Whatever little concern they may have for the working and living conditions of the labourers and environmental pollution arises from the fact that, of late, Alang has been receiving a lot of adverse publicity in the national and international media due to the large number of accidents and deaths of its workers over the last couple of years. Since 1996, over 400 fires have broken out and around 200 labourers have died. This has led to pressure groups within ship-owning countries urging their governments not to send their ships to scrapping yards with poor safety and environmental records. The ship-breakers, on their part, insist that the ship-owners should de-contaminate the ships before selling them off to the scrapping yards. The Gujarati Maritime Board (GMB), a government body responsible for regulating ship-breaking activity and for promotion and maintenance of basic infrastructure facilities at Alang, has laid down some safety and environmental regulations to be followed during ship-breaking, but has limited powers to implement them due to the economic and political clout enjoyed by the ship-breakers. Non-governmental organizations in India as well as international, such as Greenpeace, are of the opinion that in accordance with the Basel Convention, which decrees that exporting nations and polluting industries have to take care of their toxic waste, ships should be cleaned of all toxic materials in Western countries before they are to be scrapped in Asia. But until that happens, the labourers and the environment at Alang will continue to get a raw deal.

**Bibliography**


**By Rupa Abdi**

A fter 25 to 30 years, when ships are at the end of their sail- ing life, they are sold to scrapyards in order to be dis- mantled so as to recover the valuable steel which constitutes almost 95 per cent of the ship. India is the world’s largest ship-breaking nation by volume, and in India, Alang is the main centre of ship-breaking activities. The 6,000 metric tonnes of steel that come out of Alang every day, on average, account for about 15 per cent of the country’s total steel output. At about half the cost of regular furnace-based plants, this output contributes massive revenue in terms of custom duties, excise duty, sales tax, and so on, to central and state govern- ment exchequers.

Ship-scraping around the globe exemplifies both the potentialities and the dangers of an increasingly globalized economy. Northern corporations seek to neutralize their activities (and waste producers, their hazardous materials) to southern countries, which are unwilling to enforce internation- ally acceptable environmental and labour conditions for fear of the industry relocating to an even lower cost country. Ship-breaking may create job opportunities for thousands of labourers and contribute to the economic growth of these regions, but exposes the labour force to risks of death, seri- ous injury, and chronic health problems. During the scrap- ping process hazardous wastes are released into the envi- ronment, and labourers are exposed to toxic substances. In short, economic profit gains precedence over environmen- tal health and labour rights.

Ship-scraping at Alang violates numerous national and international regulations related to pollution, hazardous wastes, and labour rights. Established in 1986 and built on the sweat and blood of migrant labourers, Alang has grown to be the world’s biggest ship-breaking yard, a monument to the outrageous abuse of human labour and environment. The labourers in Alang live in poor housing and sanitary con- ditions and little attention is paid to their health and safety concerns. According to the physicians in and around Alang, besides other Alang patients, the combination of haz- ardous working conditions, congested and unhygienic living conditions, poor quality drinking water, availability of illicit country liquor, and rampant homosexual activity and prostitution have given rise to a number of skin, gastrointestinal, and liver diseases besides tuberculosis, leprosy, malaria, malnutrition, cancer, HIV-AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases (STD). According to the local Bhavnagar Blood Bank office at Alang, besides 38 confirmed cases of AIDS, about 70-75 new cases of other STD are being reported every week among the labourers. This is probably the tip of the iceberg. There is a severe lack of medical facilities at Alang. The main facil- ity is the Red Cross Hospital which is inadequate to meet the health requirements of 36,000 labourers. Serious cases are referred to the Civil Hospital at Bhavnagar, 55 kilometres away. The violation of the civil and labour rights of these workers is common. In fact, they are low paid, are provided no systematic job training, and do the ship-dismantling work with insufficient protective gear. As a result, injuries and deaths due to accidents are common.

The above conference was held at the Institute of Geog- raphy, part of the City Center of the University of Copen- hagen. In addition to funding provided by IAS, the con- ference was sponsored by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida), the Danish Social Science Research Council, North/South Research Program, the Danish Agricultural and Veterinary Research Council, the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University (Copenhagen), and the Institute of Geography (University of Copenhagen).

**Letterbox to the Editor**

Domain, to resist official ‘malpractice’ and assert their own management plans for the island. With critical sup- port from a leading Philippine envi- ronmental non-governmental organi- zation (NGO), diverse official policies allowed the Tagbanua to shape the terms of encounter over a conservation project under the National Integrated Protected Areas Program (and funded by the European Union). They did this in such a way that it enhanced their own ability to manage Coron Island. NGO support was critical for this local success: it helped to prepare local Tagbanua organizations early on in the policy process, and aided them in bridg-
The Return to the Laggai

As part of the current reformatory politics in Indonesia, otonomi daerah (regional autonomy) has been introduced. In response to the growing demands for greater political and financial autonomy, a start was made when decentralization was introduced in 1999. The desire to have autonomy at a provincial level, which could potentially have undermined the state, was cleverly circumvented when the government decided to denote lower administrative units – the kabupaten (district) and desa (village) – as key levels in the new autonomous system (von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 2001).

Regional autonomy and the adherent decentralization are all about the empowerment of Indonesia’s civil society and the democratization of its political structure. Under informal as well as external pressure to move towards a less authoritarian political system, Indonesia is being forced to replace former repressive top-down policies with locally instigated bottom-up strategies. The role of domestic NGOs in promoting local adat as an important bottom-up strategy is extremely significant. Local NGOs, supported by post-Cold War discourses that prioritize democratization, human rights, environmental protection, transparency, and good governance, do not seem to have a hard time linking themselves with powerful international (donor) organizations, thereby creating potentially powerful positions for themselves.

On the mainland of West Sumatra regional autonomy has triggered off a restructuring of the local government, in which the desa (village) structure is to be replaced by a local government based on the nagari.1 When West Sumatra reintroduced the nagari as a local government unit in late 2000, the Mentawai Archipelago – also part of the province of West Sumatra – feared that they would also become subject to this ‘return to the nagari’. This would have been an unacceptable development for most of the Mentawaians, for they feel substantially different – in a cultural as well as religious sense – from their Minangkabau neighbours from the Sumatran mainland. While Mentawai waited for additional legislation from the provincial level, several local NGOs had in the meantime introduced the idea that Mentawai should have its own movement: kemahli ke laggai (return to the laggai).2 A simple return to the laggai is, however, not as simple as it may seem. Not all parties involved are equally in favour of such a return, in which the current village government would be replaced by one based on the laggai. Some consider it the ultimate opportunity to differentiate the Mentawaians from the mainland Minangkabau, while others fear – not unreasonably – that the structure of the laggai, which is, strictly taken, a land tenure structure, is not capable of carrying the political structure that it would need to support in the near future. Local NGOs and the provincial government are much in favour of the ‘return to the laggai’. Most local NGOs use it as a supportive tool in processes of identity formation. The provincial government, eager in making Jakarta believe that the ‘return to the laggai’ is a direct expression of the popular will of the Mentawaians and, thus, prove that it can handle issues of ethnic diversity within the province by itself. The local government in the Mentawai Archipelago itself seems to have little or no interest in the developments around the laggai. The review of draft versions of legislation has met with serious delay not least because of the slack behaviour of local government officials. Only recently have they openly stated that they do not consider the ‘return to the laggai’ to be in their interest. The ‘return to the laggai’ is seen as just one more burden on the newly constituted but already problematic governance of bakupapen (district) Republikan Mentawai, created in 1999. The local communities, on their part, feel generally left out when it comes to negotiations regarding the ‘return to the laggai’. Due to various practical obstructums, these communities are informed either slightly or not at all. As a result they feel that the return to the laggai is a process in which their role is at best that of the spectator.

Section 24 of the provincial regulation No. 4/2000 on the reintroduction of the nagari grants the Mentawaians the opportunity to draft their own regulations with regard to the restructuring of the local government on the basis of their significantly different adat and culture. Although this statement may seem only logical, this was in fact one of the first times that the different status of the Mentawaians had been officially recognized in neutral terms. That is to say, in earlier days the different Mentawai adat, culture, and religion had always been talked about in negative terms, as a backward and pagan lifestyle that had to be either changed or erased (Persoon 1994). Thus the statement published in section 24 of the above-mentioned provincial regulation was interpreted as a public acknowledgement of the different, yet equal, status of the Mentawaians within the province of West Sumatra.

In accordance with this legislation, an advisory team of 23 people consisting of civil servants, intellectuals, and academicians, several of whom were Mentawaians, was created. This team had to investigate the wishes of the local communities and was also responsible for drawing up the regulations which would eventually lead to a return to the laggai. It was a local NGO, Yayasan Citra Mandiri (YCM), known as a strong protagonist of the laggai structure, which facilitated five meetings with local communities in the first three months of 2001. The team experienced several problems while compiling the successful draft version. According to the advisory team local communities had forgotten about the laggai. Moreover, this loss of cultural knowledge could be blamed upon the Indonesian government, which had been actively suppressing the local culture of the Mentawaians since the 1970s. In the team’s recommendations, the government was, therefore, cited as being responsible for re-educating the local communities about the laggai system. It also turned out to be rather problematic to overcome all differences in the various local understandings of laggai and opinions on what the system should look like in the future. On the southern Mentawai islands of Sipora and the Pagai Islands the word laggai refers to a settlement, but on the Island of Siberut the word laggai knows a variety of different meanings, none of which refer to a settlement in the sense understood on the southern Mentawai Islands. The process of ‘returning to the laggai’ is technically speaking an impossible process, for – at least on Siberut – there has never been a laggai.

Apart from the confusion with regard to the terminology, the structure of the settlements on the different islands tends to differ significantly due to different initial settlement patterns. Things have also been complicated through both spontaneous and forced (re)settlement projects, instigated by the Indonesian government. Thanks to these different and shifting settlement patterns it is now extremely difficult to delimit the borders of the laggai. Whether it should be composed on the basis of the initial stretches of ancestral land, or whether it should be based on the territory of the village, is a highly debated issue all the more so because the very access to political power is at stake here.

Negotiations about the return to the laggai are characterized by bottom-up rhetoric in which the revitalization of adat is made into an important feature of local autonomy. The choice for adat as a central notion within these developments is not a random one: in national as well as international public discourse it is considered to be something that originates from below, which means that the revitalizing of adat is a symbolically powerful factor in the quest for bottom-up strategies. That the return to the laggai will automatically lead to adat enjoying a more important role is, however, not all that certain. Neither is the revitalization of adat an automatic guarantor that democratization, in the Western understanding, will follow.

References


Myrna Eindhoven, MA, is currently working at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research where she is conducting PhD research. Her research, which is part of the research programme ‘Transnational Society, Media and Citizenship: the Capacity of the State to Control Information and Communication: the Gulf Area and Indonesia’, describes and analyses manifestations of Mentawai activism, its relationship to the postcolonial state, and its strategic use of information.

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1 The nagari is a typical Minangkabau form of local government, which was operative in West Sumatra until 1945. It was at that time the Indonesian government – in an attempt to create uniformity in the abundant variety of local forms of government – introduced the desa (village) government system (Persoon 1994: 227).

2 The use of the word laggai in the context under discussion is based on the use and meaning of the word as it is understood on the southern Mentawai Islands of Sipora and the Pagai Islands, where it refers to a ‘settlement’.

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The IIAS offers excellent senior scholars the opportunity to do research in the Netherlands.

### Regions

1. **Research fellows**
   - Ahmed Safi (Indonesia)
   - Dr. RHEE Sang Jik (Korea)
   - Prof. Sheldon Pollock (Canada)
   - Dr. YI Jianping (China)
   - Dr. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh (Iran)
   - Dr. Margaret Sleeboom (Australia)
   - Dr. Zhongyi Zhen (China)

2. **Professorial fellows**
   - Dr. YANG Shu-yuan (Taiwan)
   - Prof. Ben White (UK)
   - Prof. SHEN Yang (China)
   - Prof. Zohra Ibrahim (the Netherlands)
   - Dr. Andi Faisal Bakti (Indonesia)
   - Dr. Alex McKay (UK)
   - Dr. Keat Gin Ooi (Singapore)

3. **Senior visiting fellows**
   - Dr. Japar van Buijschot (Netherlands)
   - Dr. Moch Nur Ichwan (Indonesia)
   - Dr. Dr. Jaya Tan (Australia)
   - Dr. Noorhaidi, MA (Malaysia)
   - Dr. Dr. Ali Mahdavi (Iran)
   - Dr. Lalla Benteined Boudjellal (Algeria)
   - Dr. Dr. Toshio Iguchi (Japan)

4. **Visiting exchange fellows**
   - Prof. HAMID ALI ( Israel)
   - Prof. Dr. Zalakati (Malaysia)
   - Dr. Riem-Binti Jusri (Malaysia)
   - Prof. Bita Guven Hekimoglu (Turkey)
   - Prof. Dr. Tarek Fahmy (Egypt)
   - Dr. dr. Jianfeng Gu (China)

### Categories of fellows

- Affiliated fellows
- Senior visiting fellows
- PhD students within the framework of the KNAW programme
- Visiting exchange fellows
Rethinking Geopolitics in Central Eurasia

Geopolitics in Central Eurasia (CEA) is today a more contentious issue than ever. Organized crime, ethno-religious conflict, environmental degradation, civil wars, and border disputes reflect the region’s instability. At the same time, Central Eurasia has huge land, water, and gas resources – the production and export of which are crucial to the region’s economic and political development. The following key questions were addressed at the ICAS3 panel: (1) How should we conceptualize geopolitics as an approach to studying international relations in the post-Cold War period? (2) What is the nature of geopolitics as practiced by both state and non-state actors in the region? (3) What are the possibilities for and impediments to political stability and sustainable economic development in the countries of Central Eurasia?

Dealing with Socio-Genetic Marginalization in Asia

Few will dispute that new genetic technologies will become very useful in the prediction of disease and diagnostics. Nonetheless, the health and position of some social groups and individuals may be adversely affected when genetic information is applied in any social context. One concept of socio-genetic marginalization is the tendency to relate the social to the (assumed) genetic make-up of people and bring out its consequences. Certain groups and individuals may find themselves isolated as a consequence of discrimination on the basis of genetic information, and suffer the psychological burden of the knowledge, feelings of social inaptitude, and a sense of financial uncertainty.

DURING our ICAS3 meeting we explored the ways in which government/state policies affect the fate of the socio-genetically marginal, and the role that researchers play in the process of developing and applying the fruits of genomics. According to TSAI Dujian (National Yang Ming University, Taiwan), consensus building can have a mediating role in Taiwanese genomic policy. So-called ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci) ought to provide a challenge to the one-dimensional logic of technocratic policy. So-called ‘organic intellectuals’ have low levels of both political awareness and independent, liberty, and can help re-shape current socio-economic positions of the region.

By Matthew Phillips

Report

Central Asia

19-22 August 2003
Singapore

Debating Global Genomics

By Margaret Sleenboom

Few will dispute that new genetic technologies will become very useful in the prediction of disease and diagnostics. Nonetheless, the health and position of some social groups and individuals may be adversely affected when genetic information is applied in any social context. One concept of socio-genetic marginalization is the tendency to relate the social to the (assumed) genetic make-up of people and bring out its consequences. Certain groups and individuals may find themselves isolated as a consequence of discrimination on the basis of genetic information, and suffer the psychological burden of the knowledge, feelings of social inaptitude, and a sense of financial uncertainty.

By Matthew Phillips

Report

Central Asia

19-22 August 2003
Singapore

Debating Global Genomics

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DURING our ICAS3 meeting we explored the ways in which government/state policies affect the fate of the socio-genetically marginal, and the role that researchers play in the process of developing and applying the fruits of genomics. According to TSAI Dujian (National Yang Ming University, Taiwan), consensus building can have a mediating role in Taiwanese genomic policy. So-called ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci) ought to provide a challenge to the one-dimensional logic of technocratic policy. So-called ‘organic intellectuals’ have low levels of both political awareness and independent, liberty, and can help re-shape current socio-economic positions of the region.

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Transnational Exchanges

Business Relations and Identity Formation Emanating from Asia

Recent literature on processes of globalization identifies the emergence of transnational social spaces as ‘social realities and entities that grow up either from the grassroots by international migration or through a complex top-down and bottom-up process brought about by international business companies.’ The concept of transnational social spaces emerge as a result of the growing and differentiating migration movements and of substantial changes in the activities of international business companies. Or in other words, the development of international business networks generates transnational spaces. This particular condition of specific culturally and ethnically defined national business companies. Or in other words, the development of international business networks generates transnational spaces. This particular condition of specific culturally and ethnically defined entities when operating in transnational business networks and can also be predominant in transactions between different parts of Afro-Eurasia during the past centuries. Cross-border transactions have a long history, stretching back beyond the past millennium into prehistoric times if we refer to Eurasian interaction. World historians André Gunder Frank and Barry Gills argue in their book, The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (1993) that Europe, Asia, and Africa were part of a single world-system as early as 2000 BC. A historical dimension not only confirms the processes of global and regional integration that have been ongoing, but also supplies a sound historical empirical basis to the recent debates on the rationality of business coalitions and exchanges in transnational space. The workshop raised questions addressing continuity and change in transnational relations, such as: To what extent do these relations differ if pre/post-colonial and colonial conditions are compared? What kind of factors and relationships emerge as recurring or stable? What processes can be identified in transnational business relations and practices? What role does the nation-state play in either facilitating or hampering transnational exchanges? What underlying mechanisms of loyalty and commitment can be identified in transnational exchanges? How does cultural affinity relate to political and economic interests?

The papers were grouped around historical eras, starting in colonial times and moving down to de-colonization and the post-colonial, and into the twenty-first century. A number of papers by (business) historians focused on transnational formations in trade and business networks emanating from the Straits and the identity politics affecting both existing business partnerships and new cooperative ventures.

The workshop also supplies a sound historical empirical basis to the recent debates on the rationality of business coalitions and exchanges in transnational space. The workshop raised questions addressing continuity and change in transnational relations, such as: To what extent do these relations differ if pre/post-colonial and colonial conditions are compared? What kind of factors and relationships emerge as recurring or stable? What processes can be identified in transnational business relations and practices? What role does the nation-state play in either facilitating or hampering transnational exchanges? What underlying mechanisms of loyalty and commitment can be identified in transnational exchanges? How does cultural affinity relate to political and economic interests?

The complete call for proposals is enclosed as an insert to this issue. Deadline for submission: 1 March 2004. Participants should come predominantly but not exclusively from ASEM countries with Asian and European participation.

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Asia and South Africa: A Missing Link of Nearly Seven Million Words

The significance of the Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) archives for research on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was fully acknowledged earlier this year when the organization’s complete archives, including the relevant archives held at the Cape Town Archives Repository, were incorporated into the Memory of the World list of UNESCO, the cultural branch of the United Nations. The Resolutions of the Council of Policy of the VOC, covering the whole period of Dutch occupation of the Cape colony from 1651 to 1795, are presently being digitized by two TANAP (Toward A New Age of Partnership) teams in Cape Town.

The work involved in the digitizing project was carried out in two phases by a team of two computer experts and two proofreaders. Firstly, the 121 already published volumes were scanned, digitized in Word, proofread, corrected and finally converted into XML format. Secondly, of the 121 volumes concerning the transcription project, 75 volumes which were initially transcribed in Word had to be converted into XML format. (The remaining 35 volumes of the transcription project are transcribed directly in XML format.) At present, ships’ names and geographical names are two of the encoded text types. Once the encoding has been done, searches may be executed on the Internet and all the encoded information covering these subjects may be extracted. When the information has been converted into XML as data, it can be made available, for instance, in either printed or electronic format.

The publication of the massive quantity of information contained within these 231 volumes will not only be of interest to historians, sociologists, and anthropologists, but also expected to capture the attention of linguists as it offers examples of Asian influence on the development of the Afrikaans language. A number of words from Malay origin entered the vocabulary of the inhabitants of the colonized regions of the Cape. Some words were part of the standard trade jargon, referring to beautiful and exotic fabrics, while other words referred to social behavior. Words like pikol (Afrikaans), combau, hadjou, pilier, and hokkien (from eastern Indonesia, Afrikaans, to quarr or fight) were eventually incorporated into Afrikaans.

For geographers and ecomonomists the resolutions offer an extremely rich source for place-name research, including the names of rivers, rivers, mountains, and towns, being either of Dutch or indigenous origin. The fact that the texts also include a large number of personal names of VOC employees, casual visitors, freemen and their familiies, high-profile Easterners banned from their countries, and slaves and their families, should be of great importance to genealogical research. Those interested in maritime history can find many ships’ names, reconstruct sea routes, locate shipwrecks, and much more besides. After the completion of the digitization process, the digital information collected can be used in various ways.

The interdisciplinarity of the ASEF-Alliance sponsored workshop ‘Transnation- al Exchanges: Business Networks and Identity Formation in Nine- teenth and Twentieth Century Asia and Europe’ was organized as a joint activity of the Free University, Amsterdam and the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. The papers presented at the workshop will be published in an edited volume and a special issue of a business journal. The abstracts are available at www.asia-alliance.org.
When commissioned research is not in itself unusual, it raises the question of how to safeguard the independence of inquiry, especially when moral, political or newlyworn interests are at stake. As the party placing the commission and other parties involved may have interests in the outcome of the inquiry, attempts to intervene in the inquiry are not inconceivable. While this is inadmissible in light of the independent nature of the inquiry, neither is it possible to cut off contact with the commissioning party: a good working relationship can be crucial to the research. In contrast to the humanities departments of most universities, the NIOD often faces these dilemmas in its research assignments.

By Hans Blom

From the outset, commissioned research has been at the heart of the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), itself founded by Royal Decree in 1947. The Dutch government commissioned the 16-volume history on the Netherlands in the Second World War by NIOD’s former director L. de Jong, the Weinek inquiry and, more recently, the Srebrenica report. Today’s NIOD research programme ‘Indonesia across Orders’ was also commissioned by the Dutch government, and the current historical research programme ‘Japan and the Netherlands’ can likewise be considered commissioned research. Drawn up after consultation with the Japanese embassy in The Hague, the latter project is funded by the Japanese government.

Due to the sensitivities of war history, in particular that of the Second World War, NIOD’s research cannot be carried out in safe academic seclusion. Interest groups and even political squab on NIOD’s threshold, trying to read over the shoulders. This makes it necessary for NIOD and its researchers to reflect on their position vis-à-vis the outside world. The situation — commissioned research eagerly watched by the world of politics, interest groups and the larger public — may seem inimical to independent research, it requires the solid protection of research interests and a careful strategy of dealing with stakeholders.

The NIOD/Rijksmuseum exhibition ‘Dutch, Japanese, Indonesians: The memory of the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies’, exhibited in the Rijksmuseum in 1999 and subsequently shown in Japan, brought to the fore many of these challenges. With the sensitive nature of the topic in mind, the exhibition aimed to present various perspectives to the visitors — many of whom presumably entered the exhibit with one-sided pre-conceptions. The exhibition presented the stories and experiences of individuals, displaying highly personal artefacts and documents. These were presented in the simplified context of national categories: the experiences and memories of Indonesians, Dutch/Europeans, and Japanese.

During the research for the exhibition, contact was sought with the parties involved in various ways. Not surprisingly, the final result was influenced by the often emotional, sometimes most poignant pleas of interest groups to have ‘their’ experience represented in the exhibition. These ranged from specific elements of collective wartime experience (specific internment situations and categories of victims), to the specific elements of collective wartime experience (specific internment situations and categories of victims), to the protection of research interests and a careful strategy of dealing with stakeholders.

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With respect to the content, those responsible for the exhibition showed an awareness of the risks and acted circumspectly in accordance with their own insights. It became clear in their contacts with the parties involved that there would be a lot of resentment, as proved to be the case during the opening and afterwards. At the risk of generalizing — as there was of course a whole spectrum of reactions — the Indonesian groups were often disappointed at what they felt to be insufficient attention paid to the suffering and injustices they had experienced. They expressed their irritation above all in individual interviews and, occasionally, in the media.

Japanese grievances mainly concerned the way the emperor had been portrayed as well as a perceived trivialization of three hundred years of Dutch colonial oppression in comparison to which the three years of Japanese occupation paled to near insignificance. In spite of many explanatory discussions during the initial stage of the project, the result were negative media coverage in Japan and the Japanese government’s refusal to allow the ambassador to be presented with a copy of the conference and exhibition publication at the opening conference.

Furthermore, the commitment made to assist in making the exhibition accessible to the public in prestigious locations in Japan went unrequited. As a result, a vastly reduced version of the exhibit was shown on panels in a few small, relatively remote locations in Indonesia. Interestingly enough, the fewest problems came from Indonesia, which had many other pressing problems on its mind at the time. As a result the exhibition was not present-
The Impacts of Space Technology in Southeast Asia

Many in the world of politics, academia, and media today consider space technology to be a high-tech engine for economic growth. Unsurprisingly then, numerous Asian nations have recently embraced new developments of space technology to prove the applications in a plethora of fields, prominent among which are: telecommunications, meteorology, and research as well as exploitation of environmental resources. Certain recently initiated and innovative applications in the fields of health and telemedicine, distance education, crime prevention, disaster monitoring and poverty mitigation (e.g., food and agriculture planning and production), benefit potential revolutionary effects for these Asian nations. Turning our eye to the developing nations of Southeast Asia, a number of them have adopted programmes by which they actively pursue the increased application of space technologies in their economies. Simultaneously, they seek to acquire their own capabilities, by means of small satellite developments and technology transfer. These satellite technologies and operations, as well as their impact on Southeast Asian communities, culture, and commerce, are the focal points of the symposium ‘Space Technology Developments in Southeast Asia and its Impact on Culture, Commerce, and Communities’. This meeting will provide opportunities for academics and professionals to interact outside their own specialist disciplines and to discuss and share information and knowledge to solve common problems of sustainable economic growth. We warmly welcome abstracts from space engineers and scientists, sociologists, rural and urban planners, economists, political scientists, legal experts, educators, and satellite service providers (telecommunications, earth observations, meteorologists). The deadline for the submission of abstracts is mid-February 2004.

Contact and proposals:
Dr Randolph Kluver
tokluver@ndu.edu.sg
http://oase.uu.kmn.nl/~jankow/elections/proposal%20ASEF.htm

The Internet and Elections in Asia and Europe

The histories of Europe and Asia are studied with conspiracies and rumours of conspiracy. The idea of powerful forces working behind the scenes to shape events and to conceal their power from the public has deep roots both in historical evidence and in popular imagination. From the Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Europe to the lie of Lin Biao in China and the Gestapo coup in Indonesia, the combination of fragmentary information, political interest, and fertile imagination have given rise to a vast range of conspiracy theories. This conference will examine conspiracies, real and imagined, along with the lies and propaganda, used on the one hand to conceal reality and on the other to create suspicion and mistrust. Prophetic contributions are invited on relevant topics including:
- specific and/or comparative studies of the conduct and effects of conspiracies in Europe and/or Asia (including Australia)
- efforts to create the suspicion of conspiracies where none existed
- the public and media appetite for conspiracy theories
- the historiographical treatment of conspiracies

Note that proposed titles with 200-400 word abstract should be submitted by 14 December 2003.

Contact and proposals:
Dr Robert Cribb
robert.cribb@anu.edu.au

Orality and Improvisation in East Asian Music

The Impacts of Space Technology in Southeast Asia

The year 2006 might very well be the 300th anniversary of the death of Tshangs-dbyangs rGya-mtsho, the Sixth Dalai Lama. And then again it might not. As with many enigmas, some of us think we know things that others know we do not; some of us boldly comment upon texts about whose provenance we are not, and others led by Chen Xiaolu. We urge conference participants to bring their own musical instruments for spontaneous music making in the leisure hours in-between conference sessions, or indeed, for illustrating points made in their papers. Abstracts of up to 500 words for individual papers related to the theme of ‘Orality and Improvisation in East Asian Music’ are welcomed and should be sent in before 1 March 2004.

Contact and proposals:
CRIME European Foundation For Chinese Music Research
Programme Committee of the Ninth CRIME Meeting
crime@uoa.gr
http://home.uoa.gr/~crime
December 2003

21-23 November 2003
Stockholm, Sweden

"New perspectives in European governance"
AUF-Asia Alliance workshop
Conveners: Dr Magnus Fiskesjö, Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Sweden and Lyne M. Ching, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China
Information: magnus.fiskesjo@ostasiatiska.se

21-24 November 2003
Auckland, New Zealand

"Musics, Gender, Meaning, and Metaphor"
ABN Sixth Workshop and Seminar
Indira Gandhi Centre for Arts
Contact: Dr Madhu Khanna, coordinator
Madhu@nus.edu.sg

26 November 2003
Hong Kong, China

"Urbanisation and Non-Agricultural Land Use in Past Reform China"
The University of Hong Kong Centre for Planning and Environmental Management (CUPEM)
Information: cupem@hkusua.hku.hk

27-28 November 2003
Canberra, Australia

Vietnam Update 2003
Australia National University Conveners: Prof. Philip Taylor, Prof. Ben Kellett, Prof. David Marr

28 November 2003
Singapore

Asian Political & International Studies Association
Co-chairs: Lee Lai To (National University of Singapore) and Amitav Adharya (DSY, Nanyang technological university)
Information: www.apisa.org

28-30 November 2003
Matare, Sri Lanka

"Sri Lanka’s coastalways: Continuity and change."
Ninth International Conference on Sri Lanka Studies
Contact: Prof. Sarah Amarasinge, University of Ruhuna, coordinator sarahamarasinge@hotmail.com

23 December 2003
Berlin, Germany

"Language, identity and culture: East-West perspectives"
The Society of Indian Philosophy & Religion
Contact: Dr Chandana Chakraborti chakrabarti@elon.edu

December 2004

5-7 January 2004
Hong Kong, China

Information: www.anu.edu.au.sg/ 0409258517@intranet.interactions.htm
Contact: Michelle L. Montanaro, convenor
michelle@anu.edu.sg

11-14 February 2004
Bonn, Germany

"Theatre of a theme: The stage and the middle classes – comparative perspectives"
Information: fms@uni-bonn.de

11-14 February 2004
Bonn, Germany

Theatre of a theme: The stage and the middle classes – comparative perspectives
Information: fms@uni-bonn.de

15-17 January 2004
Penang, Malaysia

SEASCON conference 2004

16-17 January 2004
Bonn, Germany

"The art of interpretation: Poetry of the Indic civilisation"
19 International conference on religions of India
Contact: Madhu Kishwar, convenor
madhuk@dcs.deloitte.com

16-18 January 2004
Singapore

National South Asian Law Student Association Convenor: Prof. Singapore Law
Sponsored by IIAS

16-18 January 2004
Seattle (WA) United States

"Breaking barriers and building bridges: Human rights and the law in South Asia,"
National South Asian Law Student Association Conference 2004
Contact: Regina Paulos paul@seattleu.edu

16-17 February 2004
Sambalpur, India

Second Biennial Conference of the Indian Association for Asian studies
Information: ftp://aol.nl.net.in/sec-main.htm

29-31 January 2004
Sambalpur, India

Second Biennial Conference of the Indian Association for Asian studies
Information: ftp://aol.nl.net.in/sec-main.htm

February 2004

5-7 February 2004
Singapore

Workshop on ethnic interactions in the making of Southern Thailand/Netherlands Malaysia
Sponsored by IIAS